08.01.2012
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See Explanatory Note
См. Инструкцию
(Version russe)
COUR EUROPEENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
Conseil de l'Europe - Council of Europe
Strasbourg, France - Страсбург, Франция
REQUETE
APPLICATION
ЖАЛОБА
presentee en application de l'article 34 de la Convention europeenne
des Droits de l'Homme,
ainsi que des articles 45 et 47 du Reglement de la Cour
under Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights
and Rules 45 and 47 of the Rules of Court
в соответствии со статьей 34 Европейской Конвенции по правам человека
и статьями 45 и 47 Регламента Суда
Table of Contents
I. The Parties 4
(1) The Applicant 4
(2) The High Contracting Party 4
II. Summary 5
III. Statement of the Facts 6
IV. Statement of the alleged violations of the Convention and/or
Protocols and of relevant arguments 8
(1) VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY 8
THE LAW 8
APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE CASE 10
1) Interference with the right to property 10
2) The rule applying to the case and the requirement of legitimate
objective 11
3) Fair balance and the principle of legal certainty 11
(2) VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO NON-DISCRIMINATION IN CONJUNCTION WITH
THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY 11
THE LAW 11
APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE CASE 12
1) The difference of treatment between tax residents and non residents
12
2) Aim of the measure 13
3) No proportionality between the aim sought and the means employed 14
(3) VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 14
THE LAW 14
1) Notion of "criminal charge" in the case law of the European Court
14
2) Application of the notion of `criminal charge' to X v. Russia
17
APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE CASE 19
1) The requirement to give reasons and consider the arguments of the
parties under Article 6 of the Convention 19
2) Violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention in the present case 21
V. Admissibility of the case regarding Article 35, 3 B 24
THE LAW 24
APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE CASE 26
VI. Statement relative to 35 S: 1 of the Convention 28
VII. Statement of the object of the application 28
VIII. Statement concerning other international proceedings 29
IX. List of documents 29
X. Declaration and signature 29
I. The Parties
1. The Applicant
..........................
1. The High Contracting Party
The Russian Federation is a contracting party to the European
Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
(hereinafter: the Convention) since 5 may 1998.
I. Summary
CASE OF X V. RUSSIA
The applicant X is a citizen of the Russian Federation who
had been enrolled in a course of study in the United Kingdom. He
returned to Russia in April 2008 in order to deliver a course of
lectures in the Ural Institute of Economics, Management, and Law. In
calculating the wage for the course that he taught, a 30 percent
income tax was withheld, with reference to Article 224, section 3 of
the Tax Code of the Russian Federation. According to this disposition,
the rate of taxation applied to all income of natural persons who are
not tax residents of the Russian Federation is set at the amount of 30
percent, while the income tax rate applicable to resident citizens of
the Russian Federation under section 1 of the same article is 13
percent. On October 29^th 2010, the applicant filed a complaint before
the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation because of the
uncertainty related to the compliance with the Constitution of the
Russian Federation. On July 14^th 2011, the Constitutional Court of
the Russian Federation ruled in its judgement that there was no
violation of the applicant's constitutional rights.
In this case, the applicant claims that:
(1) The 30 per cent tax rate applied to the income he earned in Russia
amounts to an unjustified and abusive interference in his right to use
of property and therefore constitutes a breach of article 1 of
Protocol 1 of the Convention.
(2) This interference is discriminatory and violates article 14 of the
Convention and the right to non discrimination because the difference
of treatment between tax residents and non residents, both Russian
citizens, is not justified and does not follow a legitimate aim.
(3) The failure of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
to mention the Convention and the disregarding of the allegations of
violations of it in its judgment of July 14^th 2011 results in a
breach of Article 6(1) of the Convention, since the Constitutional
Court of the Russian Federation has to give reasons and consider the
arguments of the parties, in accordance with its commitment under the
Convention.
II. Statement of the Facts
1. The applicant is a citizen of the Russian Federation and his place
of permanent residence is Russia. From October 1^st 2005 to July
18^th 2009, the applicant was enrolled in a course of study in the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
2. The applicant returned to Russia in April 2008 for the purpose of
delivering a course of lectures in the Ural Institute of
Economics, Management, and Law. In calculating the wage for the
course that he taught, a 30 percent income tax was withheld, with
reference to Article 224, section 3 of the Tax Code of the Russian
Federation (hereinafter: the tax measure).
Article 224(3) :3. The tax rate shall be fixed in the amount of 30 per
cent with respect to all incomes received by natural persons who are
not tax residents of the Russian Federation (...)>>
3. According to the aforementioned rule, the rate of taxation applied
to all income of natural persons who are not tax residents of the
Russian Federation is set at the amount of 30 percent, while the
income tax rate applicable to resident citizens of the Russian
Federation under section 1 of the same article is 13 percent.
4. On October 29^th 2010, the applicant filed a complaint before the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation contesting the
constitutionality of the words "in the amount of 30 percent" in
Article 224, section 3 of the Tax Code, as applied to non-resident
citizens of the Russian Federation. The applicant submits that the
tax measure as a violation of his right to use of property and
discrimination on the basis of the place of residence, rights
guaranteed under articles 15(1), 19, 35(2), 55 (2,3) of the
Constitution of the Russian Federation.
5. The applicant also submits that the tax measure as applied to
nonresident citizens of the Russian Federation constitute a
violation of his right to use of property and discrimination
against him on the basis of his place of residence, guaranteed
under Article 1 of the Protocol 1 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter:
the Convention) and Article 14 of the Convention. In addition to
that, the decision of the Constitutional Court violates the
applicant's right to a fair trial (Article 6 of the Convention)
since the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation omitted
and/or neglected to mention the Convention and ignored his
allegations of violations of it in its judgment, which deprived
the applicant of the full support of the law and the Convention.
6. On 14 July 2011, the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation ruled in its judgement that there was no violation of
the applicant's constitutional rights, failing to analyse and
consider the arguments of applicants regarding the Convention.
I. Statement of th e al leged vi olations of th e Convention and/or
Protocols and of relevant arguments
7. The applicant claims that:
1. The 30 per cent tax rate applied to the income he earned in Russia
amounts to an interference with his right to use of property and
therefore constitutes a breach of article 1 of Protocol 1 of the
Convention;
2. This interference is discriminatory and violates article 14 of the
Convention and the right to non discrimination;
3. The failure of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
to consider and analyse the arguments of applicant relying on the
Convention and the disregarding of the allegations of violations
of it in its judgment of July 14^th 2011 amount to a violation of
Article 6(1) of the Convention (the right to a fair trial).
(1) VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY
THE LAW
8. Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides that:
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment
of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except
in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by
law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control
the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."
9. In its case law, the Court has developed a methodology to evaluate
whether there has been a violation of the right to property as
protected by Article 1 of Protocol 1. There are six steps to
follow to determine whether a violation of the right to property
has occurred.
10. First, the existence of a right to property on the good in dispute
must be demonstrated.
11. Second, the Court determines whether there has been interference
in the right to property of an applicant.
12. Third, the Court must decide under which of the three rules
provided by the case of Sporrong and Loennroth v. Sweden^ the
interference has occurred:
The first rule, which is of a general nature, enounces the principle
of peaceful enjoyment of property; it is set out in the first sentence
of the first paragraph. The second rule covers deprivation of
possessions and subjects it to certain conditions; it appears in the
second sentence of the same paragraph. The third rule recognises that
the States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of
property in accordance with the general interest, by enforcing such
laws as they deem necessary for the purpose; it is contained in the
second paragraph.
Following the decision in Svenskamanagementgruppen AB. v. Sweden^,
cases related to taxation fall under the third rule and the second
paragraph of article 1 that <>
13. Fourth, the Court seeks to find out if the interference serves a
legitimate objective. The legitimacy of the aim is being regarded
in the light of the "general'' or public interest^. Regarding the
second paragraph of article 1 of Protocol 1, the State has a
margin of appreciation to secure the payment of taxes, but this
margin is not absolute:
The Court, finding it natural that the margin of appreciation
available to the legislature in implementing social and economic
policies should be a wide one, will respect the legislature's judgment
as to what is "in the public interest" unless that judgment be
manifestly without reasonable foundation. In other words, although the
Court cannot substitute its own assessment for that of the national
authorities, it is bound to review the contested measures under
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) and, in so doing, to make an
inquiry into the facts with reference to which the national
authorities acted.^
14. Then, the Court looks at the proportionality of the interference
by evaluating "whether a fair balance was struck between the
demands of the general interest of the community and the
requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental
rights".^
15. Finally, the Court observes the lawfulness and legality of the
interference in the light of the principle of legal certainty.^
APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE CASE
1. Interference with the right to property
16. Following the meth odology deve loped by t he Cour t's case law
regarding the right to property, the examination of the statement
of income of the applicant contained in the attachments attests
the applicant's right to property on the good in dispute; in this
case, 17 per cent of the salary of 2000 roubles he earned from
delivering a course of lectures at the Ural Institute of Economics
in April 2008. The applicant submits that the 30 per cent tax rate
applied to the 2000 roubles earned from the course of lectures he
delivered constitutes an interference with his right to property,
his personal income.
1. The rule applying to the case and the requirement of legitimate
objective
17. The ap plicant al so su bmits th at th is withholding, pursuant to
section 3 of article 224 of the Russian Tax Code, falls under the
third rule contained in the first paragraph of article 1 of
Protocol 1 to the European Convention because it relates to a
restriction of the use of his duly earned salary and personal
asset. The applicant submits that the taxation of an additional 17
per cent of his wage because of his stay in United Kingdom cannot
be considered as falling under the second paragraph of article 1
of Protocol 1.^ Indeed, the tax measure goes beyond the margin of
appreciation of the State and has no legitimate aim related to the
public interest. In its decision, the Constitutional Court did not
consider nor raise any reasonable aim that could justify the tax
measure in light of the public interest, therefore evidencing a
lack of legitimacy of the measure. Moreover, even though the
Constitutional Court mentioned that the tax measure was justified
on the basis of economic characteristics, it never went further in
its explanation and this reveals a definite problem of legitimacy
of the tax measure.
1. Fair balance and the principle of legal certainty
18. In th e li ght of th e pr eceding as sessments, th e ta x measure
deprives a considerable number of people of the use of 17 per cent
of their income on the sole basis of their place of residence. The
Russian constitutional laws protect the right of property of
Russian citizens, thus the tax measure violates a fundamental
right in Russian law and certainly creates legal contradictions
and uncertainty. On that sole basis there is no need to
demonstrate an absence of fair balance between the demands of the
general interest of the community and the requirements of the
protection of the individual's fundamental rights.
(2) VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO NON-DISCRIMINATION IN CONJUNCTION WITH
THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY
THE LAW
19. Article 14 of the Convention guarantees that
"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex,
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, association with a national minority, property,
birth or other status".
20. The applicant claims that the interference with his right to
property is discriminatory. In its case law, the European Court
established a methodology for assessing whether discrimination has
occurred. In the Belgian Linguistic Case^, the Court has developed
a test and identified which criteria were necessary to prove a
discrimination claim. First, the difference of treatment is a
breach of article 14 when "the distinction has no objective and
reasonable justification". In order to establish this, it must be
determined that the aim is not legitimate. It is also necessary to
prove that there is "no reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised".
APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE CASE
1. The difference of treatment between tax residents and non
residents
21. The applicant alleges that the tax measure creates a difference of
treatment between tax residents and non residents that amounts to
discrimination on the basis of the place of residence. The list of
grounds for discrimination enumerated in article 14 of the
Convention is not exhaustive. This is particularly apparent from
the words "or other status." Discrimination on the basis of place
of residence amounts to discrimination on the basis of such "other
status." (See Carson and others v. The United Kingdom and Darby v.
Sweden^).
22. Furthermore, the notion of discrimination within the meaning of
Article 14 (art. 14) generally implies cases where a person or
group is treated, without proper justification, less favourably
than another, even though the more favourable treatment is not
called for by the Convention (Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v.
the United Kingdom^).
23. In this case, the difference of treatment is not justified because
both residents and non residents can be regarded as being in an
analogous situation. Indeed, they are all citizens of the Russian
Federation, who have to pay taxes when they work in their country.
There is no denying that States have a right to taxation, as
guaranteed by article 1 paragraph 2 of Protocol 1 and that they
enjoy a margin of appreciation in this matter (see Gasus v. the
Netherlands^). However, this margin of appreciation is not
unlimited. Discretion is applicable only for the purpose of
ensuring that taxpayers comply with their obligations. In
particular, the legislature cannot establish discriminatory
conditions (e.g. permanent residence in the Russian Federation)
that impinge upon taxpayers' constitutional rights (e.g. property
rights). Without reasonable and proper justification, this
discrimination is arbitrary.
1. Aim of the measure
24. As it was submitted above, an acceptable difference of treatment
must be objective, justified and must pursue a legitimate aim. In
this case, the difference of treatment between tax residents and
non residents is based on the fact that the latter spend more than
183 days outside of the Russian Federation. The Constitutional
Court provided no further explanation as to why the tax rate is
doubled for non residents taxpayers. The Constitutional Court only
stated that the tax measure is justified and based on an objective
criterion "characterizing a natural person's connection with the
tax jurisdiction of the Russian Federation". According to the
applicant, this argument is not sufficient to justify the
difference of treatment. The criterion of differentiation is based
on the place of residence, and not on an economic criterion. It
seems that this is an arbitrary determination of the tax rates
that does not take into consideration the financial situation of
each individual. The applicant also submits that public interest
demands effective tax administration for which the enactment of
unjust laws is unacceptable.
1. No proportionality between the aim sought and the means employed
25. As the Court established in the Belgian Linguistic Case, "Article
14 is likewise violated when it is clearly established that there
is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means
employed and the aim sought to be realised^". As it has been
established above, there is no legitimate aim or reasonable
justification to such a major difference of treatment between
Russian nationals who are tax residents and those who are non
residents according the tax measure. The State failed to support
and justify a measure that inflicts an additional financial strain
on non residents. Besides, even if the impugned legislation
followed a legitimate aim, which it does not, a law that
disproportionately restricts the basic rights of the individual
and property rights on the basis of temporary place of residence
should be considered unjust. Given all these considerations, it
cannot be stated that the means employed by the State meet the
principle of proportionality.
(3) VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
THE LAW
26. Article 6 of the Convention guarantees that
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing [...]" (emphasis added)
1. Notion of "criminal charge" in the case law of the European Court
1. Article 6(1) of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair
trial for everyone charged with a criminal offense. In its case
law, the European Court has defined the terms of "criminal
offense" and "criminal charge" in a broader approach than the
proceedings defined as "criminal" in the Contracting States. Thus,
"the indications furnished by the domestic law of the respondent
State have only a relative value,"^ when determining whether or
not an offence should be considered as criminal in its nature,
since it is an autonomous concept under the Convention.
2. The European Court will first treat the charge as `criminal' if
the national law of the Contracting States defines the charge as
such^. Since tax differentiation is part of the Russian fiscal
regime, the situation does not comply with the first criterion,
which is the classification as a criminal offense in national law.
Thus, the European Court will examine the consequences of the
procedure in question based on two alternative criteria^: the
nature of the offense and the degree of severity of the penalty.
3. In evaluating the nature of the offense, several factors, amongst
others, can be taken into account, such as:
* The generally binding character of the legal rule as opposed to
rules addressed to a specific group^.
* The classification of comparable procedures in other Contracting
States in order to evaluate if there is a similar practice^
* The punitive or deterrent purpose of the legal rule^.
30. The nature of the offense is the main criterion examined by the
European Court in order to determine the "criminal" nature of a
charge when the national law does not qualify it as such^, the
European Court will also examine the degree of severity of the
maximum potential penalty, which depends on the circumstances of a
specific case. In Lauko v. Slovakia^, the European Court ruled
that accusing a neighbour of causing a nuisance without
justification, action punishable with a maximum fine of SKK 3,000
(approximately 90EUR) and with an imposed fine of 9EUR, was
"criminal in nature" because of the general, deterrent and
punitive character of the charge. In Weber v. Switzerland^, the
European Court ruled that a fine of 300 Swiss francs for breach of
confidentiality in a judicial proceeding is a "criminal" act.
Furthermore, the fact that sanctions could amount to a small
amount of money does not take away their punitive character.
Indeed, the Court ruled in Ozturk v. Germany that:
There is in fact nothing to suggest that the criminal offence referred
to in the Convention necessarily implies a certain degree of
seriousness. [...] it would be contrary to the object and purpose of
Article 6 [art. 6], which guarantees to "everyone charged with a
criminal offence" the right to a court and to a fair trial, if the
State were allowed to remove from the scope of this Article [art. 6] a
whole category of offences merely on the ground of regarding them as
petty.^
31. In Kadubec v. Slovakia, the European Court supported the Ozturk
decision and ruled that "The relative lack of seriousness of the
penalty at stake cannot deprive an offence of its inherent
criminal character"^, which is also confirmed in Jussila v.
Finland^ (cited, para 32 and 35).
1. Application of the notion of `criminal charge' to X v. Russia
32. Under the current case law, the tax differentiation imposed on the
applicant based on the tax measure shall be classified as
"criminal" under the Convention because of the nature of the
offence and the severity of the maximum potential penalty.
33. In regards to the nature of the offence, the tax differentiation
fulfills the criteria set down by the ECtHR case law for criminal
charges:
34. The Tax code in general, the tax measure as applied in the
applicant's case in particular are of general binding character.
35. This situation can potentially affect the whole population since
all citizens going abroad for more than 183 days will have to pay
30% in taxes of the income earned in the Russian Federation. For
instance, according to a UN Report^, there are about 1-1.5 million
Russians who are working abroad, which can potentially be affected
by this measure. If those workers decide to come back to the
Russian Federation, they will be considered as non-resident for a
six-month period and they will have to pay more than the double in
taxes than Russian citizens who are living on the Russian
territory.
36. The tax surcharges are intended as a punishment to deter
re-offending, which has a chilling effect on the Russian citizens
willing to go abroad.
37. Indeed, tax surcharges are falling within the context of a general
tendency of the Russian Federation to control its citizens'
migration that goes back to the propiska system in place during
the Soviet regime^. This propiska has been settled in order to
plan "the economic development of the country [and to shape]
migration flows''^. Therefore, migration management in the Soviet
period was coordinated with the State interests and contributed to
the limitation of the mobility of the citizens of the USSR^. In
addition to the limitation of internal migration, it is important
to mention that "international migration was an exception rather
than a rule in the Soviet Union. For decades of the Soviet regime
the USSR was a `closed' country where international migration was
strictly limited by the State"^.
38. Despite the fact that the propiska was officially abolished in
1993 with the Federal Law "On the right of citizens of the Russian
Federation to freedom of movement and choice of domicile on the
Territory of the Russian Federation", it is still part of the
system, which has notable effects in terms of enjoyment of human
rights and basic freedoms.
39. The fact that citizens who are going abroad are paying more than
the double in taxes than citizens who are living in Russia
inevitably causes a chilling effect on the Russian citizens
willing to go abroad. Therefore, the Tax Code has the effect of
deterring re-offending, which complies with the criterion of the
penal nature of the measure.
40. In this respect, this case is very similar to Lauko v. Slovakia in
which the ECtHR analyzed the criminal nature of minor offences
under Slovakian law (in that particular case, the minor offence of
unjustified accusation). In Lauko, the Court concluded that the
general character of the legal provision taken together with the
deterrent purpose of the penalty imposed on the applicant showed
that the offence was criminal in nature^.
41. In regards to the severity of the penalty, there is a 17% tax
surcharge imposed on citizens who are not considered as residents
in light of the Tax code, no matter what their income is.
Therefore, there is no specified maximum potential penalty. This
combined with the fact that this situation is potentially
applicable to all Russian citizens, is triggering the severity
threshold^.^
APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE CASE
1. The requirement to give reasons and consider the arguments of the
parties under Article 6 of the Convention
42. The lack of examination of the argument of the defendant regarding
the Convention is a violation of the right to a fair trial,
ensured by Article 6(1). This guarantee is implied in Article
6(1), as it has been recognised by the Court on many occasions.
43. Indeed, it has been recognized that "Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)
obliges the courts to give reasons for their judgments"^.
Furthermore, the European Court ruled in Kraska v. Switzerland^,
that the court was under a duty to "conduct a proper examination
of the submission, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties,
without prejudice to its assessment of whether they are relevant
to its decision". The same reasoning has been reaffirmed in
paragraph 59 of the case of Van de Hurk v. Netherlands^.
44. However, the courts have some discretion when considering
arguments and evidence, since Article 6(1) does not require the
court to give a detailed answer to every argument raised^.
Nevertheless, the court must justify its activities by giving
reasons for its decisions^. This interpretation in confirmed in
Hadjianastassiou v. Greece, in which the European Court declares
that although states enjoy considerable freedom in the workings of
their judiciary system: "the national courts must indicate with
sufficient clarity the grounds on which they based their
decision"^in order to demonstrate that the parties have been
heard^.
45. In addition to that, the European Court mentions that the right to
a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 6(1) of the Convention
includes the parties' right to raise observations they judge
relevant and that this right is not solely theoretical:
La Convention ne visant pas `a garantir des droits theoriques ou
illusoires mais des droits concrets et effectifs. Ce droit ne peut
passer pour effectif que si ces observations sont vraiment
<>, c'est-`a-dire dument examinees par le tribunal saisi.^
46. Therefore, even though the obligation to state reasons will vary
depending on the nature of the decision and the circumstances of
the case, the European Court states that the courts silence could
give rise to doubt on the scope of the examination conducted by
the national court^. Consequently, if a court considers that
certain arguments and/or evidences presented by an applicant have
no merit or are irrelevant to the matter in dispute, it must state
the reason why they are not considered. Moreover, it is important
to note the firmness of the position of the European Court
regarding the implementation of the Convention: "effective
implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights at
national level is crucial for the operation of the Convention
system. In line with its subsidiary character the Convention is
intended to be applied first and foremost by the national courts
and authorities"^. This position has been reaffirmed by the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe since they deemed
that "the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention [must]
be protected in the first place at the national level and applied
by national authorities [...]"^. Therefore, States "[must] give
effect to the Convention in their legal order, in light of the
case-law of the Court"^.
1. Violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention in the present case
1. The aforementioned section presents numerous cases that confirm
the right to a fair trial as stated in Article 6(1) of the
Convention. Therefore, the guarantees underlying Article 6(1) must
be applied before all types of courts, including the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.
2. On October 29^th 2010, the applicant filed a complaint before the
Constitutional Court, in which he specifically mentioned the tax
measure, as applied to non resident citizens of the Russian
Federation, breaches the right to property and the right to equal
treatment, rights guaranteed by Article 1 of the Protocol 1 and
Article 14 of the Convention.
3. Moreover, the applicant used the European Court's case law in
order to validate the allegations of violation of the Convention.
In regards to the right to property, the applicant has put forward
the Sporrong and Loennroth v. Sweden case to illustrate the
principle of fair balance between the interests of society and the
conditions necessary for protection of the fundamental rights of
the individual. Concerning the right to equal treatment, the
applicant explained the extent of the guaranteed right by
referring to the Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United
Kingdom case.
4. In its judgement of July 14^th 2011, the Constitutional Court of
the Russian Federation summarized the allegations of the applicant
and explicitly mentioned that "according to the complainant, the
tax rate of 30 percent to citizens of the Russian Federation who
are not tax residents of the Russian Federation amounts to
discrimination on the basis of place of residence, and causes an
incommensurate restriction on property rights, and therefore
violates [...] the Constitution of the Russian Federation, as well
as article 14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms and article 1 of Protocol 1 to said
Convention" (emphasis added)^ ^.
5. Despite the fact that the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation was aware of the alleged violations, it neglected to
mention the Convention and disregarded applicant's arguments.
Therefore, the Constitutional Court failed to consider the
arguments based on the Convention brought forward by the
applicant, even though they contained additional material
submitted in relation to the petition. This failure to address
these arguments in its decision has resulted in a breach of
Article 6(1) of the Convention.
6. As mentioned in the last section, the European Court has outlined
in its past judgments that the right to be heard does not imply an
obligation of providing a detailed response to every argument^. In
contrast, in this particular case, the Constitutional Court simply
failed to examine the questions regarding the Convention raised by
the applicant even though it was aware of the demand. Hence, this
is not a case where a tribunal has taken the liberty not to
respond in detail to each argument, but rather a case where a
tribunal has chosen to consciously ignore a valid argument and a
fundamental human right violation raised by the applicant. Indeed,
this omission by the Constitutional Court raises an important
issue. The Hiro Balani v. Spain case featured a similar failure.
In that case, the European Commission ruled that the fact that the
Supreme Court had not addressed the petitioner's arguments was a
violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention and added: "that the
silence of the Supreme Court in this matter could give rise to
doubts as to the scope of the examination conducted by that
court^". Such doubts are definitely present in the present case.
The legal process finds much of its legitimacy in the
justification of its judgments, which is absent in the present
case.
7. Finally, in the Gast and Popp v. Germany case, this Court ruled
that "a State which established a constitutional-type court was
under a duty to ensure that litigants enjoyed in the proceedings
before it the fundamental guarantees laid down in Article 6"^. The
requirement to give reasons and to consider the arguments of the
parties is part of the fundamental guarantees set by Article 6. In
this case, the Constitutional Court has not ensured that right to
the applicant since there was no examination of the allegations of
violations of the Convention, which is leading in a breach of
Article 6(1).
IV. Admissibility of the case regarding Article 35, 3 B
THE LAW
54. Paragraph 3 b) of article 35 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides as follows:
"The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application
submitted under Article 34 if it considers that:
...
(b) the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless
respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the
Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the
merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which
has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal."
1. Paragraph 3 of Article 35 of the Convention was recently amended
by Protocol 14, which entered into force on 1^st June 2010, which
sets a new criterion of admissibility regarding applications in
which the disadvantage suffered is not significant. This amendment
aims to relieve the Court's workload considering it is facing a
growing number of applications. Paragraph 3 b) of Article 35
establishes that applications in which the disadvantage suffered
is not significant are inadmissible. Indeed, the Court's case law
established that the violation of a right must achieve a minimum
level of severity to warrant consideration by an international
Court.^ Regarding the pecuniary damages, the significant
disadvantage is established in relation with the importance of the
financial impact on the applicant^ or the importance of the
financial prejudice suffered and its repercussions on the personal
life of the applicant.^ However, the fact that an applicant did
not suffer a great pecuniary loss does not mean that the case is
automatically inadmissible. Indeed, the Court considers that the
pecuniary loss is not the sole criterion to determine whether the
applicant suffered a significant disadvantage or not. In Korolev
v. Russia, the Court ruled that "a violation of the Convention may
concern important questions of principle and thus cause a
significant disadvantage without affecting pecuniary interest".
2. In addition to that, in the case of Finger v. Bulgaria^ which
concerned the length of civil proceedings in Bulgaria, the Court
did not look at the damage suffered by Mrs. Finger, but only
looked at the two provisions following the element of significant
disadvantage contained in article 35, 3b) and observed whether the
State of Bulgaria had complied with the criteria of the respect
for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols
and the due consideration by a domestic tribunal. Regarding Mrs.
Finger's case, the Court ruled that there was no need "to
determine whether she suffered a "significant disadvantage" on
account of their allegedly unreasonable duration, because of the
second and third elements of the new admissibility criterion. The
sentences that follow the criterion of significant disadvantage in
Paragraph 3) are intended to be two safeguard clauses ensuring the
admissibility of applications in which <> and those that have
"not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal". Once the
safeguard clauses apply, it is unnecessary to evaluate whether the
applicant suffered a significant disadvantage and the application
should be admissible.
APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE CASE
57. Following Finger v. Bulgaria, it is not necessary to determine
whether the applicant suffered a significant damage resulting from
the taxation of his income to the amount of 30 percent resulting
from the tax measure since the two safeguard clauses contained in
paragraph 3 b) of article 35 of the Convention apply.
58. Respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the
Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on
the merits. Indeed, there are three problems with the application
of the rule of law and the administration of justice by the
Constitutional Court regarding the present case. First, the
justification given by the Court to dismiss the argument of
discrimination raised by the applicant is clearly insufficient and
does not address any specific justifications and aim for the
differentiated tax rate applicable to non-resident taxpayers. The
tax measure reveals a potential situation of systemic
discrimination in the taxation of people who leave Russia for more
than 183 consecutive calendar days.^.
59. Second, the President of the Court, Valery Zorkin and the acting
speaker of the Federation Council, Aleksandr Torshin made worrying
statements about the place of the Convention in Russian justice
system. Indeed, those two important Russian figures made public
statements reporting a desire to limit "the right of the European
Court to interfere into the area of Russian jurisdiction"^. In a
doctrinal article, President Zorkin argued that the
Constitutionnal Court, when verifying the constitutionality of a
law, should only use the European Convention and its case law as
an accessory ratio.^ In June 2011, Torshin proposed a "draft bill
stat[ing] that Russian court decisions should be reconsidered
following the European Court of Human Right rulings only if a
specific law was unconstitutional."^
60. Third, there is a major background issue regarding Russia's
attempts to reduce the applications presented before the European
Court as noted by Alexei Trochev in an article presented in the
Legal Research Studies Paper Series of the University of Wisconsin
Law School: "The Kremlin today has made it a priority to stem the
flow of potential complaints to the ECtHR and to do something
about the complaints that already been received by the Court"^.
Considering these three issues relating to the situation of human
rights in Russia, the applicant submits that the first safeguard
clause of article 35, paragraph 3 b) applies. Respect for human
rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto
requires an examination of the application on the merits.
61. In addition, he present case has not been duly considered by a
domestic tribunal, here the Constitutional Court, since the
Constitutional Court declared it inadmissible and refused to
examine it on the merits. IN its decision, the Constitutional
Court sates that it "finds no grounds for accepting [the
applicant's] complaint for trial" and dismissed it "on the grounds
that it does not comply with the requirements of the Federal
Constitutional Law". Moreover, as aforementioned, the
Constitutional Court did not consider the arguments that were
brought before it under the European Convention and this is one of
the "check point[s] raised by the present case"^ as the applicant
submits that his right to a fair trial under article 6 of the
Convention has been violated. Therefore, the second safeguard
clause regarding his case applies and the present application is
admissible.
IV. Statement relative to 35 S: 1 of the Convention
Final decision:
62. According to Article 125 of the Constitution of the Russian
Federation, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation is
competent to rule upon the constitutionality of all applicable
laws. Therefore, when a Russian law contravenes the Convention or
the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitutional
Court must be seized before bringing a case to the Court. This has
been stated in Griшankova and Griшankovs v. Latvia, in which the
Court mentioned that "where the applicant calls into question a
provision of (...) legislation or regulations as being contrary,
as such, to the Convention, and the right relied on is among those
guaranteed by the Latvian Constitution, proceedings should, in
principle, be brought before the Constitutional Court prior to
being brought before the European Court of Human Rights"^.
63. In this case, all internal state means of legal protection have
been exhausted since a petition has been brought before the
Russian Constitutional Court in order to declare unconstitutional
the words "in the amount of 30 percent" in Article 224 of the Tax
code, as applied to non-resident citizens of the Russian
Federation. The petition was dismissed on the basis that the
disputed legal provision doesn't violate the applicant's
constitutional rights.
IV. Statement of the object of the application
64. According to Article 41 of the Convention, the applicant requests
that the Court:
a. declares the State Party in violation of Article 1 of the Protocol
1 to the Convention,
b. declares the State Party in violation of Article 14 of the
Convention,
c. declares the State Party in violation of Article 6 of the
Convention,
d. orders that the State Party refunds the applicant the fees and
expenses of the lawyers in charge of this case.
IV. Statement concerning other international proceedings
65. This case has not been examined by any other international organs.
IV. List of documents
1. The application before the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation dated of October 29^th 2010.
2. Translation into English of the application before the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation dated of October
29^th 2010.
3. The decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
dated of July 14^th 2011.
4. Translation into English of the decision of the Constitutional Court
of the Russian Federation dated of July 14^th 2011.
5. The statement of income of natural person for 2008, from the
accounting department of the Ural Institute of Economics, Management
and Law, indicating the withholding of a 30 percent income tax.
6. The document confirming the presence of the applicant from October
1^st 2005 to July 18^th 2009 in the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, period in which he was enrolled in a course of
study.
IV. Declaration and signature
I hereby declare that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the
information I have given in the present application form is correct.
Place
Date
(Signature of the applicant)
^Case of Sporrong and Loennroth v. Sweden, application no. 7151/75;
7151/75, 23 September 1982, para 61, online,
[2]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=6
95456&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF0
1C1166DEA398649
^Case of Svenskamanagementgruppen AB v. Sweden, application no.
11036/84, 2 December 1985, online,
[3]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=open&documentId=7
92551&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF0
1C1166DEA398649
^Case of James and others v. United Kingdom, application no. 8793/79,
21 February 1986, online,
[4]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=6
70934&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF0
1C1166DEA398649
^Ibid, para 46
^See, mutatis mutandis, the judgement of 23 July 1968 in the "Belgian
Linguistic" case, Series A no. 6, p. 32, para 5, online,
[5]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=6
95402&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF0
1C1166DEA398649
^Case of Iatridis v. Greece, application no. 31107/96, 25 March 1999,
online,
[6]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=6
96104&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF0
1C1166DEA398649
^Case of Svenska Managementgruppen AB v. Sweden, aforecited.
^Case "Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages
in education in Belgium" v. Belgium, Application no 1474/62; 1677/62;
1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64, 9 February 1967, para. 10, online
:
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=6954
02&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1
166DEA398649
^Case of Carson and others v. The United Kingdom, Application no.
42184/05, 16 march 2010, para. 70; Case Darby v. Sweden, Application
no. 11581/85, 23 october 1990, para. 31-34, online :
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=8646
11&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1
166DEA398649
^Case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom,
Application no. 9214/80; 9473/81; 9474/81, 23 May 1985, para. 82.
online:
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=6952
93&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1
166DEA398649
^Case of Gasus Dosier- Und Foerdertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands,
Application no. 15375/89, 23 February 1995, para. 60. Online :
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=6957
95&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1
166DEA398649
^Case "Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages
in education in Belgium" v. Belgium, cited, para.10.
^Kadubec v. Slovakia, Application no. 27061/95, 2 September 1998, para
51, online :
[7]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=6
96112&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF0
1C1166DEA398649
Ozturk v. Germany, Application no. 22479/93, 28 September 1999, para
52, online :
[8]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=6
95430&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF0
1C1166DEA398649
Benham v. United Kingdom, Application no. 19380/92, 20 June 1996, para
56, online :
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95867&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF0
1C1166DEA398649
Engel and Others v. The Netherlands, Application no. 50100/71, 23
November 1976, para 82, online :
[10]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
695356&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
^Engel and Others v. The Netherlands, cited, para 82
^The ECtHR ruled that a cumulative approach may be adopted where
separate analysis of each criterion does not make it possible to reach
a clear conclusion as to the existence of a criminal charge (Bendenoun
v. France, Application no. 12547/86, 24 February 1994, para. 47).
^Bendenoun v. France, Application no. 12547/86, 24 February 1994,
para. 47, online :
[11]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
695740&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
Demicoli v. Malta, Application No. 13057/87, 27 August 1991, para. 33,
online :
[12]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
695559&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
Ozturk v. Germany, cited, para. 53
^Ozturk v. Germany, cited, para. 53
^Ozturk v. Germany, cited, para. 53 and Bendenoun v. France cited,
para. 47
^Jussila v. Finland, Application no. 73053/01, 23 November 200, para
38, online :
[13]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
810782&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
^Lauko v. Slovakia, Application no. 26138/95, 2 September 1998, online
:
[14]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
696111&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
^Weber v. Switzerland, Application no. 11034/84, 22 May 1990, online :
[15]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
695506&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
^Ozturk v. Germany, cited, para 53.
^Kadubec v. Slovakia, cited, para 52.
^Jussila v. Finland, cited, para 32 and 35.
^Leonid Rybakovsky and Sergey Ryazantsev, "International Migration in
the Russian Federation", United Nations Expert Group Meeting on
International Migration and Development (UN/POP/MIG/2005/11), p.16
^The propiska system is "a compulsory registration of the passport
holder at a specific address. [This measure] was introduced by a
Government Decree'' in 1932, in Irina Ivakhnyuk, "The Russian
Migration Policy and its Impact on Human Development: the Historical
Perspective", Human Development Research Paper, UNDP (2009/14), p.5
^Ibid., p.9
^Ibid., p.8
^Ibid., p.10
^Lauko v. Slovakia, cited, para. 58.
^The case law on the `severity of the maximum penalty' seems to
combine also elements from the second criterion (`nature of the
offence'), in particular the general character of the offence. In a
number of cases where the ECtHR ruled that a charge would be criminal
because of the severity of the maximum penalty, it was because the
offence was in fact of general character (Demicoli v. Malta, cited,
Weber v. Switzerland, cited). See also footnote 4 above on cumulative
approach.
^Hiro Balani v. Spain, Application no. 303-B, 09 December 1994, para
27, online :
[16]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
695787&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
^Kraska v. Switzerland, Application no. 13942/88, 19 April 1993, para
30, online :
[17]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
695705&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
^Van de Hurk v. The Netherlands, Application no 16034/90, 19 April
1994, para 59, online:
[18]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
695755&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
^Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands, cited, para 61; Ruiz Torija v. Spain,
Application no. 303-A , 9 December 1994,
para 29, online :
[19]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
695786&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
^Suominen v. Finland, Application no 37801/97, 1 July 2003, para 36,
online:
[20]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
699055&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
^Hadjianastassiou v. Greece, Application no. 252, 16 December 1992,
para 33, online :
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695656&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
^Kuznetsov and Others v. Russia, Application no. 184/02, 11 January
2007, para 83 to 85, online :
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812677&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
^Dulaurans v. France, Application no 34553/97, 21 March 2000, para 33,
online :
[23]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
700893&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
^Ruiz Torija v. Spain, cited, para 29-30
^Erik Fribergh, "Foreword by the Registrar on the occasion of the
100th issue of the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights,"
Information Note of the European Court of Human Rights, no. 100
(September 2007), p.1.
^Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe Rec(2004)4, Preamble, Rec(2004)5, Preamble.
^Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
Rec(2004)5, section 3.
^Paragraph 1 of the Decision of the Constitutional Court of the
Russian Federation, attached as document number two in the present
petition.
^Ruiz Torija v. Spain, cited, para 29 and Van de Hurk v. The
Netherlands, cited, para 61.
^Hiro Balani v. Spain, cited, para 25.
^Gast and Popp v. Germany, Application no. 29357/95, 25 February 2000,
para 63, online :
[24]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
696375&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
^Case of Korolev v. Russia, application no. 25551/051 July 2010,
online,
[25]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
865826&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
^Case of Bock v. Germany, application no. 11118/84, 21 February 1989,
online,
[26]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
695317&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
^Case of Ionescu v. Romania, application no. 38608/97, 2 November
2004. online,
[27]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
706630&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
^Case of Finger c. Bulgaria, 10 May 2011, application no. 37346/05,
para 75, online,
[28]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
885172&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
^See, mutatis mutandis, the case of Finger v. Bulgaria, in regards to
the potential systemic problem, 10 May 2011, application no 37346/05,
para 75, online,
[29]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
885172&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
^RT, <>, online,
[30]http://rt.com/politics/torshin-european-court-russia/ (Consulted
on 1^st December 2011)
^Kirill Koroteev, <>, Droits
fondamentaux, no 5, January-December 2005, pp. 8-12.
^RT, <>, online,
[31]http://rt.com/politics/torshin-european-court-russia/ (Consulted
on 1^st December 2011)
^Alexei Trochev, <>, Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, paper no 1082, University of Wisconsion Law
School, Heldref Publications, 2009, p. 146
^Finger v. Bulgaria, aforecited, para 76
^Griшankova and Griшankovs v. Latvia, Application no.36117/02, 13
February 2003, p.7, online :
[32]http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
671991&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF
01C1166DEA398649
29
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18.
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?
action=html&documentId=695755&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A2
7FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649
19.
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?
action=html&documentId=695786&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A2
7FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649
20.
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?
action=html&documentId=699055&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A2
7FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649
21.
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?
action=html&documentId=695656&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A2
7FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649
22.
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?
action=html&documentId=812677&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A2
7FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649
23.
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?
action=html&documentId=700893&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A2
7FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649
24.
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?
action=html&documentId=696375&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A2
7FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649
25.
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?
action=html&documentId=865826&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A2
7FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649
26.
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?
action=html&documentId=695317&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A2
7FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649
27.
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?
action=html&documentId=706630&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A2
7FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649
28.
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?
action=html&documentId=885172&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A2
7FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649
29.
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?
action=html&documentId=885172&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A2
7FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649
30. http://rt.com/politics/torshin-european-court-russia/
31. http://rt.com/politics/torshin-european-court-russia/
32.
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?
action=html&documentId=671991&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A2
7FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649
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