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03.12.2013

 

                                                File number______________

                                Application

   ENIKEEV, BURKOV AND Sverdlovsk regional non-governmental organization
                                "SUTYAJNIK" 

                                    V. 

                                   RUSSIA

                           (Secret Justice Case)

        under Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights

                 and Rules 45 and 47 of the Rules of Court

   Contents

   I. The Parties

     * A. The Applicants

   A.1. FIRST APPLICANT ["Principal Applicant" or "Applicant"]

   1. Surname: Enikeev

   2. First Name(s): Evgeny

   Sex: male

   3. Nationality: Russian

   4. Occupation: software engineer

   5. Date and place of birth: 

   6.  Permanent  address:  

   7. Tel no.: 

   8. Present address (if different from 6.):

   A.2. SECOND APPLICANT: ["Applicant Lawyer" or "Legal Representative"]

   1*. Surname: Burkov

   2*. First Name(s): Anton

   Sex: male

   3*. Nationality: Russian

   4*. Occupation: lawyer

   5*. Date and place of birth: 

   6*.  Permanent  address:  

   7*. Tel no.: 

   8*. Present address (if different from 6.)

   A.3. THIRD APPLICANT: ["Applicant - NGO/News Agency"]

   1**.   Name  of  organization:  Sverdlovsk  regional  non-governmental
   organization   "Sutyajnik"   (Свердловская  региональная  общественная
   организация  "Сутяжник"), its department News-Agency "Sutyajnik-Press"
   (информационное агентство "Сутяжник-пресс").

   2**. First Name(s): n/a

   3**. Nationality: n/a

   4**. Occupation: n/a

   5**.  Date  and  place  of registration: 29 August 1994, Ekaterinburg,
   Russia.

   6**. Permanent address: 620075, Russia, Ekaterinburg, Turgeneva, 11-1

   7**. Tel no.: +7-343-3553651

   8**. Present address (if different from 6.): n/a

   A.4. FIRST REPRESENTATIVE

   9.  Name  of  representative  of  Enikeev  and  of Sverdlovsk regional
   non-governmental  organization  "Sutyajnik" (Свердловская региональная
   общественная   организация  "Сутяжник"),  its  department  News-Agency
   "Sutyajnik-Press"  (информационное  агентство "Сутяжник-пресс"): Anton
   BURKOV

   10. Occupation of representative: lawyer.

   11.  Address  of representative: 

   12. Tel no. Fax no. 

   A.5. SECOND REPRESENTATIVE

   9*. Name of representative of Burkov: 

   10*.   Occupation   of   representative:   

   11*.  Address  of  representative:  

   12*.   Tel  no.  

     * B. The High Contracting Party

   13. The Russian Federation

   I.* Summary

                SUMMARY OF APPLICATION PROVIDED PURSUANT TO

                   PARAGRAPH 11 OF THE PRACTICE DIRECTION

                     ON THE INSTITUTION OF PROCEEDINGS

   This  summary  is  provided  entirely  without  prejudice  to the full
   Application  lodged herewith. Nothing in this document should be taken
   to  alter,  modify, restrict or diminish any allegation of fact or law
   made in the full Application. 

   Evgeny Enikeev [hereinafter "Principal Applicant"] has been living and
   working  in Moscow which is his de facto place of residence, while his
   official   residence   (as  inscribed  in  his  passport)  remains  in
   Dimitrovgrad,  Ulianovsk oblast, which is located some 1000 kilometres
   away.

   The  Principal  Applicant's driver's license went missing in September
   2012 and he needed a duplicate copy in order to drive legally.

   On  16 March 2013, the Head of a police station in Moscow Stadnuk I.I.
   officially  rejected  a  request  by  the  Principal Applicant for the
   duplicate  licence (Annex 1) citing the rule that a Russian citizen is
   only  eligible  to  apply  for  the  duplicate licence at his official
   residence  documented  in his passport, as per Article 12 of the Rules
   of  passing  the  qualifying  examination and the issuance of driver's
   licenses  incorporated  by  the  Regulation  of  the Government of the
   Russian  Federation No.1396 of 15 December 1999 [hereinafter "the 1999
   Regulation"],  (Annex  2). A similar provision to this is contained in
   Article  3 of the Regulation No.782 issued by the Minister of Internal
   Affairs  of  the  Russian Federation on 20 July 2000 [hereinafter "the
   2000 Regulation"], (Annex 3).

   The Principal Applicant believes that both the 1999 Regulation and the
   2000 Regulation violate his right to freedom of movement because he is
   forced  to  travel  in  order  to  exercise his other civil right, and
   discriminate  against  him  in relation to other citizens of Russia on
   the  basis  of  the possession of a registration at a particular place
   (or  absence  thereof).  Therefore the Applicant decided to defend his
   rights before national courts.

   On  5  April 2013, the applicant filed an application (Annex 4) to the
   Russian Supreme Court in order to challenge provision of Article 12 of
   the 1999 Regulation and the similar provision of Article 3 of the 2000
   Regulation [hereinafter "the 2013 case"]. On 10 April 2013, a Judge of
   the  Russian  Supreme  Court  Emysheva V.A. (Емышева В.А.), sitting ex
   parte  in  chambers  by  a decision [hereinafter "Decision of 10 April
   2013"]  (Annex 5), rejected the application as inadmissible, and ruled
   that  the  same  provision  was  already challenged before the Supreme
   Court  on  9  August 2007 (Judgment No. ГКПИ07-527), [hereinafter "the
   2007  case" or "the secret evidence"] by another applicant on the same
   grounds as in the application by the Principal Applicant.

   On  15  April 2013 the Principal Applicant appealed the Decision of 10
   April  2013 rendered by the Supreme Court. In the appeal (Annex 6), in
   addition  to  the  demand  to quash the Decision of 10 April 2013, the
   Principal   Applicant  firstly  requested  to  be  allowed  "to  study
   materials of the case No. ГКПИ07-527" [i.e. the 2007 case] in order to
   establish  if  the  grounds  of  the application in the 2007 case were
   indeed  similar to the grounds in his application that resulted in the
   Decision  of  10  April  2013.  Despite  the  fact  that the Principal
   Applicant  and  his  representative,  Anton  Burkov  [hereinafter "the
   Applicant-Lawyer"]  were not notified of the date, time, and the place
   of  the appeal hearing, they arrived to the Supreme Court of Appeal in
   time,  and  were  allowed  into  the  Court's  building,  and  to  the
   courtroom.  The  Supreme Court of Appeal considered the appeal without
   allowing   the   Principal   Applicant  and  the  Applicant-Lawyer  to
   participate  in the hearing despite the fact that they were present at
   the  hearing,  and  were  seated  in  front  of the Judges. The Judges
   justified  their  behaviour  based  on  Part  2  of Article 333 of the
   Russian  Civil  Procedure  Code  which  states  that  persons  are not
   notified  of  the  appeal hearing when considering an appeal against a
   ruling of a Court of the first instance.

   On  24  June  2013,  the  Principal Applicant and the Applicant-Lawyer
   challenged  before  the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
   Part  2  of  Article  333  of  the  Civil  Procedure  Code  as  it was
   interpreted  by  the  Supreme  Court of Appeal, and claimed that their
   rights  to  fair  trial  and  their rights to an effective remedy were
   violated  (Annex  17).  The application by the Principal Applicant was
   rejected  on  24  September 2013, whereas that by the Applicant-Lawyer
   was simply ignored.

   On  22  May  2013,  the Principal Applicant also challenged before the
   Constitutional  Court of the Russian Federation Article 12 of the 1999
   Regulation  and  Article  3  of the 2000 Regulation in connection with
   Part  3 of Article 27 of the Federal Law "On Security of Road Traffic"
   as  it  is  understood  and  interpreted  by  the  Supreme  Court,  as
   prohibiting  a request for a duplicate driver's license to be filed at
   the  place  of his de facto place of residence therefore violating his
   right  to  freedom  of movement and freedom from discrimination (Annex
   13). The application was rejected on 24 September 2013.

   On   7   November   2013,   the   head   of  the  Sverdlovsk  regional
   non-governmental  organization  "Sutyajnik"^  and the head of its news
   agency    "Sutyajnik-Press"^    Sergey   Beliaev   [hereinafter   "the
   Applicant-NGO/News-agency"]  requested  to  receive  from  the Supreme
   Court  decisions  concerning  the Principal Applicant delivered by the
   Supreme  Court  sitting  ex parte in chambers on 10 April 2013, and by
   the  Supreme  Court  of  Appeal on 4 June 2013 (Annex 11). The Supreme
   Court never replied to this request.

   Thus,   the   Principal   Applicant,  the  Applicant-Lawyer,  and  the
   Applicant-NGO/News-Agency faced a situation where:

    1. The  Principal  Applicant  is forced to travel 2000 km (roundtrip)
       from  Moscow  to  Dimitrovgrad and is forced to spend his property
       (money)  on  the  mentioned travel in order to be able to exercise
       his civil right;
    2. When  the  Principal  Applicant decided to turn to national courts
       for  legal  remedy, he realised that no fair trial guarantees were
       in place, and no effective remedy was available:

    1. the  Supreme  Court  sitting  ex  parte  in chambers delivered the
       Decision  of  10  April 2013 on inadmissibility of the application
       without  a  hearing  based  on  secret  evidence  [the  2007 case]
       advanced  by  the  Supreme Court judge, the Principal Applicant or
       the Applicant-Lawyer have no access to "secret evidence";
    2. the  Supreme  Court  of Appeal did not allow access to this secret
       evidence by simply ignoring the request by the Principal Applicant
       made in his appeal;
    3. the  Supreme Court of Appeal did not allow the Applicant-Lawyer to
       make  a  request  to get access to this secret evidence during the
       appeal hearing;
    4. the Supreme Court of Appeal did not allow for the participation of
       the  Principal  Applicant  and  the Applicant-Lawyer in the appeal
       hearing;
    5. the  Supreme Courts' Decisions of 10 April 2013 and of 4 June 2013
       are  not  available to the public, because they were not published
       online   or   provided   at   the   request   of   journalists  or
       representatives of civil society;



   The  Principal  Applicant and the Applicant-Lawyer were not allowed to
   seek  for  information  (i.e.  the  secret evidence) and express their
   ideas before the Supreme Court of Appeal;



   The  representative of civil society (NGO Sutyajnik) and of journalist
   society  (news agency Sutyajnik-Press) (the Applicant-NGO/News-Agency)
   was  not  allowed to access decisions which were delivered without the
   participation of the Principal Applicant and the Applicant-Lawyer, and
   were based on a secret evidence.

   These  facts  described  above demonstrate unjustified restrictions to
   the  freedom of movement, discrimination, complete secrecy of justice,
   as  well  as limitations to the freedom of expression, and the lack of
   effective  remedies  to  deal  with  the  violations. As a result, the
   Principal     Applicant,     the     Applicant-Lawyer,     and     the
   Applicant-NGO/News-Agency  have applied to the European Court of Human
   Rights asking it to rule on violations of Articles 6(1), 10, 13, 14 of
   the  European  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Human  Rights and
   Fundamental Freedoms [hereinafter "European Convention"].

   I.** List of Abbreviations 

   The Applicant or the Principal Applicant - Evgeny Enikeev;

   The Applicant-Lawyer or the Legal Representative - Anton Burkov;

   The  Applicant-NGO/News-Agency  - Sverdlovsk regional non-governmental
   organization   "Sutyajnik"   (Свердловская  региональная  общественная
   организация  "Сутяжник"), its department News-Agency "Sutyajnik-Press"
   (информационное агентство "Сутяжник-пресс");

   The  police  station  - 2 отделение по экзаменационной работе МОГТОРЭР
   No.1 ГИБДД ГУ МВД РОССИИ по г. Москве.

   The  Supreme  Court  sitting  ex  parte in chambers - The Judge of the
   Russian  Supreme Court, Judge Emysheva V.A. (Емышева В.А.), sitting ex
   parte in chambers who delivered the Decision of 10 April 2013;

   The  Supreme  Court  of  Appeal  - The Appeal Collegium of the Russian
   Supreme Court which delivered the Decision of 4 June 2013;

   The  1999  Regulation  -  Article  12  of  the  Rules  of  passing the
   qualifying   examination   and   the  issuance  of  driver's  licenses
   (incorporated  by  the  Regulation  of  the  Government of the Russian
   Federation No.1396 of 15 December 1999;

   The  2000  Regulation  -  Article  3  of  the Regulation No.782 by the
   Minister  of  Internal  Affairs of the Russian Federation issued on 20
   July 2000;

   The  2013 case - Application of Enikeev of 5 April 2013 to the Russian
   Supreme  Court  challenging  provision  of  Article  12  of  the  1999
   Regulation and the provision of Article 3 of the 2000 Regulation;

   The  2007  case  -  Judgment  No.  ГКПИ07-527  of 9 August 2007 by the
   Supreme Court;

   CPC - The Civil Procedure Code of the Russian Federation.

   The  European  Convention - the Convention for the Protection of Human
   Rights and Fundamental Freedoms - hereinafter "European Convention".

   II. Statement of facts 

   14. Evgeny  Enikeev  (the  Principal  Applicant)  has  been living and
       working  in  Moscow since September 2009. Therefore, Moscow is his
       de  facto  place  of  residence,  while his official residence (as
       indicated  in  his  passport)  remains  in Dimitrovgrad, Ulianovsk
       oblast, which is located some 1000 kilometres away.
   15. The  Principal  Applicant  does not own real estate in Moscow, nor
       does  he  have  the  financial  means to buy real estate there; he
       therefore  rents  an  apartment.  However,  in order to be validly
       registered  in  Moscow,  a  registrant must either own real estate
       (which  the  Principal  Applicant  does  not),  or must be able to
       produce  documentation  from  a landlord from whom he rents (which
       the  Applicant  could  not  obtain  due  to  the  owner/landlord's
       unwillingness  to  provide  such documentation).^ Apparently, this
       unwillingness  stems  from the owner/landlord's refusal to declare
       the  rental  income  to  the  Russian tax authorities. There is no
       effective  legal  remedy  to  force the owner/landlord to give the
       necessary  documentation  in  order  to  allow the Applicant to be
       registered  at  the dwelling he rents. Any lawsuit in this respect
       against  the  owner/landlord will result in the termination of the
       Applicant's lease agreement with the owner and his eviction before
       the  first  hearing  of  the  case by a Court. For this reason the
       Applicant cannot be registered in Moscow.
   16. The  Applicant's  driver's  license went missing in September 2012
       and he needed a duplicate copy in order to drive legally.
   17. The  Applicant planned to travel to Dimitrovgrad, Ulianovsk oblast
       in December 2012 in order to apply for a duplicate, as this is the
       only  place  in  Russia  he can legally apply for such a duplicate
       according to the rules which will be explained below. However, the
       Applicant  did  not  find  an  opportunity  to  do  so due to long
       distance  between  Moscow  and  Dimitrovgrad  (i.e.  2000 km round
       trip),   the  cost  of  roundtrip  travel,  and  the  lack  of  an
       opportunity  to ask his employer for a minimum three days off from
       work needed to undertake such travel.
   18. On  12  March  2013  the  Applicant  filed  an  application  for a
       duplicate  of  the  driver's  license at a local police station in
       Moscow  (2 отделение по экзаменационной работе МОГТОРЭР No.1 ГИБДД
       ГУ  МВД РОССИИ по г. Москве) [hereinafter "the police station"] at
       the  place  of his de facto residence in Moscow. On 16 March 2013,
       the   Head  of  the  police  station  Stadnuk  I.I.  rejected  his
       application  for  the  duplicate  (Annex  1) on the basis that the
       Applicant  is  deemed  to  be  only  eligible  to apply for such a
       duplicate  licence  at his official residence as documented in his
       passport.  This  decision  was  based  on  Article  12 of the 1999
       Regulation, (Annex 2).
   19. According  to  Article  12 of the 1999 Regulation: "[...] issuance
       and  exchange  of  driver's  licenses are carried out by the State
       Inspection  of  Traffic  Police on the territory of the subject of
       the  Russian  Federation  where  the  citizen is registered in the
       place of his permanent residence or temporary residence."^
   20. However,  according  to Article 13 of the 1999 Regulation, Russian
       citizens  who  have  lost  their driver's licence have a different
       legal  status.  The issuance of duplicates of driver's licences to
       these citizens of the Russian Federation who are not registered at
       the place of permanent residence or temporary residence is carried
       out  by  the State traffic police inspection at the place of their
       de  facto  residence.  This  provision  reads  as  following: "13.
       Examination,  issuance  and  exchange  of driver's licences to the
       citizens  of  the Russian Federation who are not registered in the
       place  of  their  permanent  residence  or  temporary residence is
       carried  out by the state [traffic police] inspection in the place
       of  their  factual  residence."^  Those  registered  in Moscow can
       request a duplicate in Moscow as well.
   21. A  similar  provision  is  found  in  of  Article  3  of  the 2000
       Regulation,  (Annex  3): "3. Examination of citizens, issuance and
       exchange  of  driver's  licenses  are  carried  out  by  the State
       Inspection  [of traffic police] on the territory of the subject of
       the  Russian  Federation  where  the  citizen is registered in the
       place of his permanent residence or temporary residence."^
   22. The  next  provision  of  the  2000 Regulation, Article 4, repeats
       Article  13 of the 1999 Regulation: "4. Examination of citizens of
       the Russian Federation, issuance and exchange of driver's licences
       to  them  when  they  are  not  registered  in  the place of their
       permanent  residence  or temporary residence is carried out by the
       state  [traffic  police]  inspection in the place of their factual
       residence on the basis of decision of persons mentioned in Article
       5 of this Instruction [officers of the State Inspection of Traffic
       Police]."^
   23. It is not possible for the Applicant to request a duplicate of his
       driver's licence at the place of his de facto residence in Moscow,
       or to apply for a duplicate through the post. The Applicant cannot
       be  represented  in  the  application  process. The Applicant must
       apply personally for the duplicate.
   24. Since,  according  to the Applicant's passport, his official place
       of  residence is in Dimitrovgrad, Ulianovsk oblast, under the 1999
       Regulation  the  Applicant  has  to travel to Ulianovsk oblast and
       back  to  Moscow (about 2000 km round trip) to request a duplicate
       of  his  lost  driving  license. Under the 1999 Regulation and the
       2000  Regulation  the  Applicant's right to drive a car depends of
       the  existence of a registration, which impacts the realization of
       his  right to move freely in the territory of the state as well as
       his  right  to  the peaceful possession of his property, seeing as
       the  Applicant  is  required to have three days off and to pay for
       the  travel in order to have an opportunity to request a duplicate
       at  the  place  of  his  residence in Dimitrovgrad. The Applicant,
       unlike  all other citizens duly registered in Moscow, is unable to
       register through no fault of his own. The Applicant is essentially
       "forced"  to  make  absurd  travel  plans  for a 2000 km roundtrip
       voyage, incurring expenses and time and having to take time off of
       work,  simply  to get a duplicate copy of a driver's license which
       could  otherwise be dome in Moscow by the same Ministry, be it for
       the state's "registration requirement".
   25. The  Applicant  believes that the mentioned government Regulations
       of 1999 and 2000 violate his right to freedom of movement as he is
       forced  to  travel  in  order  to  exercise his other civil right,
       discriminates  against  him in regards to other citizens of Russia
       on the basis of possession (or the absence) of a registration at a
       particular  place.  Therefore  the Applicant decided to defend his
       rights before national courts.
   26. On  5  April 2013, the Applicant filed an application (Annex 4) to
       the  Russian  Supreme  Court (the 2013 case) in order to challenge
       provision  of  Article  12  of the 1999 Regulation and the similar
       provision  of  Article  3  of  the  2000 Regulation. The Applicant
       claimed  a  violation  of  his  right to freedom of movement under
       Article  3  of  the  Russian  Federal Law "On the Right of Russian
       Citizens to Freedom of Movement, Choice of Temporary and Permanent
       Residence  within the Borders of the Russian Federation" ("О праве
       граждан  Российской Федерации на свободу передвижения, выбор места
       пребывания  и  жительства  в  пределах  Российской Федерации") and
       Article 2 of Protocol 4 to the European Convention.
   27. On  10  April  2013,  a Judge of the Supreme Court, Judge Emysheva
       V.A. (Емышева В.А.), sitting ex parte in chambers, by the Decision
       of  10  April  2013 rejected the application as being inadmissible
       (Annex   5),  and  ruled  that  the  same  provision  was  already
       challenged  before  the  Supreme Court on 09 August 2007 (i.e. the
       2007  case)  by  another  applicant  on the same grounds as in the
       application  by  Enikeev,  who  is  the Principal Applicant in the
       present  case  before  the European Court. The Supreme Court based
       its  Decision  of  10  April  2013 on Part 8 of Article 251 of the
       Civil  Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, which is entitled
       "Filing  Applications  for  Disputing  Legal  Normative Acts", and
       which states: "The judge shall summarily dismiss an application if
       a  previous judgment has come into legal effect which verified the
       legality  of  the  disputed  legal  normative  act  of  the  state
       government  body,  of  the  local  self-government  body or of the
       official on the grounds mentioned in the application."^
   28. The  Applicant did not have access to the judgment rendered in the
       2007  case [secret evidence] nor to the application that initiated
       that case, nor to any minutes or any other materials of that case,
       which  could  demonstrate  that  the grounds of the application in
       that  case before the Supreme Court in 2007 were indeed similar to
       the  grounds  in  the application of Enikeev. The applicant of the
       2007 case was not even named in the Supreme Court's Decision of 10
       April  2013,  nor  is  locatable. This did not allow the Principal
       Applicant  to  check  the  only  factual  basis  (which  is in all
       respects   a   "secret   evidence")  in  the  ruling  against  the
       admissibility of his application to the Supreme Court that was put
       forwards  by  the Supreme Court Judge Emysheva V.A. (Емышева В.А.)
       sitting ex parte in chambers on her own initiative as a ground for
       inadmissibility  of  the application. The Supreme Court acted as a
       defendant and as a Judge in the same case.
   29. The  Decision  of  10  April  2013 by the Supreme Court sitting ex
       parte  in  chambers  regarding  inadmissibility  of  the Enikeev's
       application,  who  is  the Principal Applicant to this case before
       the  European  Court,  was  delivered  by a single Judge without a
       hearing (by the Supreme Court sitting ex parte in chambers).
   30. On  15 April 2013 the Principal Applicant appealed the Decision of
       10 April 2013. In the appeal application (Annex 6), in addition to
       the  request to quash the Decision of 10 April 2013, the Applicant
       requested  "to  allow  him  to  study  materials  of  the case No.
       ГКПИ07-527"  (the  2007  case  or  secret  evidence)  in  order to
       establish  if the grounds of the application in the 2007 case were
       similar  to  the  grounds in his application to the 2013 case. The
       representative  of  the  Principal  Applicant  before  the Supreme
       Court,  Anton  Burkov  (the Applicant-Lawyer), having obtained the
       power  of  attorney  to  represent  the  Applicant before national
       courts  as  per (Annex 7), also prepared a memorandum dated 4 June
       2013 to be submitted at the appeal hearing of the same date (Annex
       8).  This  memorandum  stated  that: "the Applicant in the present
       case   points  at  the  grounds  of  contradiction  of  challenged
       normative  acts,  which  [grounds]  have never been subject to the
       judicial  consideration  before."^  It was mentioned in particular
       that   the  challenged  Regulations  of  1999  and  2000  were  in
       contradiction  with  Article  2  of Protocol no. 4 to the European
       Convention.  However,  this  memorandum  was  not  allowed  by the
       Supreme  Court of Appeal to be submitted for consideration by this
       Court.  This  fact  will  be  described  below  in  further detail
       (subsection D.2.).
   31. The   Principal   Applicant  and  his  legal  representative,  the
       Applicant-Lawyer,  had  not been directly informed of the date and
       time  (4  June  2013, at 11:50 a.m.) as well as the place (121260,
       Moscow,  Povarskaya  Street, 15, courtroom No. 4038) of the appeal
       hearing.  They  only  learnt about the relevant information of the
       appeal  hearing  from  the  website  of  the Russian Supreme Court
       [1]http://www.supcourt.ru (Annex 9).
   32. On  4  June  2013, the Applicant and his legal representative, the
       Applicant-Lawyer,  arrived  to  the  Supreme Court of Appeal where
       they  were allowed into the building no 15 on Povarskaya Street at
       approximately  11:40  a.m.  At  the  time  of  the  hearing of the
       Applicant's  appeal (which had begun with a delay at approximately
       13:00  p.m.)  the bailiff invited both the Applicant and his legal
       representative,  the  Applicant-Lawyer, to the courtroom No. 4038.
       They  were  the  only  persons present in the courtroom apart from
       three  Judges of the Appeal collegium of the Russian Supreme Court
       (i.e.  the  Supreme  Court  of  Appeal)  namely  Judges Fedin A.I,
       Manokhina  G.V.,  Lavrov  N.G.  (Федин А.И., Манохина Г.В., Лавров
       Н.Г.)  and  the  secretary of the hearing Kulik U.V. (Кулик Ю.В.).
       The  bench  of three Judges of the Appeal collegium of the Russian
       Supreme   Court   did  not  allow  the  Applicant  and  his  legal
       representative, the Applicant-Lawyer, to take part in the hearing,
       totally  ignoring  them  as  if  they  had not been present in the
       courtroom,  without  even making an attempt to verify the identity
       of  the  two  people  who  were present in the courtroom, as it is
       required by Part 2 of Article 161 of Civil Procedure Code:

   Article 161. Checking the Presence of Participants in the Case.

   1.  The  secretary of the court session shall report to the court, who
   of  the  persons  summoned on the civil case is present, whether those
   who  have  failed to appear were duly notified and what information is
   obtained about the reasons behind their absence.

   2.  The  presiding justice shall identify the persons of the attending
   participants in the court procedure and shall verify the powers of the
   official persons and of their representatives.^

   33. The  Supreme  Court  of  Appeal  considered the appeal without the
       participation  of  the  Applicant  and  his  legal  representative
       despite  the  fact that they were present at the hearing, and were
       sitting  directly  in  front  of  the  Judges.  A moment after the
       Supreme  Court of Appeal announced the end of consideration of the
       appeal  and  before Judges of the Supreme Court of Appeal left the
       courtroom  for  the deliberation room (совещательная комната), the
       legal  representative  of  the Applicant asked the Judges why they
       ignored  the  Applicant and his legal representative. The question
       was  ignored.  After  the  Judges reappeared from the deliberation
       room,  the  Presiding  Judge  announced the decision rejecting the
       appeal  (i.e.  Decision of 4 June 2013, Annex 10). Right after the
       announcement  of  this  decision,  the legal representative of the
       Applicant  asked  the  Judges for the second time why they did not
       allow the Applicant and his legal representative to participate in
       the  hearing. This second time, the Judges reacted to the question
       saying  that they were not been obliged to allow the Applicant and
       his  legal  representative  to  participate in the hearing because
       according  to  Article  333 of the Civil Procedure Code the Judges
       had  not  invited  the Applicant to the hearing in the first place
       ("мы вас не приглашали")^.
   34. Under  Part  2  of Article 333 of the CPC, appeals of decisions on
       procedural   matters,   particularly   on   inadmissibility,   are
       considered without notification of the Applicant:

   Article  333  - Procedure for Filing and Considering a Separate Appeal
   or Prosecutor's Presentation.

   1.  A  separate appeal or prosecutor's presentation shall be filed and
   they  shall  be considered by a court in the procedure provided for by
   this article, with the waivers stipulated by Part Two of this article.

   2.  A separate appeal or prosecutor's presentation against a ruling of
   a  court  of  the  first  instance,  except  for  rulings  to  suspend
   proceedings  in respect of a case, to terminate proceedings in respect
   of  a  case  or  to  shelve an application shall be considered without
   notifying the persons participating in the case.^

   35. On   7   November  2013,  the  head  of  the  Sverdlovsk  regional
       non-governmental  organization  "Sutyajnik"^  and  the head of its
       news  agency  "Sutyajnik-Press",^  Sergey Beliaev requested (Annex
       11)  from  the  Supreme Court the decisions on Enikeev's case that
       were  delivered  by the Supreme Court sitting ex parte in chambers
       on  10  April  2013  and  by the Supreme Court of Appeal on 4 June
       2013. The Supreme Court has never replied to this request.
   36. Article  5.5 of the Order of 18 June 2010, by the Chief Justice of
       the  Supreme  Court states that the Supreme Court publishes online
       only  its  decisions  on  the merits (Annex 12). This provision is
       implemented in practice by the Supreme Court. This is evident from
       the  fact  that none of the decisions by the Supreme Court relates
       to  the 2013 case of the Principal Applicant were published. Also,
       a statement by the Supreme Court issued on 8 September 2011 to the
       request  made  by  Lada Bugrova (Annex 22) states that the Supreme
       Court only publishes judgments issued on the merits of a case. The
       same  follows  from  the  reply of 27 December 2012 by the Supreme
       Court (particularly by Карюк Владимир Ильич karyuk_vi@vsrf.ru) on
       the request made by Simmons Deborah-Jane (Annex 26).
   37. On  22  May  2013,  the  Principal Applicant challenged before the
       Constitutional  Court  of the Russian Federation Article 12 of the
       1999 Regulation and Article 3 of the 2000 Regulation in connection
       with  Part 3 of Article 27 of the Federal Law "On Security of Road
       Traffic"  as it is understood and interpreted by the Supreme Court
       as  to  prohibit  granting  the  request  for  a  duplicate of the
       driver's  license  filed at the place of de facto residence (Annex
       13).  The  Principal  Applicant  argued  that the challenged legal
       provisions  violated  his  right  to  freedom of movement and were
       contrary  to  Part 1 of Article 27 of the Russian Constitution, as
       well as Article 2 of Protocol no. 4 to the European Convention. On
       21  June 2013, the Secretariat of the Russian Constitutional Court
       rejected  the  application  (Annex  14).  On  18  July  2013,  the
       Principal  Applicant submitted follow-up application demanding the
       Constitutional  Court  to issue decision on the matter (Annex 15).
       On  24  September  2013,  the  Constitutional  Court  rejected the
       application  without  considering  the  application  on the merits
       (Annex 16).
   38. On  24 June 2013, the Principal Applicant and the Applicant-Lawyer
       challenged   before   the  Constitutional  Court  of  the  Russian
       Federation,  Part  2 of Article 333 of the Civil Procedure Code as
       it  is  interpreted  by  the Russian Supreme Court (Annex 17). The
       Principal  Applicant  claimed  that  Part  2 of Article 333 of the
       Civil Procedure Code violated his right to a fair trial guaranteed
       by  Article  2, 17, 19 (Part 1 и 2), 45 (Part 2), 46, 47 (Part 1),
       48  (Part 1), 52, 55 и 123 of the Russian Constitution and Article
       6  of  the  European  Convention.  The Applicant-Lawyer joined the
       application  as  a  co-applicant  to the Constitutional Court, not
       just  as the legal representative of the Principal Applicant. On 2
       August  2013, the Secretariat of the Constitutional Court rejected
       the  application  by  the  Principal  Applicant  (Annex 18). On 24
       September  2013, the Constitutional Court rejected the application
       by  the  Principal  Applicant without considering it on the merits
       (Annex  19).  The  argumentation for the rejection is that "if the
       Court  allows the participation of the Applicant, the right of the
       defendant,  who  did  not  come  to  the  Court, is violated". The
       application   by   the   Applicant-Lawyer   was   ignored  by  the
       Constitutional  Court; he has never received any reply or decision
       from the Constitutional Court on the matter.
   39. Thus,  the  Principal  Applicant,  the  Applicant-Lawyer,  and the
       Applicant-NGO/News-Agency have faced a situation where:

    1. The  Principal  Applicant is forced to travel 2000 km (round trip)
       from  Moscow  to  Dimitrovgrad and is forced to spend his property
       (money)  on  the  mentioned travel in order to be able to exercise
       his civil right
    2. When  the  Principal  Applicant decided to turn to national courts
       for  legal  remedy, he realised that no fair trial guarantees were
       in place, and no effective remedy was available:

    1. the  Supreme  Court  sitting  ex  parte  in chambers delivered the
       Decision  of  10  April 2013 on inadmissibility of the application
       without a hearing. This might be appropriate if not in conjunction
       with the rest of the facts;
    2. in  this  Decision  of 10 April 2013, the Supreme Court sitting ex
       parte  in  chambers  based  itself on evidence which the Principal
       Applicant  or  his  legal representative, the Applicant-Lawyer (in
       the  present  case  before the ECHR), did not have access to (i.e.
       "secret evidence");
    3. the  Supreme  Court  of Appeal did not allow access to this secret
       evidence by simply ignoring the request by the Principal Applicant
       made in his appeal;
    4. the  Supreme Court of Appeal did not allow the Applicant-Lawyer to
       make  a  request  to get access to this secret evidence during the
       appeal hearing;
    5. the  Supreme  Court  of  Appeal did not allow participation of the
       Principal    Applicant   and   his   legal   representative,   the
       Applicant-Lawyer, in the appeal hearing;
    6. the  Supreme  Court  sitting  ex parte in chambers' Decision of 10
       April  2013  and  the Supreme Court of Appeal's Decision of 4 June
       2013  are  not  available  to  the  public  because  they were not
       published  online  or  provided  at  the request of journalists or
       representatives of civil society;



   The   Principal   Applicant   and   his   legal   representative,  the
   Applicant-Lawyer  in  the present case before the European Court, were
   not  allowed  to have access to the necessary information for the case
   (i.e.  the  secret  evidence) and were prevented from expressing their
   views before the Supreme Court of Appeal;



   The  representative  of  civil  society  (the  NGO  Sutyajnik)  and of
   journalist     society     (news    agency    Sutyajnik-Press)    (the
   Applicant-NGO/News-Agency)  was  not  allowed  to access the Decisions
   which  were  delivered  without  the  participation  of  the Principal
   Applicant  and  his  legal representative, the Applicant-Lawyer, which
   were based on secret evidence.



   The facts, as described above, made the Principal Applicant, his legal
   representative       (the       Applicant-Lawyer),       and       the
   Applicant-NGO/News-Agency  to  apply  to  the  European Court of Human
   Rights for a legal remedy.

   III.   Statement  of  alleged  violations  of  the  Convention  and/or
   Protocols, and of relevant arguments

     * A.  VIOLATION  OF  THE  RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT (VIOLATION OF
       ARTICLE 2 OF PROTOCOL 4). 



   The  Regulations  of  the Russian federal government which essentially
   force  the Applicant to travel from Moscow to Dimitrovgrad in order to
   request  the  duplicate  of his driver's license, violate his right of
   freedom  of  movement  guaranteed by Article 2 of Protocol No.4 to the
   European  Convention  by  discriminating  the Applicant with regard to
   other  Russian  citizens,  who  are  register in Moscow or do not have
   registration at all.

   THE LAW

   42. Article 2 of Protocol No.4 to the European Convention states:

   1.  Everyone  lawfully  within  the territory of a State shall, within
   that  territory, have  the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
   choose his residence.
   2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
   3.  No  restrictions  shall  be placed on the exercise of these rights
   other  than  such as are in accordance with law and are necessary in a
   democratic  society  in  the  interests of national security or public
   safety,  for  the maintenance of "ordre public", for the prevention of
   crime,  for  the protection of health or morals, or for the protection
   of the rights and freedoms of others.
   4.  The  rights  set  forth  in  paragraph  1  may also be subject, in
   particular  areas,  to restrictions imposed in accordance with law and
   justified by the public interests in a democratic society.

   43. The right to freedom of movement is a fundamental human right^. In
       addition to in Article 2 of Protocol 4 to the European Convention,
       this  right  is  found  in several other human rights instruments,
       such  as  Article  12  of  the International Covenant on Civil and
       Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 22 of the American Convention on
       Human  Rights,  Article  12  of  the  African Charter on Human and
       Peoples' Rights, and Article 13 of the United Declaration of Human
       Rights^.
   44. Article  2  of  Protocol 4 protects inter alia the right to freely
       move  within  a country. The purpose of this provision is close to
       the  notion  of personal self-development. The individual right to
       stay  and  the right to leave are included in the right to freedom
       of movement .
   45. Thus,  the  right  to  freedom  of movement covers the Applicant's
       right  not  to be forced to stay in one place as well as his right
       not  to  be  forced  to  move  from  one place to another within a
       country.  Under Article 2 of Protocol 4, the Applicant has a right
       to freely travel wherever and whenever he wants within Russia.
   46. According  to  Article  2 (3) and (4) of Protocol 4, Article 12 of
       the  ICCPR,  the  human  right  of  freedom  of  movement  can  be
       restricted only for a few reasons.
   47. Article 12 of the ICCPR, to which the Russian Federation is also a
       party,  defines  the right to freedom of movement in the following
       terms:

   1. Everyone  lawfully  within  the  territory of a State shall, within
   that  territory,  have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
   choose his residence.

   2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country including his own.

   3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions
   except  those  which  are  provided  by  law, are necessary to protect
   national  security,  public  order  (ordre  public),  public health or
   morals  or  the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with
   the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.

   48. The  Human Rights Committee has stated in the General Comments no.
       27  (67) to Article 12 of the ICCPR that restrictions of the right
       of  freedom  of movement must be clear, proportional and that they
       must not impair the essence of the right:

   13.  In  adopting laws providing for restrictions permitted by article
   12,  paragraph 3, States should always be guided by the principle that
   the restrictions must not impair the essence of the right (cf. art. 5,
   para. 1); the relation between right and restriction, between norm and
   exception,  must not be reversed. The laws authorizing the application
   of  restrictions  should  use  precise  criteria  and  may  not confer
   unfettered discretion on those charged with their execution.

   14.  [...]  Restrictive  measures  must  conform  to  the principle of
   proportionality;  they must be appropriate to achieve their protective
   function;  they  must  be the least intrusive instrument amongst those
   which might achieve the desired result; and they must be proportionate
   to the interest to be protected.

   15.  The  principle of proportionality has to be respected not only in
   the  law  that frames the restrictions, but also by the administrative
   and  judicial  authorities  in  applying the law. States should ensure
   that  any proceedings relating to the exercise or restriction of these
   rights  are  expeditious  and  that  reasons  for  the  application of
   restrictive measures are provided.

   16.  [...] The application of restrictions in any individual case must
   be based on clear legal grounds and meet the test of necessity and the
   requirements of proportionality.

   17.  A  major source of concern is the manifold legal and bureaucratic
   barriers  unnecessarily  affecting the full enjoyment of the rights of
   the  individuals  to  move freely, to leave a country, including their
   own, and to take up residence.^

   49. The  compulsion for the Applicant to undertake a 2000 km roundtrip
       voyage  to  Dimitrovgrad  in  order  to request the authorities to
       issue  a  duplicate  of  his  driver's  license subjects his civil
       rights  to the obligation of registering his place of residence at
       a particular place of registration.
   50. This  registration  system  known as "propiska" was established in
       1932  in  the  Soviet Union. The propiska system was instituted in
       order  to  plan  the  Soviet  union's "economic development of the
       country  [and to shape] migration flows". The realization of civil
       rights  and  obligations  depended  on  the existence of propiska,
       because   rights   could   be  exercised  only  at  the  place  of
       registration. 
   51. Propiska was officially abolished in 1993 with the Federal Law "On
       the  right  of  citizens  of  the Russian Federation to freedom of
       movement  and  choice  of domicile on the Territory of the Russian
       Federation".  Under  Part 2 of Article 3 of this Law "Registration
       or non-registration may not serve as a ground or condition for the
       implementation  of  the  rights and freedoms of citizens, provided
       for by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the laws of the
       Russian  Federation,  the  Constitutions and laws of the Republics
       within  the  Russian  Federation."^  Despite this provision and in
       violation  of  its  international  human  rights  obligations, the
       Russian Federation has adopted laws, as in the present case, which
       provide  for  restrictions  to the freedom of movement that are in
       violation  of the principle that "the restrictions must not impair
       the essence of the right" (Article 12, paragraph 3, of the ICCPR).
   52. Today,  making  the  exercise  of  civil  rights  and  obligations
       dependant  on  a  registration  is  a bureaucratic obstacle to the
       freedom  of  movement,  and such a limitation of rights is neither
       appropriate  to  the  interest  to be protected nor is it based on
       clear legal grounds as required by Part 4 of Article 2 of Protocol
       4 to the Convention as well as Article 12 of the ICCPR. 
   53. Propiska  is  still part of the system, now called "registration",
       in  question  in  this case, which has notable effects in terms of
       enjoyment  of human rights and basic freedoms like the Applicant's
       right to freedom of movement.
   54. At present, the advances in technology must make it possible for a
       country's  authorities  to  be  able to network, coordinate and to
       share  documents  and  knowledge about the status of its citizens.
       This  is  especially  urgent  in  a large country like the Russian
       Federation  where  the distances can be up to 9000 km. At the very
       least,  it  should  be  possible to apply for a duplicate of one's
       driver's   license   by   application   letter  or  an  authorized
       representative/agency,   rather   than   having  to  travel  large
       distances in person.
   55. The European Court has previously expressed serious concerns about
       the  Russian  registration  system.  In  the Case of Tatishvili v.
       Russia  the  Court stated that "[t]he Court must further determine
       whether  the  interference  complained  of  was justified. In this
       connection  it  observes  that  the  Parliamentary Assembly of the
       Council  of Europe expressed concern over the existing restrictive
       system of residence registration in Russia."^
   56. Moreover,  the  Parliamentary  Assembly  of  the Council of Europe
       (hereinafter  ``PACE'') in its Report Doc. 9262 of 12 October 2001
       urged Russia:

   "a. to  undertake a thorough review of national laws and policies with
   a  view  to eliminating any provisions which might impede the right to
   freedom  of  movement and choice of place of residence within internal
   borders;

   b. to refrain from applying and legitimising regulations and practices
   which   might  hinder  fair  implementation  of  the  above  mentioned
   right..."^

   57. Further  PACE  in  Resolution  1277  (2002)  on  the  honouring of
       obligations  and  commitments by the Russian Federation, which was
       adopted on 23 April 2002, noted as follows:

   "8.  However,  the Assembly is concerned about a number of obligations
   and  major  commitments  with which progress remains insufficient, and
   the  honouring  of  which  requires  further  action  by  the  Russian
   authorities:

   [...]

   xii.  whilst noting that the Russian federal authorities have achieved
   notable    progress    in    abolishing    the    remains    of    the
   old propiska (internal registration) system, the Assembly regrets that
   restrictive  registration  requirements continue to be enforced, often
   in  a discriminatory manner, against ethnic minorities. Therefore, the
   Assembly  reiterates  its  call made in Recommendation 1544 (2001), in
   which it urged member States concerned `to undertake a thorough review
   of  national  laws  and  policies  with  a  view  to  eliminating  any
   provisions  which  might  impede  the right to freedom of movement and
   choice of place of residence within internal borders';"^

   57. Such  restrictive and discriminatory registration requirements are
       still  enforced in 2013 as is evident from the present case before
       the European Court.

   APPLICATION OF FACTS OF THE CASE TO THE LAW

     * The Applicant is forced to travel from Moscow to Dimitrovgrad;
     * The   obligation  of  the  Applicant  to  travel  from  Moscow  to
       Dimitrovgrad  has  a  chilling  effect  on his right to freedom of
       movement within the country.

   The  Applicant  is forced to travel from Moscow to Dimitrovgrad (undue
   restriction of freedom of movement).

   58. Federal  authorities  violated  the Principal Applicant's right to
       freedom  of  movement  by  denying  the  possibility  to receive a
       duplicate  of  his  lost  driver's  license in the place of his de
       facto  residence  in  Moscow,  rather  than  in  the  place of his
       registered   residence   in   Dimitrovgrad,  because  he  lacks  a
       registration in Moscow (which he has no opportunity to obtain).
   59. The  right  of the Principal Applicant to receive the duplicate of
       his  driver's  license  depends  on the existence of the residence
       registration  in  Moscow,  not on his ability to drive a car. This
       impacts his right to freedom of movement. His right to move freely
       is  discriminately  dependant on the existence of the registration
       in  Moscow.  The  Russian Regulations in question of 1999 and 2000
       force  the  Principal  Applicant  to  travel  to  the place of his
       official  registration  in  Dimitrovgrad  in order to exercise his
       right  to  request from the authorities a duplicate of his license
       which certifies his right to drive a car.
   60. Travel  to  Dimitrovgrad  and back to Moscow is approximately 2000
       km. It requires at least three days to travel there, then to apply
       for the duplicate licence and to return back to Moscow. The single
       trip  one-way  travel  time  is 18 hours by train.^ This means the
       Principal Applicant has to travel for 36 hours by train at his own
       expense,  not  to mention expenses he would have to incur while in
       Dimitrovgrad.

   The  obligation of the Applicant to travel from Moscow to Dimitrovgrad
   has  a  chilling effect on his right to freedom of movement within the
   country 

   61. Federal  government  Regulations  of  1999  and  2000 in this case
       oblige  the  Applicant  to  travel  from Moscow to Dimitrovgrad in
       order  to  exercise  his  civil right to use a basic civil service
       (that   is,   make   a  request  of  documents  from  governmental
       authorities).  For the Applicant, this means that each time he has
       a  request  regarding  the  issuance  of  a document, he has to go
       through  this  difficult  process.  This  is despite the fact that
       Article  3  of  the  Federal  Law "On the right of citizens of the
       Russian  Federation  to freedom of movement and choice of domicile
       on  the  territory  of  the  Russian  Federation"  states that the
       realisation of rights must not depend on registration. This, apart
       from  being  in  direct violation of the Applicant's right to move
       freely,  has a chilling effect on the Applicant's right to freedom
       of  movement  within the country, particularly to choose his place
       of residence.
   62. The  dependency of the enjoyment of rights on the existence of the
       registration  has  a  chilling  effect on the right to freely move
       within  the  country as well. In the current situation, it is much
       more difficult for the Applicant to live and work in Moscow rather
       than  in  his  home  town  of  Dimitrovgrad  as he is only able to
       exercise  his  civil  rights,  including  the  right  to  requests
       documents from the state authorities, in Dimitrovgrad.
   63. As  previously  mentioned, subjecting the exercise of civil rights
       on  registration  is a core element of the Soviet propiska system,
       the  goal  of  which  was  to  restrict  unauthorised  movement of
       citizens  within  the  USSR.  It still exists in the Russian legal
       system as is demonstrated by the present case.
   64. The  Federal  government Regulations of 1999 and 2000 in this case
       demonstrate  that  no  actions were undertaken in order to abolish
       such  practices,  despite  the  call  made by PACE "to undertake a
       thorough  review  of  national  laws  and  policies with a view to
       eliminating any provisions which might impede the right to freedom
       of  movement  and  choice  of  place  of residence within internal
       borders."^
   65. Another, element which causes a chilling effect on the Applicant's
       right  to  freedom of movement is the monetary cost of travel from
       Moscow to and from Dimitrovgrad. (Further details at paragraphs 66
       and 67).
   66. The  compulsion  to travel to Dimitrovgrad in order to request the
       duplicate  of  the  driver's  license  due  to  the  1999 and 2000
       regulations  also  affects  the  Applicant's right to the peaceful
       enjoyment  of his possessions. The compulsion to travel constrains
       the  Applicant's property right because he has to pay a minimum of
       2600  Rubbles  (RUR)  which  is  the minimal cost of a third class
       return  ticket (plazkart) by train from Moscow to Dimitrovgrad and
       back again.^
   67. Also  during  the  required  minimal  travel  time  of 3 days, the
       Principal  Applicant  will not be able to perform his work because
       the  application for a duplicate driver's license can only be made
       on   weekdays.  Thus,  the  Principal  Applicant  will  experience
       additional  losses  of  income  totalling  6426  RUR of his salary
       (which  is  the  equivalent  of  three  days taken out of a 28 day
       vacation period).

     * B.   VIOLATION   OF  THE  RIGHT  TO  FREEDOM  FROM  DISCRIMINATION
       (VIOLATION  OF  ARTICLE  14  READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 2 OF
       PROTOCOL No.4).

   68. Article 14 - Prohibition of discrimination:

   The  enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention
   shall  be  secured  without  discrimination on any ground such as sex,
   race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
   or  social  origin,  association  with  a national minority, property,
   birth or other status.

   69. Article 14 is applicable, if the subject of treatment is a form of
       exercise of the right guaranteed by the European Convention or the
       challenged  measure  is  closely  connected with the exercise of a
       right guaranteed by the European Convention^. However, a violation
       is not necessary^.
   70. A  prerequisite  for  the application of Article 14 is that people
       have  been  treated  differently  in a comparable or substantially
       similar legal situation^.
   71. The  Principal  Applicant  faced  a comparable situation like many
       other  Russian  citizens  required  to  apply for a duplicate of a
       driver's license.
   72. However,  the  Principal  Applicant  was  treated differently from
       those  other citizens who are registered in Moscow or those who do
       not  have  a  registration  at  all: the Principal Applicant as an
       individual  who lives in Moscow but is not registered there has to
       travel  to  the  place  of  his  legally registered residence. The
       person  who  lives in Moscow and is registered in Moscow or is not
       registered  at  all  (also  called  BOMZH, БОМЖ) can apply for the
       duplicate driver's in Moscow.
   73. The  compulsion of the Applicant to travel about 2000 km roundtrip
       to  Dimitrovgrad  is  neither  appropriate  to  the interest to be
       protected,  nor is it based on clear legal grounds. The compulsion
       to  travel is based on the discriminatory ground of a person being
       in  possession  of  a  registration  in  Moscow, or not having any
       registration in Russia at all.
   74. This  different  treatment  of  Russian  citizens  on the basis of
       possession  of  registration  or  lack  of  it  is in violation of
       Article  14  of  the European Convention taken in conjunction with
       Article 2 of Protocol No.4.
   75. The  Applicant's  right  to move freely is violated because of the
       discriminatory effect of the provisions of Regulations on 1999 and
       2000. The requirements of these Regulations are impossible to meet
       as  described  in  the  facts  of  this  case: it is impossible to
       register   in  Moscow,  and  the  State  makes  no  compromise  or
       reasonable exemption on this point, despite PACE's recommendations
       to  this  effect. Therefore, the Russian government discriminately
       restricts  the  right  to freedom of movement of the Applicant who
       does  not  possess  a  registration in Moscow but de facto resides
       there.
   76. The  registration  system therefore violates the Applicant's right
       to  freely choose his place of residence, and infringes his access
       to  other  human  rights (such as healthcare, education, etc.). In
       such  a context, no state law should make the enjoyment of a human
       right  or  the access to governmental services dependant on such a
       registration system.^
   77. Article  14 requires an objective and reasonable justification for
       unequal treatment. In the present case before this Court, there is
       no  justified  basis  for  the  application for the duplicate of a
       driver's  license  to  be  allowed  only  at  the  place  of legal
       residency.  The  only justification for subjecting such a right to
       the  system  of registration is that it is more convenient for the
       authorities  of  the Ministry of Internal Affairs to perform their
       duties.

     * C.  VIOLATION  OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (VIOLATION OF
       ARTICLE 10)

   78. Article 10 of the Convention provides:

   "Everyone  has  the  right  to freedom of expression. This right shall
   include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
   and  ideas  without interference by public authority and regardless of
   frontiers. [...]

   The  exercise  of  these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
   responsibilities,  may  be  subject  to  such formalities, conditions,
   restrictions  or  penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary
   in a democratic society [...]."

   79. The  present  case  clearly  shows  a  violation  of the Principal
       Applicant   and   the   Applicant-Lawyer's  right  to  freedom  of
       expression,  as  understood by the European Court of Human Rights,
       on two grounds, namely the denial of access to information and the
       denial of a possibility to be heard.

   NO ACCESS TO INFORMATION

   80. First,  the  Supreme  Court  sitting  ex parte in chambers (in the
       Decision of 10 April 2013) and the Supreme Court of Appeal (in the
       Decision of 4 June 2013) prevented access to the argumentation and
       the  2007  case'  materials  regarding  judgment  ГКПИ07-527 of 29
       August  2007,  which  hindered the right of access to information,
       which  is  an  essential  component  of  the  right  to freedom of
       expression. By failing to allow access to case materials and legal
       argumentation,  the  Russian Supreme Court restricted the right of
       information  that  Principal Applicant and Applicant-Lawyer needed
       for their legal defence in these cases. It also violated the right
       of  the  Applicant-NGO/News-Agency  for  denying  it access to the
       Decisions  of  10 April 2013 and 4 June 2013, which is contrary to
       the  public's rights and needs within a democratic society. Access
       to these Decisions (on both the merits and on admissibility) would
       have  allowed  the  Applicant  and  his  legal representative (the
       Applicant-Lawyer)  to  litigate their case, as well as allowed the
       public  to  be  informed  of the actions of the judiciary. In this
       case,  a member of the public should be able, as the Court pointed
       out  in  Kobenter and Standard Verlags Gmbh v. Austria, to "verify
       that  judges  are  discharging  their  heavy responsibilities in a
       manner  that  is  in conformity with the aim which is the basis of
       the task entrusted to them" (Kobenter and Standard Verlags Gmbh v.
       Austria, at paragraph 29).
   81. Moreover,   Article  10  of  the  European  Convention  should  be
       understood  as  including  the  right to access to information and
       official  documents  in  a  timely  fashion,  as  mentioned in the
       Committee  of Minister's Recommendations of 2002^ and 2003^. These
       Recommendations  formulate,  articulate,  and  extend the right to
       freedom  of  information  in  member States, including Russia, and
       require  them  to "guarantee the right of everyone to have access,
       on  request,  to  official documents held by public authorities."^
       The  Recommendations  acknowledge  that  special  regard should be
       given  toward the access to information held by legislative bodies
       and  judicial  authorities,  thereby allowing the member States to
       apply and implement measures to respect these principles.^
   82. Access   to  case  materials,  as  well  as  legal  arguments  and
       information,   is   particularly   crucial   for   any   potential
       applicants/litigants and their lawyers involved in a case, as well
       as  for  the  public  at  large.  Indeed,  the  European Court has
       previously  mentioned the importance for the public to be informed
       of  judicial  matters.  For  instance,  in  Ressiot  and others v.
       France,  the  Court  recognized that the public at large had to be
       informed  of  judicial  activities  in  order to supervise its own
       legal system (Ressiot and others v. France, at paragraph 102). The
       lack  of  timely  access  to  the  both the argumentation and case
       materials   of  the  judgment  No.  ГКПИ07-527  (the  2007  case),
       demonstrates  the Russian Federation's breach of Article 10 of the
       European Convention.

   NO ACCESS TO THE HEARING

   83. Second,  the European Court has stated that the public has a right
       to receive information on "questions concerning the functioning of
       the  system  of  justice, an institution that is essential for any
       democratic  society."  (Kobenter  and  Standard  Verlags  Gmbh  v.
       Austria,   at   paragraph  29^).  Thus,  judicial  activities  are
       specifically  included  given  the very definition of a democratic
       society   and  institutions,  which  contribute  to  the  flow  of
       information  in any such society. Therefore freedom of information
       also  entails reasonable and timely access by legal professionals,
       such  as lawyers, to jurisprudence, which is a part of law. In the
       present  case,  the  Supreme  Court  has  prevented  the Principal
       Applicant's   legal  representative,  the  Applicant-Lawyer,  from
       accomplishing  a  professional undertaking since he could not have
       access  to the argumentation, evidence, and case material, and was
       not  even allowed to participate in the hearing, all of which form
       passive   and  active  components  of  the  right  to  freedom  of
       expression.
   84. This   essentially   obstructive  measure  clearly  constituted  a
       violation  of  the  right  to  freedom  of  expression, especially
       considering  the  special  status  of  lawyers  in  any democratic
       society.  Indeed,  the  European  Court  has characterized them as
       playing  a  "central position in the administration of justice, as
       intermediaries  between  the  public  and the courts" (Schoepfer v
       Switzerland,  at paragraphs 17 and 29-30; Casado Coca v. Spain, at
       paragraph 54; Nikula v. Finland, at paragraph 45).
   85. In addition, the Supreme Court of Appeal prevented the Applicant's
       legal  representative,  the Applicant-Lawyer, from accomplishing a
       professional  undertaking  because  the  latter was not allowed to
       submit  any argumentation whatsoever to the court on behalf of his
       client,  according to the Supreme Court of Appeal's interpretation
       of  Part  2  of  Article  333  of  the Civil Procedure Code in the
       Decision  of  4  June  2013. This undeniably violated the right to
       freedom  of  expression of the Principal Applicant as well as that
       of  his  legal representative, the Applicant-Lawyer in the present
       case before the European Court.
   86. This  violation  is  even  more  severe  considering the role of a
       "public  watchdog" played by the legal representative in question,
       who  is also human rights defender. Indeed, human rights defenders
       have  been  recognized  as being a "public watchdog" and have been
       granted  the  right  to impart information of public interest in a
       similar   manner   to   members   of   the   Press   (Tarsasag   a
       Szabadsagjogokert  v.  Hungary).^  Since  the Applicant-Lawyer was
       engaged  in  a "legitimate gathering of information on a matter of
       public  importance"  (Tarsasag  a Szabadsagjogokert v. Hungary, at
       paragraph  28)^, the Court must conclude a violation of Article 10
       of the Convention in the following regards:

    1. lack of access to argumentation, evidence and the materials of the
       case ГКПИ07-527 of 2007 as regards the Principal Applicant and the
       Applicant-Lawyer;
    2. lack of access to the appeal hearing on 4 June 2013 as regards the
       Principal Applicant and the Applicant-Lawyer;
    3. lack  of  access to the Decisions of 10 April 2013 and 4 June 2013
       as regard the Applicant-NGO\News-Agency.

     * D.  VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL (VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6
       S: 1)



   Article 6 S: 1 of the European Convention provides:

   "In  the  determination  of  his  civil  rights  and obligations [...]
   everyone  is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
   time  by  an  independent  and  impartial tribunal established by law.
   [...].  Judgment  shall  be  pronounced publicly [...] in a democratic
   society [...]."

     * D.1. Applicability of Article 6 S: 1 to the Present Case.

   THE LAW

   88. The  wording of Article 6 S: 1 requires the existence of a dispute
       over a civil right rooted in national law. The notion of a dispute
       over  a  civil  right should be understood widely as including any
       procedure  where  the outcome could infringe a civil right. As has
       been  held by the European Court in Benthem v. Netherlands (1985):
       "in  order  to  constitute  a  `determination' of civil rights and
       obligations,  the  outcome  of a dispute must be directly decisive
       for  those  rights  or  obligations.  The  rights at issue must be
       central  to  the  proceedings, and may not be merely incidental or
       have a remote or tenuous connection to the outcome of the domestic
       proceedings in question."^ It is not sufficient to simply consider
       the  national label attached to the procedure, but rather the real
       nature of a dispute behind that national label must be addressed.
   89. Traditionally,  the European Court has considered the civil rights
       as  a part of the private law sphere. However, it was decided that
       not  only  can  procedures  between  private individuals meet that
       definition,  but  also disputes occurring between a government and
       individuals.  In  Ringeisen v. Austria (1971), the Court says that
       ``it is not important for the dispute to occur between two private
       persons  to  be  considered  as  a civil procedure. The wording of
       Article  6  S: 1 is far wider; covering all proceedings the result
       of which is decisive for private rights and obligations".^ In that
       case,  the  administrative  authorities decided not to approve the
       sale  of a piece of land belonging to the applicant Ringeisen. The
       Court  held  that  the  outcome  of the proceedings at issue would
       affect  that applicant's private rights because a pecuniary damage
       was  involved.  That  same  logic  was  applied also in Benthem v.
       Netherlands  (1985)  where  the  applicant  Benthem  was refused a
       business license.
   90. The European Court has indicated that Article 6 S: 1 does not give
       a  particular definition of the notion of civil rights. Indeed, in
       H  v.  Belgium (1987), the Court said that Article 6 S: 1 does not
       in itself guarantee any particular content for (civil) "rights and
       obligations." It should apply to disputes over (civil) "rights and
       obligations"  which  can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to
       be recognised under domestic law.^ In that case, the applicant was
       trying  to  restore  his license to practice law after a period of
       suspension  by  authorities.  The  issue  was  to determine if the
       administrative  dismissal  of  his  application  was effectively a
       civil  procedure.  Because  the  right  to  apply for a license to
       practice  law was a civil right recognised under domestic law, and
       because  the  role of the lawyer featured a civil aspect, the case
       fulfilled the requirements of Article 6 S: 1. The Court also noted
       that  the outcome of the proceedings has caused a pecuniary damage
       to  the  applicant  by  preventing  him from exercising his chosen
       profession altogether.
   91. Even  if the notion of pecuniary damage has often been used by the
       European  Court  to establish the existence of a civil proceeding,
       it  is  not a conditio sine qua non. Indeed, the expression "civil
       rights"  can  refer  to proceedings involving private law aspects,
       but  it can also refer to proceedings related to civil rights in a
       wider sense. In Kenedi v. Hungary (2009), the Court recognised the
       applicability  of  Article 6 S: 1 to a case relating to freedom of
       expression.  This case concerned a historian to whom the access to
       governmental  documentation was denied. In its judgment, the Court
       recalled  "that  the  right to freedom of expression constitutes a
       "civil  right"  for  the purposes of Article 6 S: 1. The Court was
       therefore  satisfied  that  the  subject matter of the case [fell]
       under the civil limb of Article 6 S: 1".^

   APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT CASE

   92. The   provisions  that  were  first  contested  by  the  Principal
       Applicant  before the Russian Supreme Court and the Constitutional
       Court were part of the 1999 Regulation and 2000 Regulation: "[...]
       issuance  and  exchange  of driving licences is carried out by the
       State Inspection of Traffic Police on the territory of the subject
       of  the  Russian Federation where the citizen is registered in the
       place  of  his  permanent  residence  or  temporary residence". As
       mentioned  in  the statement of facts, the Principal Applicant was
       in  practice  refused  an opportunity to obtain a duplicate of his
       lost driver's license in the city of Moscow, and was told to go to
       Dimitrovgrad,  Ulianovsk  region,  a  three-day 2000 km round trip
       voyage to obtain such a document in person.
   93. The  problem  lies  in the requirement of being registered. Simply
       "modifying"  the  official  place  of  registration  is  sometimes
       impossible  for  citizens,  such  as  the  Principal Applicant who
       merely rented an apartment in Moscow. Consequently, any rule which
       requires  a  local  registration to have access to a State service
       effectively   discriminates   based  on  the  citizen's  place  of
       residence,   a   prohibited  ground  of  discrimination  protected
       explicitly  by  Article  14  of  the  European  Convention and the
       Russian  Constitution.  In  the  instant  case,  because  the 1999
       Regulation   and   the  2000  Regulation  requires  such  a  local
       registration for realization of the Applicant's right to apply for
       duplicate  of  his  lost  driver's  license,  and because no other
       options  were  offered  to  the Principal Applicant, the normative
       Regulations are discriminatory on this prohibited ground.
   94. Therefore,  the  discriminatory effects of the 1999 Regulation and
       the  2000  Regulation infringe the Applicant's freedom of movement
       to  choose  his  place of residence. This civil right is rooted in
       Russian national law in Article 27 S: 1 of the Constitution of the
       Russian  Federation, under the second chapter entitled "Rights and
       Freedoms of Man and Citizen":

   "Everyone  who  is  legally  present  on  the territory of the Russian
   Federation  shall have the right to travel freely and freely to choose
   the place of temporary or permanent residence."

   95. According  to  the requirements set out in Benthem v. Netherlands,
       the civil right (freedom of movement) must be directly affected by
       the  outcome  of  the proceeding. The discriminatory effect of the
       1999   Regulation  and  the  2000  Regulation  unduly  forces  the
       Principal  Applicant to travel for many days to simply to obtain a
       duplicate  of  his  lost  driver's  licence.  This form of forced,
       unreasonable  displacement  should  be  considered by the European
       Court  as  a  major  violation  of  the Applicant's civil right to
       freedom  of  movement  recognised  both by the Constitution of the
       Russian  Federation and by the European Convention at Article 2 of
       Protocol No.4.
   96. In  the  same  way,  but more insidiously, the effects of the 1999
       Regulation  and  the  2000  Regulation constitute a barrier to the
       right  to  freely  choose  one's  place of residence because these
       Regulations  require  citizens  to be registered, and because this
       requirement  is  impossible  to  meet  or  comply  with in certain
       populous  cities  such as Moscow. These regulations truly have the
       tangible  effect of diminishing the real capacity to freely choose
       a place of residence, where all rights may be freely exercised. In
       the  present  case, this undue restriction as applied to a citizen
       who  effectively  lives  in  Moscow  and  infringes  the Principal
       Applicant's  right  to  freely  choose his place of residence, and
       exercise his rights accordingly. This should thus be considered as
       a deprivation of a "civil right" as defined by Article 6 S: 1.
   97. Also,  the outcome of the proceeding had a pecuniary effect on the
       Principal   Applicant,   consistent   with  the  European  Court's
       requirement of demonstrating a consequence on the livelihood of an
       Applicant,  affecting  wages or property.^ In the present case, in
       order  to  get  a duplicate of the driver's licence, the Principal
       Applicant would have to take time off from work for at least three
       days,  foregoing  his  salary and his professional reputation as a
       reliable  employee.  Taking  off  three  days of work for personal
       reasons,  is  not  well seen by employers, and could have negative
       repercussions  on  the Applicant professionally. He is also forced
       to  pay  for  the  public  transportation  to obtain his duplicate
       driver's  license for a 2000 km roundtrip voyage. Then, beyond the
       denial of the civil right to freedom of movement, the present case
       concerns  a  denial of civil rights, under its private law meaning
       (which includes professional and pecuniary aspects).
   98. Before  the  Constitutional Court, the Principal Applicant and the
       Applicant-Lawyer  also  challenged  the perverse interpretation of
       Part  2  of  Article  333 of the Civil Procedure Code^ made by the
       Supreme Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court of Appeal employed Part
       2 of Article 333 as a pretext to deny that it had any jurisdiction
       to  hear  the  arguments  from  any  of the parties present in the
       Courtroom.  The  Constitutional  Court rejected the application by
       the   Principal   Applicant,   whereas   the  application  by  the
       Applicant-Lawyer  was  simply  ignored,  the  latter  having never
       received  any  reply or decision from the Constitutional Court. By
       this interpretation, the Russian courts clearly violated the right
       of  the Principal Applicant and the Applicant-Lawyer to freedom of
       expression  as  incorporated  in  the  Constitution of the Russian
       Federation  (Art  29)  and  the  European  Convention  (Art  10)^.
       Therefore,  it  is  reasonable  to consider the proceeding as of a
       civil  nature,  because its outcome, negatively affected the civil
       rights of the Principal Applicant in a direct manner.
   99. In  the  same  way,  the  Supreme  Court  of Appeal as well as the
       Constitutional  Court,  prevented  the Principal Applicant's legal
       representative,   the  Applicant-Lawyer,  from  accomplishing  his
       professional  undertakings  since he himself, as an officer of the
       court, was altogether prohibited from submitting anything to these
       Courts  on  behalf of his client.^ For these reasons, the European
       Court  should  characterize the procedure and its outcome as being
       of a "civil nature", and as being in violation of Article 6 S: 1.

     * D.2. The "Right to a Court" under Article 6(1) of the Convention.

   THE LAW.

   100. According  to  the  European  Court's  case-law,  Article  6 S: 1
       embodies the "right to a court", of which the right of access to a
       court,  that  is, the right to institute proceedings before courts
       in  civil  matters, constitutes one aspect only.^ For the right of
       access  to  a  court  to  be  effective, an individual must have a
       clear,  practical  opportunity  to  challenge  an  act  that is an
       interference with his or her rights.^
   101. Even  though  the  "right  to  a court" is not absolute and lends
       itself  to  limitations,  these  however,  must  not  restrict the
       exercise  of the right in such a way or to such an extent that the
       very  essence  of  the  right  is  impaired.  They  must  pursue a
       legitimate   aim   and  there  must  be  a  reasonable  degree  of
       proportionality  between  the means employed and the aim sought to
       be  achieved.^  Rules  governing  the  procedure  and  time-limits
       applicable  to  legal  remedies  are  intended  to ensure a proper
       administration  of justice and compliance with, in particular, the
       principle  of legal certainty^. The European Court's task, in this
       sphere,  is  not  to  review  the  relevant  law  and  practice in
       abstracto,  but  to  determine  whether  the  manner in which they
       affected  the  Principal Applicant gave rise to a violation of the
       Convention.^

   VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 S: 1

   102. In  the  present  case,  even  though the Principal Applicant had
       "access"  to  the four courts, none of them ruled on the merits of
       the  case  as  put  before  them, due to the cumulative effects of
       violations  of  the  right to a fair trial and ensuing guarantees.
       According  to  the  European Court, this may be sufficient for the
       Court  to  consider that^ such a "situation amounts to a denial of
       justice which impaired the very essence of the [Applicant's] right
       of  access  to  a  court  as  secured  by  Article  6  S: 1 of the
       Convention."^  Indeed,  the  present  case is one where it clearly
       appears  that  the  Applicant faced an opaque, secretive system of
       justice.

   LACK OF ACCESS TO CASE MATERIALS WHICH CONTAIN MAIN EVIDENCE

   103. First,  on  5  April  2013,  the Applicant applied to the Russian
       Supreme  Court  to  challenge  the  1999  Regulation  and the 2000
       Regulation  which  infringed  his  right to move freely within the
       country.  On  10 April 2013, the Supreme Court sitting ex parte in
       chambers   rejected  his  application  on  the  basis  of  a  2007
       unpublished  case  (Judgment  No. ГКПИ07-527) which no one but the
       Supreme  Court  itself  had  access to (Decision of 10 April 2013;
       decision  of  4  June  2013).  Moreover,  as decisions relating to
       inadmissibility  of  a  case in Russia are not published, there is
       neither  transparency nor a reasonable means to address or redress
       the  consequences  of  an incorrect inadmissibility decision. As a
       result,  all  similar  cases  therefore  remain effectively secret
       cases.  The  Principal  Applicant  had  to file the submission for
       appealing  the  decision  by the Supreme Court sitting ex parte in
       chambers  (within  the prescribed time limits) without ever having
       access  to  either the 2007 judgment or the 2007 case material (on
       which the Supreme Court had based its' Decision of 10 April 2013).
       The  Principal  Applicant  finally  got  a  copy  of  the  summary
       information contained in the 2007 judgment through his own private
       contacts, albeit too late to modify his initial appeal submission.
       Anyway,  the 2007 judgment No. ГКПИ07-527 summary obtained was not
       sufficient  as  it did not contain either the grounds on which the
       Applicant  in  2007  case challenged the 1999 Regulation (the fact
       which  serves as the only evidence in the inadmissibility argument
       in  the  Principal  Applicant's  case,  and the fact which is only
       available  from the materials of the 2007 case No. ГКПИ07-527) nor
       the  identity  of  the former Applicant, in the 2007 case, as this
       information could only be accessed in the 2007 case materials.
   104. On  4 July 2013 before the Supreme Court of Appeal, the Principal
       Applicant's  request  (contained in the appeal dated 15 April 2013
       of the Decision of 10 April 2013) to access the 2007 case material
       was  altogether  ignored.  There  is no way of knowing whether the
       grounds  of  the  2007 precedent were the same as in the Principal
       Applicant's  case. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Appeal would
       have  had  the positive obligation to verify any interpretation of
       the  2007  grounds,  and  the  conformity of such grounds with the
       European  Court's  jurisprudence,  which it did not do. Bearing in
       mind  that  there  was  no  hearing at first instance, the Supreme
       Court  of  Appeal did not let the Principal Applicant or his legal
       representative,  the  Applicant-Lawyer, to speak, make submissions
       or  present  any  arguments, or even request for the suspension of
       the  proceedings, as if the decision was already taken in advance.
       In  fact,  there is no way to know if the appeal submission was at
       all  thoroughly  examined  since the European Convention's grounds
       were  neither  mentioned  in  the  appeal nor in the lower court's
       decisions. Moreover, the legal representative of the Applicant was
       refused  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Appeal  to  submit a written
       memorandum  at  the  appeal  hearing  of 4 June 2013 (Annex 8). In
       addition,  the  Principal  Applicant's  European Convention claims
       were also completely absent from both inadmissibility decisions in
       Constitutional  Court.  The  European Court has affirmed^ that the
       refusal to accept the submissions for examination may constitute a
       restriction  on  the  Principal  Applicant's  right of access to a
       court.^

   LACK OF ACCESS TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL HEARING

   105. The  Russian  courts  gave  no explanations as to the reasons why
       they  used  jurisprudence  apparently  unrelated  to the Principal
       Applicant's Convention claims when refusing to consider the merits
       of  the present case. The domestic authorities' explanations as to
       the reasons for the refusal to let the Principal Applicant and his
       legal  representative,  the Applicant-Lawyer, communicate with the
       court  in the instant case were based on the newly introduced Part
       2  of  Article  333  of the Civil Procedure Code: they interpreted
       that  if  there  is  no need to notify the Principal Applicant for
       considering  a separate appeal, then the Principal Applicant shall
       not  participate  in  any way in the proceedings before the Court.
       The  appeal  Decision  of  4  June  2013  does  not  contain  this
       interpretation   expressly.  The  Supreme  Court  of  Appeal  only
       unofficially  mentioned  this interpretation after the hearing and
       the  audio  record of this is available on the web-site.^ However,
       the Constitutional Court expressly stated so in its decision of 24
       September  2013 (Annex 20) delivered in regards to the application
       by  the  Principal  Applicant  (Annex  17). The application by the
       Applicant-Lawyer  was  ignored,  and the latter never received any
       reply  or a decision from the Constitutional Court although he was
       a  co-applicant  in the case of 25 June 2013 to the Constitutional
       Court  together  with the Principal Applicant (Annex 17). However,
       there  is  no apparent legitimacy of such limitation in a free and
       democratic  society,  since  it  amounts  to  a denial of the very
       essence  of the principle of access to justice, as demonstrated in
       the following discussion.
   106. The  effect  of  such  application  of the rules of procedures is
       extreme:  the  Russian  judicial  body  is implementing a complex,
       closed system of what may be called "secret" justice. 1) The Court
       refuses  to  consider  the  substance  of  a  case on the basis of
       "secret"  jurisprudence  and  pleadings  which  may  not  even  be
       consistent  with the relevant European Convention case law. 2) The
       inadmissibility  decisions  of  both  the Supreme Court sitting ex
       parte  in  chambers  and  the  Supreme  Court of Appeal were never
       published, denying any legal certainty to Applicants seeking legal
       remedies  for  an  alleged  violation  of  their civil rights, and
       denying  any  opportunity  of  oversight  by  the  public  to  the
       administration  of  justice, notably against the Federal State and
       on the grounds provided by the European Convention. 3) Both in the
       Supreme  Court  sitting  ex  parte  in chambers and in the Supreme
       Court  of Appeal, the Principal Applicant and the Applicant-Lawyer
       could  not  participate, nor argue the validity of the application
       of  the  2007  case  with  regard  to  the  present  case, nor add
       arguments,  jurisprudence or make other submissions to the Supreme
       Court  sitting  ex  parte  in chambers and to the Supreme Court of
       Appeal.  4)  The  Constitutional Court rejected the application by
       the  Principal Applicant refusing to apply its jurisdiction to fix
       this  situation  by  declaring  Part 2 of Article 333 of CPC to be
       unconstitutional  and ordering new proceedings. The application by
       the  Applicant-Lawyer  was  ignored.  Consequently,  the Principal
       Applicant  has  no  clear or practical opportunity for the Russian
       courts  to  determine the infringement of his effective freedom of
       movement,  because  of the systematic denial of access to judicial
       information  (unpublished  decisions  and  judgments),  a perverse
       application of the rules of procedures (no right to participate to
       the  hearings), and the apparent systematic practice to ignore the
       European  Convention  based-claims  when  rendering  a decision on
       inadmissibility   (unsatisfactorily   reasoned   judgments).  This
       demonstrates   a   structural  barrier  to  adjudicating  European
       Convention  based-claims. The very essence of the right to a court
       was  thereby  impaired here, and such a systemic denial of justice
       cannot  be  justified as consistent with the proper administration
       of justice.
   107. As  regards  to the Principal Applicant this Court may conclude a
       violation of the "right to a court" as protected under the article
       6  S:  1 of the Convention in these circumstances of the following
       facts  of  complete  secrecy  of  justice  (no  opportunity of the
       Applicant to participate in administration of justice):

    1. use  of "secret" evidence by the Supreme Court sitting ex parte in
       chambers;
    2. no hearing by the Supreme Court sitting ex parte in chambers;
    3. no notification to the Applicant of the appeal hearing;
    4. lack of access to the secret evidence before or during the appeal;
    5. use of the secret evidence by the Supreme Court of Appeal;
    6. no participation in the appeal hearing;
    7. no publication of decisions of both courts;
    8. no remedy to the right to court from the Constitutional Court.

     * D.3.  The  Requirement  to  Respect  the  Principle of Adversarial
       Process under Article 6 S: 1 of the Convention

   THE LAW

   108. The  principle  of  equality  of arms and adversarial process has
       been  defined  by the European Court on many occasions. Indeed, it
       requires that each party be given a reasonable opportunity to have
       knowledge  of  and  comment  on  the observations made or evidence
       adduced  by  the  other  party  and  to  present  its  case  under
       conditions  that  do  not  place  it at a substantial disadvantage
       vis-`a-vis  its  opponent.^  Each party must in principle have the
       opportunity  to  make  known any evidence needed for his claims to
       succeed.^
   109. Also,  the European Court has affirmed that the effect of Article
       6  S:  1  is,  inter alia, to place the "tribunal" under a duty to
       conduct  a  proper  examination  of the submissions, arguments and
       evidence   adduced  by  the  parties,  without  prejudice  to  its
       assessment of whether they are relevant to its decision.^ Finally,
       the  trust  of  those  who are subject to judicial decision in the
       functioning  of  justice  is  based,  among  other  things, in the
       assurance  that  they could express themselves on all materials in
       the case.^

   ALLEGED VIOLATION

   110. First,  it  should  be  noted that the 2013 case was still in the
       procedural  stage.  Consequently,  the State as a responding party
       (the Government of the Russian Federation and the Federal Ministry
       of  Internal  Affairs)  has not been notified yet of the Principal
       Applicant's  application  of  5 April 2013 directed against it. In
       other  words, the Principal Applicant is the only party before the
       Supreme  Court  sitting ex parte in chambers and the Supreme Court
       of  Appeal  and  both  times before the Constitutional Court. This
       means  that  the principal opponent of the Principal Applicant was
       the  Judges  of  Supreme Court given that he wanted to reverse the
       decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  sitting ex parte in chambers in
       order  to  see  the  case  judged on its merit, and given that the
       Supreme Court sitting ex parte in chambers brought evidence on its
       own  initiative  in  its  decision.  In  addition,  it  should  be
       considered  that  the compliance with the principle of adversarial
       process  is  ensured  by  the judge whose role is to guarantee the
       fairness  of  proceedings.  In  this  context,  the  principle  of
       equality of arms and adversarial process must be understood as the
       obligation  for  the court to make available all relevant material
       and elements which are taken into account when the court makes its
       decision.  Indeed, the European Court noted in Elles and Others v.
       Switzerland (2010):

   Dans  plusieurs  affaires concernant la Suisse, la Cour a constate une
   violation  de  l'article  6 S: 1 au motif que le requerant n'avait pas
   ete   invite   `a  s'exprimer  sur  les  observations  d'une  autorite
   judiciaire  inferieure,  d'une autorite administrative ou de la partie
   adverse.^

   111. In  the  same  perspective,  there  has  been  a violation of the
       principle  of  adversarial proceeding which implies the principles
       of  equality  of  arms  in the present case, because the Principal
       Applicant could not take note and comment on the relevant material
       (the 2007 case material) which was vital to his 2013 case. Indeed,
       as  mentioned  in  the  statement  of  facts,  the  Judge of first
       instance  ruled  the case as being inadmissible on the basis of an
       unpublished  judgment  which  was neither available to the public,
       nor  to  the  Applicant,  nor  to  his  legal  representative, the
       Applicant-Lawyer.  It  was  only a few days before the appeal that
       the  Principal  Applicant accessed the judgment by his own private
       channels,  but  this  could  not help much since the 2007 judgment
       only  stated  the  conclusions  of  the  Court  without giving the
       parties'  identity, the grounds of the application and the details
       of  the arguments presented before the Court. In fact, this latter
       information  was  only  contained in the case material, which they
       were also not able to access despite request made in the appeal.
   112. This  raises  the  question  of  unjustified  "secret"  evidence.
       Indeed,  according to the European Court: ``the right to access to
       all of the available evidence is restricted under two limitations:
       the  protection  of national and vital interest and the protection
       of  Fundamental rights of others."^ However, none of these reasons
       could  be,  or  was applied in the present case. Consequently, the
       2007  case  materials  can be deemed as "secret" evidence in fact,
       since  only  Judges  have  access to this information and can give
       access  to  this  information, which they did not do. As a result,
       the  Principal  Applicant was unable to prepare for the hearing in
       appeal,^  because  they  could  not  take  note and comment on the
       information  that  directly  affected  the outcome of the case. At
       this point, it is possible to see that no true adversarial process
       was guaranteed, which also implies the related infringement of the
       principle of equality of arms.
   113. In  Chambaz v. Switzerland (2012), the European Court stated that
       when  secret  evidence  is  not  subject  to  the  control  of the
       jurisdiction  of  first  instance,  the  lack  of  equity  in  the
       procedure   should   be   repaired  in  an  appeal  court  by  the
       communication  of  all relevant materials.^ The unjustified use of
       the  secret  evidence  in  first  instance was not repaired in the
       Supreme  Court of Appeal. This latter reiterated the lower Court's
       decision,  did  not  allow  the  Applicant to access the 2007 case
       materials  and  did  not  let  him  present further submissions to
       discuss it. The lack of assistance of the Judges in this matter is
       a breach of the principle of equality of arms. Indeed, in McGinley
       and  Egan  v.  The United Kingdom (1998) the European Court stated
       that  the  principle of equality of arms can also be breached when
       the person holding relevant information (in this case, the Supreme
       Court) prevented the Applicant from gaining access to documents in
       its  possession  which  would  have  assisted  him  in  the  legal
       proceedings.^ Thus, being denied his right to be heard, to present
       his  arguments  and  to comment on the relevant information of his
       case,  the Applicant found himself in a situation which places him
       at  a  substantial  disadvantage  both  in  respect  of lodging an
       appeal, and in the subsequent presentation of any appeal.
   114. In  light  of  the  explanations above, the Judges of the Supreme
       Court sitting ex parte in chambers and the Supreme Court of Appeal
       have not fulfilled their duties. By failing to ensure the equality
       of  arms  and  the adversarial process itself, they undermined the
       confidence  of the Principal Applicant and the Applicant-Lawyer in
       the  functioning  of  the judicial system, which is supposed to be
       guaranteed in a free and democratic society. As a consequence, the
       Court   should  find  related  violations  of  the  guarantees  of
       adversarial  proceedings  and the equality of arms under Article 6
       S:  1  of  the  European  Convention  in  regards to the Principal
       Applicant.

     * D.4.  The  Right  to  a Public Hearing under Article 6 S: 1 of the
       Convention

   THE LAW - ORAL HEARING AND EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION

   115. The  entitlement  to the right to a "public hearing" in Article 6
       S:  1 implies the right of a party to be present before the Court^
       and subsequently the right to an "oral hearing", that is to say to
       participate effectively at the hearing. Indeed, the European Court
       had  found  that  in  proceedings before a court of first and only
       instance,  the right to a "public hearing" in the sense of Article
       6  S:  1  entails an entitlement to an "oral hearing" unless there
       are  exceptional circumstances that justify dispensing with such a
       hearing.^ The exceptional character of the circumstances which may
       justify  dispensing with an oral hearing essentially relate to the
       nature  of  the  issues  to  be  decided by the competent national
       court,  but  not  the  frequency of such situations.^ There may be
       proceedings  in  which  an  oral  hearing may not be required: for
       example  where  there  are  no  issues of credibility or contested
       facts  which  necessitate  a hearing and the courts may fairly and
       reasonably   decide   the  case  on  the  basis  of  the  parties'
       submissions and other written materials.^

   VIOLATION - ORAL HEARING AND EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION

   116. In  the present case, the absence of a public and oral hearing is
       due  to  the  fact  that  the  Russian Courts assessed the case on
       procedural  matters. However, because of anomalies, that is to say
       the  absence  of  adequate  opportunities for the Applicant to put
       forward  his case in writing and to challenge the evidence against
       him, an oral hearing should have been granted in the Supreme Court
       of Appeal.
   117. As  explained  before,  the  Supreme  Court  sitting  ex parte in
       chambers  took  its  Decision  of  10  April  2013  based  upon an
       unpublished  and inaccessible case of 2007 and upon case materials
       which contained de facto secret evidence which already checked the
       legality  of  the  normative challenged Regulations, supposedly on
       the  same  grounds  (Decision  No. ГКПИ07-527 of 09 August 2007.).
       This  could  not  even be verified as the 2007 case materials were
       altogether  inaccessible  to the Applicant even on demand, and the
       grounds  were completely absent from the text of the 2007 judgment
       (See  Annex  27).  Consequently,  the  present 2013 case was ruled
       inadmissible  only  on  the  basis  of  a "secret" precedent which
       challenged  the  same  Regulations,  but  probably not on the same
       grounds  as to the present application.^ Moreover, this means that
       the  Applicant  could  not  effectively  contest  the decision and
       reasonably  prepare  for  the  appeal,  since  he lacked essential
       information.
   118. This  application  of  the  rules  of  procedure (on decisions of
       inadmissibility)  was  questionable insofar since it raised doubts
       as  to  the  respect of the principles enshrined in the right to a
       fair  trial  (such  as  an  adversarial  process  and  a  reasoned
       judgment).  This  could  have  been remedied on appeal, but it was
       not.
   119. Where  proceedings  by  the  Supreme  Court  sitting  ex parte in
       chambers  at  first  instance  did  not  involve  the  Applicant's
       attendance,  this may be cured at the appeal level, as long as the
       appeal  court  is entitled to rule on questions of fact as well as
       law.  In  the  instant  case,  the  decision  by the Supreme Court
       sitting  ex  parte  in chambers was made without any hearing as it
       was  an  inadmissibility  decision. However, given that there were
       anomalies  in the decision of first instance, the Supreme Court of
       Appeal  must have given the Principal Applicant the opportunity to
       challenge  in  writing  or  orally  the 2007 "secret" evidence put
       against him by the Supreme Court sitting ex parte in chambers. The
       Principal   Applicant   could   not  present  appropriate  written
       submissions  since  he  had  no  access to the 2007 case material.
       While  he  and  his  legal  representative were able to access the
       court  room during the appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal did not
       let  them participate at all in the hearing, either by submissions
       or  orally,  and  ignored  their  demand  to  access the 2007 case
       evidence used to rule against the Principal Applicant, and did not
       suspend  the proceedings. It is one thing to be physically present
       before  the  Court;  it  is  another  to be allowed to participate
       effectively.
   120. According  to  the  Russian  domestic  procedure before an appeal
       Court, the Judge must take the

   attendance of the parties before starting the trial (Part 2 of Article
   161  of Civil Procedure Code). But the Supreme Court of Appeal totally
   ignored  this  part  and  immediately passed to the examination of the
   case  without  accepting any submission (written or oral) and refusing
   to   let   the   Applicant   and   his   legal   representative,   the
   Applicant-Lawyer,   speak.  In  fact,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Appeal
   proceeded  as  if the concerned party was not there. It is interesting
   to  mention  that  the  European  Court  noted  the  Russian  habit to
   disregard  the  presence  of  applicants  before  appeal instances. In
   Kolegovy  v.  Russia (2012) the applicant was not properly notified in
   due  time  for the appeal hearing; and the Russian Court accepted oral
   submissions from the State in absence of the applicant:

   "The  participation  in  the hearing enabled the other party to submit
   observations  on  the  applicants'  appeal submissions, which were not
   communicated  to  the  applicants  and  to  which they could not reply
   orally.  The Court reiterates that it has frequently found a violation
   of Article 6 S: 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to
   the one in the present case."^

   121. The  Russian Court of Appeal invoked Part 2 of Article 333 of the
       Civil  Procedure  Code  and prohibited the Applicant and his legal
       representative, the Applicant-Lawyer, from speaking altogether:

   "A  separate appeal or prosecutor's presentation against a ruling of a
   court of the first instance, except for rulings to suspend proceedings
   in respect of a case, to terminate proceedings in respect of a case or
   to  shelve  an  application  shall be considered without notifying the
   persons participating in the case" (Part 2 of Article 333 of the Civil
   Procedure Code).

   122. It is true that on the one hand, this article does not oblige the
       appeal Court to notify the parties when reviewing their case. But,
       on  another  hand,  it  does  not  prohibit  the attendance or the
       participation  of the parties to the hearing. Moreover, Article 14
       Part  1  Section 2 Subsection "в" of the Federal Law No 262-FZ, 22
       December   2008   "On  Providing  Access  to  Information  on  the
       Activities  of Courts in the Russian Federation" obliges courts to
       publish  such  information  as date, time and place of hearings on
       their Court web-sites. This was the way Principal Applicant in the
       present  case  found  out  about  the  date, time and place of the
       hearing of his appeal.
   123. In  addition,  and bearing in mind that there was no oral hearing
       before  the  Supreme  Court  sitting ex parte in chambers, and the
       Principal   Applicant  and  the  Applicant-Lawyer  never  had  the
       opportunity  to  gain  knowledge of, to comment upon, or challenge
       the  use  and  the  content of the 2007 "secret" precedent used to
       adjudicate  against  him.  As  a  consequence,  by  forbidding the
       Principal  Applicant  and  the Applicant-Lawyer from speaking, the
       Supreme  Court  of  Appeal  interpreted  the law in a perverse way
       which  contradicts  the  Judges'  basic  responsibility  to ensure
       fairness  of  proceedings.  In  fact,  by refusing to fix judicial
       errors committed by the judge of first instance, the Supreme Court
       of  Appeal  has  simply  failed  to exercise its jurisdiction as a
       Court of Appeal.
   124. These errors could have been repaired by the Constitutional Court
       since the latter can both invalidate laws and compel a lower court
       to  review  a  case.  But the Constitutional Court also refused to
       exercise   its   jurisdiction.   On   24   September   2013,   the
       Constitutional  Court ruled as inadmissible the application of the
       Principal   Applicant  filed  on  24  June  2013  challenging  the
       interpretation  of  Part  2  of Article 333 of the Civil Procedure
       Code.   It   should  be  stressed  that  the  application  by  the
       Applicant-Lawyer  was  ignored  by  the  Constitutional Court, the
       latter  having  never replied to his application. According to the
       Constitutional  Court's  reasoning (Annex 19)^ , if a Court allows
       the Applicant to take part in a hearing on a procedural matter, it
       somehow infringes the principle of equality of arms in relation to
       the other party (that is, the State in the present case). However,
       as the Russian Government and the Ministry of Internal Affairs has
       not  been "notified" yet of the 2013 complaint filed against it up
       until  this  point,  and  the  case  was not yet considered on the
       merits,  there  never  was  an actual case involving another party
       (the  Russian Government and the Ministry of Internal Affairs). In
       other words, there was no "other" party or defendant at this stage
       of  the  proceedings  (10 April 2013 or 4 June 2013), but only the
       Judges  and the Applicant. Consequently, this argument used by the
       Constitutional  Court is untenable and its refusal to consider the
       arguments of the parties on the merits demonstrated a violation of
       Article 6 S: 1 at the systemic level.
   125. In  addition,  we  must  mention  that  before the constitutional
       complaint   by   the  Principal  Applicant  of  24  June  2013  on
       challenging  Part  2  of  Article  333,  on  30  November 2012 the
       Constitutional  Court  in  its  judgment No29-P^ ^ruled that inter
       alia  Part  2  Article  333  of  CPC  corresponds  to  the Russian
       Constitution  in  regard  to  lack of obligation to notify parties
       about  the  time, date, and place of appeal hearing on legality of
       inadmissibility  decision. The judgment No29-P of 30 November 2012
       by  the  Constitutional  Court  served  as  a ground to reject the
       constitutional   complaint  of  24  June  2013  by  the  Principal
       Applicant  (once  again  the complaint of the Applicant-Lawyer was
       ignored).   By  doing  so,  the  Constitutional  Court  failed  to
       distinguish  facts  of  the Principal Applicant's case (he and his
       representative  were  not  allowed  to  participate  in the appeal
       hearing)  from the facts of the applicants in the judgment No 29-P
       of 30 November 2012 (the applicants were not notified of the date,
       time and place of appeal hearings).
   126. The  Constitutional  Court Judge G.A. Zhilin delivered a separate
       opinion  on  the  judgment No 29-P of 30 November 2012 arriving at
       the  conclusion  that inter alia Part 2 of Article 333 of CPC does
       not  correspond to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, its
       Articles 19 (Part 1), 46 (Part 1), 55 (Part 3) и 123 (Part 3), and
       violates rights of parties to a fair trial.
   127. The  Constitutional Court judgment No 29-P of 30 November 2012 is
       heavily criticised by the academic community. Absolute majority of
       opinions of academic experts requested by the Constitutional Court
       (exceptions are Urals State Law Academy and Omsk State University)
       arrived  at the conclusion that Part 2 Article 333 of CPC violated
       the  right  to  a  fair  trial.  ^After  the  Constitutional Court
       judgment  No  29-P  of 30 November 2012 was announced, a number of
       academics  published articles criticizing the Constitutional Court
       judgment  No  29-P of 30 November 2012 and supporting the separate
       opinion by Justice G.A. Zhilin.^
   128. As  a  result,  it  can  clearly be stated that there has been no
       effective  participation  of  the  Applicant  at  any stage of the
       proceedings,  to the extent that his right to a public hearing was
       violated  again  and again in each instance. He was never given an
       adequate  opportunity  to  challenge  in  writing  or  orally  the
       unjustified secret evidence used against him.

   THE LAW - PUBLIC JUDGMENT

   129. Article  6  S:  1  provides  that:  "Judgment shall be pronounced
       publicly  (...)  in  a  democratic  society".  The  European Court
       affirmed that it was not necessary for the judgment actually to be
       read  out  in open court, and that States enjoyed discretion as to
       the   manner  in  which  judgments  should  be  made  public.  The
       requirement  of publicity of judgments under this provision may be
       satisfied  by  making  judgments  available in court registries or
       publishing  them in writing.^^ At least, anyone who establishes an
       interest should obtain the full text of judgments of the Court.^

   ALLEGED VIOLATION - PUBLICITY AND PUBLIC JUDGMENT.

   130. As  mentioned  above  (see,  section on adversarial process), the
       Judge  of  the Supreme Court sitting ex parte in chambers rejected
       the  present  case  on the basis of a case from 2007 which was not
       published  anywhere.  Furthermore,  only  partial  information was
       given  to  the  Principal Applicant (the date of the judgment, the
       name  of  the  Court  and  the case number) and none of the higher
       Courts  published  this  case or the related case materials which,
       until today, remain de facto "secret" evidence. In this regard, in
       Ryakib  v. Russia, the European Court found a violation of Article
       6  S:  1  "where  the  decisions  of  courts  of  both  levels  of
       jurisdiction,  before  which  a  case  concerning compensation for
       detention  was  heard  in private, were not delivered publicly and
       were  not  otherwise accessible to the public."^ Mutatis mutandis,
       this  precedent  should  apply  to  the  instant  case  (no public
       judgment,  no access to the 2007 case materials, no hearing in the
       Supreme  Court  sitting  ex  parte  in chambers, no publication of
       inadmissibility  decisions, no oral hearing in appeal, no minute).
       Moreover, the European Court added:

   "In  a  case in which dispensing with a public hearing was found to be
   unjustified,  the  provision  of  access to the case file to those who
   established  a  legal  interest  in  the  case  and the publication of
   decisions  of  special interest, mostly of the appellate courts or the
   Supreme  Court,  was  held  not to suffice in order to comply with the
   publicity requirement in question."^

   131. In  other words, even if the higher Courts would have allowed the
       Applicant to access the 2007 case material, which they did not, it
       nevertheless  would  not  have  sufficed  because  as  it has been
       explained previously the Supreme Court had no legitimate reason to
       prevent the holding of a public hearing in this case. Thus, by not
       publishing  the  judgment  of  2007, by not allowing access to the
       2007  case  materials and by subsequently using them to dismiss an
       application,  the  Supreme  Court  of  both instances violated the
       Applicant's right to a public judgment which directly affected the
       inadmissibility decision.
   132. This  situation  is  explained  by  the  fact that in Russia, the
       mandatory  publication  of  judgments  has existed since 2010, but
       this  obligation  has been restricted to judgments rendered on the
       merits.^ Therefore, procedural decisions are not published and the
       judgments  on the merits dating from before 2010 may also not have
       been  published. Although at the level of domestic law, Russia had
       no obligation to publish the judgments rendered in 2007, it had an
       obligation  to  do  so  from  the standpoint of international law.
       Indeed,  Russia  joined  the Council of Europe on 28 February 1996
       and  ratified  the European Convention on 5 May 1998. As a result,
       Russia  had  to comply with the requirements of the Convention. It
       should  have  respected  the  principle  of  "judgment  pronounced
       publicly"  by  publishing the 2007 judgment in its entirety, or at
       least  by  giving  access to it and the related case materials^ as
       the Applicant had asked for.
   133. Also, as explained previously, the Russian Courts are not obliged
       to  publish  decisions  on  procedural  issues.  Consequently, the
       respective  Decisions issued by the Supreme Court sitting ex parte
       in  chambers and the Supreme Court of Appeal in this case were not
       published  in  addition  to the fact that the proceedings were not
       held  in  public.  In  Malhous  v.  The Czech Republic (2001), the
       European Court reiterated the right to publicity:

   "The  holding  of  court  hearings in public constitutes a fundamental
   principle enshrined in paragraph 1 of Article 6. This public character
   protects  litigants  against  the  administration of justice in secret
   with  no  public  scrutiny;  it  is  also  one  of  the  means whereby
   confidence   in  the  courts  can  be  maintained.  By  rendering  the
   administration  of  justice  transparent, publicity contributes to the
   achievement  of  the  aim  of Article 6 S: 1, namely a fair trial, the
   guarantee  of  which  is  one  of  the  fundamental  principles of any
   democratic society, within the meaning of the Convention."^

   134. Thus,  by  not  publishing the decisions in the present case, the
       Russian  Courts  establish  a secret system of justice (altogether
       violating   the   right   of  publicity).  Moreover,  the  pattern
       illustrated  by  this  case  may  be  repeated  in  any other case
       challenging  any  normative  act of the government and its agents.
       Indeed,  by  maintaining  this  system  where  the  publication of
       decisions  is  optional,  the  judiciary  may  continue to dismiss
       future  applications seeking to contest or review of provisions of
       the  1999  and 2000 Regulations as being inadmissible based on the
       unpublished  2007  judgment,  thereby  effectively  insulating the
       State  against  any  legal  proceedings.  Future  applicants  will
       neither   be  able  to  access  similar  admissibility  decisions,
       understand  the  nature of the Courts' reasoning, or know how many
       times  this pattern was repeated. Such a system leaves no trace of
       the  current  legal  situation. Proceedings on inadmissibility are
       held   in   chambers,   no  proces-verbal  exists,  decisions  are
       unpublished  and  case  materials remain inaccessible as no timely
       access  is  ever  granted.  This  portrait  of  a secret system of
       justice  raises  serious  doubts  as  to  the  principle  of legal
       certainty, and fairness of proceedings in a democratic society. In
       the  end,  justice  loses sight of its original purpose, since the
       decisions  on  admissibility may be based solely on willingness of
       judges  to perform their duties properly, and fully exercise their
       jurisdiction, thus leaving the door open to arbitrariness.
   135. In  this  perspective,  the  European  Court must conclude that a
       violation  of  the right to a public hearing guaranteed by Article
       6S:  1  of  the  Convention  occurred  in regards to the Principal
       Applicant.

     * D.5. The Requirement to Give Reasons and Consider the Arguments of
       the Parties under Article 6S: 1 of the Convention

   THE LAW

   136. The  lack  of  examination  of  the  argument  of  the  Applicant
       regarding the European Convention is a violation of the right to a
       fair  trial,  ensured by Article 6 S: 1, as it has been recognised
       by the European Court on many occasions.
   137. Indeed,  "Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) obliges the courts to give
       reasons  for  their  judgments".^ Furthermore, a national Court is
       under  a  duty to "conduct a proper examination of the submission,
       arguments  and  evidence adduced by the parties, without prejudice
       to its assessment of whether they are relevant to its decision".^
   138. However,  national  Courts  have some discretion when considering
       arguments  and  evidence,  since Article 6 S: 1 does not require a
       Court  to  give  a  detailed  answer  to  every  argument raised.^
       Nevertheless,  the  Court  must  justify  its activities by giving
       reasons  for  its  decisions^:  "the national Courts must indicate
       with  sufficient  clarity  the  grounds  on which they based their
       decision"^  in  order  to  demonstrate  that the parties have been
       heard.^
   139. In addition, the right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 6
       S:  1  of  the  European Convention includes the parties' right to
       raise  observations they judge relevant and that this right is not
       solely theoretical:

   "La  Convention  ne  visant  pas  `a garantir des droits theoriques ou
   illusoires  mais  des  droits  concrets et effectifs. Ce droit ne peut
   passer   pour   effectif   que   si  ces  observations  sont  vraiment
   <>, c'est-`a-dire dument examinees par le tribunal saisi."^

   140. Therefore,  even though the obligation to state reasons will vary
       depending  on  the nature of the decision and the circumstances of
       the  case,  the  European  Court  states  that  a national Court's
       silence  could  give rise to doubt on the scope of the examination
       conducted  by  that  Court.^  Consequently,  if  a  national Court
       considers  that  certain arguments and/or evidence presented by an
       Applicant  have  no  merit,  or  are  irrelevant  to the matter in
       dispute, it must state the reason why they are not considered.

   VIOLATION

   141. The  guarantees  underlying Article 6 S: 1 must be applied before
       all  types  of  courts,  including in the present case the Supreme
       Court  sitting  ex  parte in chambers, the Supreme Court of Appeal
       and the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.
   142. As  mentioned  in the statement of facts, the Principal Applicant
       filed  a  complaint before the Supreme Court, and later before the
       Court  of Appeal, challenging the application of Article 12 of the
       1999  Regulation and 2000 Regulation on the ground of Article 2 of
       Protocol  4  to the European Convention. Before the Constitutional
       Court,  he  filed  two complaints subsequently, 1) challenging the
       application  of  the  1999  Regulation  and 2000 Regulation on the
       grounds  of  Article 2 of Protocol 4 and the Russian Constitution;
       2)  challenging  the interpretation by the Supreme Court of Appeal
       of  Part  2  of  Article  333  of  the Civil Procedure Code on the
       grounds  of  Article  6 of the European Convention and the Russian
       Constitution.
   143. Despite  the  fact  that  each  of these Courts were aware of the
       alleged   violations,  they  neglected  to  mention  the  European
       Convention  and  disregarded  these violations in their judgments.
       This  failure  to  even mention these arguments in their decisions
       has  resulted  in a breach of the requirement to state the reasons
       for a decision set out in Article 6(1) of the European Convention.
       The  Applicant  had  no way of knowing if he was heard, or whether
       his arguments were considered.
   144. Moreover,  all  of the Courts refused to consider the case on the
       merits.  The  reasoning  of  the Supreme Court sitting ex parte in
       chambers and the Court of Appeal were based on the 2007 case which
       was  neither  available  to the public nor to the Applicant or the
       Applicant-Lawyer  .  Even  when  the  Applicant  managed  to get a
       summary  of  the  2007  case at a much later date, this was not of
       much  help  since  the grounds of the case and the identity of the
       party  in  question  were  only  accessible in the case materials,
       which  had  not  been made available to the Principal Applicant or
       his  legal representative. The Supreme Court of Appeal ignored the
       Applicant's request to access this information (i.e. the 2007 case
       materials).  The  Applicant, therefore could not submit additional
       arguments for his appeal application, in addition to the fact that
       the Supreme Court of Appeal did not let him or his lawyer speak in
       Court or present additional arguments. The conclusions of both the
       Supreme  Court  sitting ex parte in chambers and the Supreme Court
       of Appeal were therefore based on "secret" evidence.^ Furthermore,
       there  was  no  way  to  know  if  the  2007 case was based on any
       provisions  of  the  European  Convention,  as  was  the 2013 case
       regarding  the  Principal  Applicant.  If  the 2007 case was truly
       based on the same grounds as the 2013 case, then the Supreme Court
       should  have  updated  its  interpretation of its 2007 decision in
       accordance  with  the  contemporary  jurisprudence of the European
       Court  in 2013, which it did not do and could not reasonably claim
       to have done.
   145. However,  in  Russian  domestic law, it is specified that a judge
       shall  refuse  to  consider an application on the merits "if there
       exists  the  judgment of the Court that has come into legal effect
       which  has  verified  the legality of the disputed legal normative
       act  of  the  state  government body, of the local self-government
       body   or  of  the  official  on  the  grounds  specified  in  the
       application."^  The Supreme Court of Appeal affirmed that the 2007
       case  which  served  as a precedent and the present case was based
       "on  the  same  grounds".^  Yet,  there  is no way to verify or to
       challenge  this  claim  since, as mentioned before, the grounds of
       the  2007  case  could  only  be identified from the relevant case
       material which was never published and remained only accessible to
       the  Court  without any legitimate or recognized reason for such a
       denial of access to information. In addition, the important issues
       related  to  violations of the European Convention were completely
       left  unaddressed  in both the 2007 and 2013 cases, which has left
       the  Applicant  clueless  as to whether the same grounds were ever
       considered or not.
   146. In   relation   to   the  Constitutional  Court,  in  both  cases
       (challenging  the  1999 and 2000 Regulations and Part 2 of Article
       333   of   CPC)  the  Constitutional  Court  refused  to  consider
       applications   on   the  merits,  basing  its  decisions  on  some
       jurisprudence  which  were  not founded on the rights protected by
       the  European Convention, and therefore were not based on the same
       grounds specified in the Applicant's claim.
   147. Consequently, it is clear that each of the four Courts completely
       overlooked  the  Applicant's  allegations  of  violations  of  the
       European   Convention   both   in   their  judgments  and  in  the
       jurisprudence  relied  upon. The Supreme Court sitting ex parte in
       chambers  and the Supreme Court of Appeal based their decisions on
       some   illegitimate  "secret"  jurisprudence  that  could  not  be
       discussed  or  examined, and without any justification. Therefore,
       the  four  refusals  to  consider  the  cases  on  the  merits are
       unsatisfactorily  reasoned,  each leading in a breach of Article 6
       S: 1 .
   148. This  is not a case where a tribunal has taken the liberty not to
       respond  in  detail  to  each  argument,  but  rather a case where
       tribunals  have  chosen  to  consciously  ignore  valid  arguments
       brought up by the Applicant. Indeed, these omissions by the Courts
       give  rise  to  serious  doubts as to the scope of the examination
       undertaken  by  them.^  Moreover, a constitutional-type court is a
       fortiori  under  a  duty  to  ensure that litigants enjoyed in the
       proceedings  before  it  the  fundamental  guarantees laid down in
       Article  6  of  the  European  Convention.^  The  requirement of a
       justification  exists  to  protect  against  arbitrariness  and to
       require  the  Judge  to  explain  what motivated his decision. The
       legal process finds much of its legitimacy in the justification of
       its judgments, which is totally absent in the present case.
   149. The  Court  should thus conclude a violation of Article 6 S: 1 of
       the Convention as regards the unfairness of proceedings in regards
       to the Principal Applicant.

     * E.  VIOLATIONS  OF  THE RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY (VIOLATION OF
       ARTICLE 13)

   THE LAW

   150. Article 13 provides:

   "Everyone  whose  rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention
   are  violated  shall  have  an  effective  remedy  before  a  national
   authority  notwithstanding  that  the  violation has been committed by
   persons acting in an official capacity."

   151. The  European  Court  has  held that a domestic appeals procedure
       cannot be considered effective within the meaning of Article 13 of
       the  European  Convention, unless it affords a possibility to deal
       with the substance of an "arguable complaint" under the Convention
       and  to  grant appropriate relief. Giving direct expression to the
       States'  obligation,  enshrined in Article 1 of the Convention, to
       protect  human  rights  first  and foremost within their own legal
       system,  Article  13  establishes  an  additional guarantee for an
       individual  in  order  to ensure that he or she effectively enjoys
       those rights.^
   152. Moreover, Article 13 of the Convention requires that the national
       legal  system  must make available to the individual concerned the
       effective possibility of challenging the measure complained of and
       of  having the relevant issues examined with sufficient procedural
       safeguards  and  thoroughness  by  an  appropriate  domestic forum
       offering adequate guarantees of independence and impartiality.^
   153. Finally,  the  scope of the Contracting States' obligations under
       Article 13 of the Convention varies depending on the nature of the
       applicant's  complaint.  The  "effectiveness" of a "remedy" within
       the  meaning of this provision does not depend on the certainty of
       a  favourable  outcome  for  the  applicant. At the same time, the
       remedy  required  by Article 13 must be "effective" in practice as
       well  as  in  law  in  the  sense either of preventing the alleged
       violation  or  its  continuation, or of providing adequate redress
       for any violation that has already occurred.^

     * E.1.  In  Conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 and Article
       14 to the Convention

   154. In the present case, the claim that an act of the authorities may
       have  infringed  the  Principal  Applicant's  right  to freedom of
       movement  on discriminatory grounds is arguable, as assessed above
       (see  above:  Alleged Violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 and
       Article 14 to the Convention).
   155. Russian  law  provided for a possibility to appeal to the Supreme
       Court  and/or  the Constitutional Court against the application by
       the  Federal  Government  Article 12 of the 1999 Regulation and by
       the  Minister  of  Interior  Affairs  of  Article  3  of  the 2000
       Regulation inconsistent with the European Convention (Article 2 of
       Protocol  No.  4,  Article  14,  Article  10),  and/or the Russian
       Constitution.
   156. However,  the  Supreme  Court  sitting  ex parte in chambers, the
       Supreme  Court  of Appeal and the Constitutional Court all refused
       to consider the case on the merits. As illustrated above (see: The
       "right  to  a  court"  under  Article  6  S: 1 of the Convention -
       section  D.2.), the portrait of the closed and secretive system of
       justice  in  Russia  is  eloquent  as  to the ineffectiveness of a
       so-called  remedy.  1)  The  Applicant  applied  to  a Court which
       rejected  his  application  on  the basis of an unpublished secret
       judgment and related case material no one can access but the Court
       itself.  2)  No  reasons  were  given  or recognized as to why the
       evidence  was  made  secret  in  practice; 3) The Supreme Court of
       Appeal  did  not  exercise its jurisdiction by completely ignoring
       the  Principal  Applicant's  requests  to  access  the  2007  case
       materials  and to suspend the proceedings in order to guaranty the
       requirements  of the principle of an adversarial trial process; 4)
       The Courts never publish inadmissibility decisions, so there is no
       transparency,  or  legal certainty as to the procedural questions;
       5)   The   present   case  concerning  the  Applicant,  which  has
       systematically  been  denied  admissibility,  and  remains  itself
       entirely  secret  and  inaccessible  to the general public; 6) The
       Supreme   Court  sitting  ex  parte  in  chambers  did  not  allow
       participation, nor did the Supreme Court of Appeal; 7) The Supreme
       Court  sitting  ex parte in chambers, the Court of Appeal and both
       Constitutional   Courts   disregarded  the  European  Convention's
       grounds of the application when deciding, and base their decisions
       on  secret  a  decision  which  potentially does not share similar
       grounds  to the present case before them, so the Applicant has had
       no  way  to  know  if  he was heard, or completely ignored; 8) The
       Constitutional Court refused to exercise its jurisdiction to order
       a new hearing.
   157. As  a  result, the portrait leads to the conclusion of a systemic
       denial  of justice where a citizen, under Russian jurisdiction and
       with a legitimate claim, cannot question the legality of a Federal
       Government  Regulation,  and  even  less  so on the grounds of the
       European  Convention.  Moreover,  such  a  decision  and all other
       similar decisions remain secret and are never made public.
   158. Of  course,  in such conditions where the Principal Applicant was
       denied   access  to  remedies,  the  Principal  Applicant  got  no
       appropriate  redress  to  enforce his fundamental rights. No other
       effective remedy or relief exists in Russian law.^
   159. This  Court  should  therefore  conclude  that  in regards to the
       Principal  Applicant  there  has been a violation of Article 13 of
       the  Convention,  because  the remedies in the present case do not
       meet the "effectiveness" standard both in practice and in law.

     * E.2. In Conjunction with Article 10 of the Convention 

   160. In the present case, the claim that an act of the authorities may
       have  infringed the Principal Applicant and the Applicant-Lawyer's
       right to freedom of expression is tenable, as assessed above (see:
       C. Violation of Article 10 of the Convention).
   161. Russian   law   provided   the   Principal   Applicant   and  the
       Applicant-Lawyer  a  cosmetic  "possibility" to contest before the
       Constitutional  Court the Supreme Court of Appeal's interpretation
       and  application  of  Part 2 of Article 333 of the Civil Procedure
       Code,   which   are  inconsistent  with  the  European  Convention
       (Articles 10 and 6), and/or the Russian Constitution.
   162. However,  for  a  lawyer  as  an officer of the Court, freedom of
       expression   can   only   be  exercised  before  the  Court  while
       representing  the  client.  When  the  Court  of Appeal refused to
       exercise  its jurisdiction to terminate the ongoing and continuous
       violations  of  Article 10 of the Convention in effect, notably by
       not  letting the lawyer speak, access the information to the case,
       add  submissions  or  present  arguments,  and by even refusing to
       consider  a  request to suspend the proceedings, then no effective
       remedy  existed  for  the  professional  legal  representative qua
       victim  (and  his client, the Applicant) unless the Constitutional
       Court  were  to  order  a  new  hearing  of  the case. Indeed, the
       Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to order new proceedings for
       the   client   to  be  satisfied,  but  the  Constitutional  Court
       altogether  refused  to  exercise  its  jurisdiction  to  do so in
       regards  to the Principal Applicant and ignored the application of
       the  Applicant-Lawyer  altogether. No declarations or disciplinary
       sanctions  are  available  to the Principal Applicant to remedy to
       the   situation.  The  Applicant-Lawyer  was  in  fact  kept  from
       fulfilling his occupational requirements, and could technically be
       sued  for  negligence. Russian law provided no possibility for the
       Applicant-Lawyer  to  remedy  the  alleged  violation  of  his own
       freedom  of  expression,  as evidenced by the Constitutional Court
       having completely ignored his application.
   163. In short, the systemic problem is as follows:

    1. Before the Supreme Court of Appeal, there was

    A. a  breach  of  access  to  information  by  ignoring the Principal
       Applicant's request to access the 2007 case material (the "secret"
       evidence) used to reject the admissibility of his application, 1.
    B. a  breach  of  the  Principal Applicant and the Applicant-Lawyer's
       freedom of expression by preventing them from participating in the
       hearing, while there was neither any hearing of first instance nor
       the  possibility  to  comment on the "secret" evidence used in the
       lower Court's decision; 2)



   By  not considering any request, including to suspend the proceedings,
   the  Supreme  Court of Appeal prejudiced both the Applicant-Lawyer who
   could  not  fulfill  his  professional requirements, and the Principal
   Applicant  who  could  not  have  his  civil  and  conventional rights
   adjudicated fairly;



   The  only  remedy  for the infringement of the Principal Applicant and
   the   Applicant-Lawyer's   freedom   of   expression   was   for   the
   Constitutional Court to order new proceedings, which it did not do.



   Instead, the Constitutional Court refused to exercise its jurisdiction
   to  remedy  the  situation,  and  rejected  the claim of the Principal
   Applicant  on  dubious  legal  logic (namely: "If the Court allows the
   participation  of  the  Applicant, the right of the defendant, who did
   not  come  to the Court, is violated", even though there was no actual
   defendant  at  the admissibility phase, since there was no actual case
   yet).  It  also  ignored  the  application by the Applicant-Lawyer and
   overlooked  any  of  the  Applicant's  claims  related to the European
   Convention  both in the reasoning of its decision and in the choice of
   jurisprudence  to  support  its motivations, therefore failing to give
   appropriate   reasons   to  its  decision.  Obviously,  the  Principal
   Applicant  and  his  legal  representative,  the  Applicant-Lawyer, in
   practice  had  no  possibility  to  have  their case considered on the
   substance with sufficient procedural safeguards and thoroughness.



   Overall,  this  case  demonstrates that there is a judicial culture of
   secrecy,  where unpublished judgments with inaccessible case materials
   are  used  to justify inadmissibility decisions, while these decisions
   are  simply  not published at all (Article 5.5 of the Order of 18 June
   2010 by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court), which is in breach of
   the  right  to  access  information  and  the  principle  of  judicial
   transparency and legal certainty. Moreover, by invoking the new Part 2
   of  Article  333  of  the  Civil Procedure Code, the Russian Judiciary
   deprived  the  Principal  Applicant  and his legal representative, the
   Applicant-Lawyer,  of  the right to participate in the hearing, and to
   be  heard  during  the  hearing of the Supreme Court of Appeal, and to
   express themselves at any judicial level in practice.



   By  being  denied  a legal remedy, the Principal Applicant, as well as
   the  Applicant-Lawyer,  whose  application to the Constitutional Court
   challenging  Part  2  of  Article  333  of CPC was ignored altogether,
   received  no appropriate redress to enforce his fundamental rights. No
   other effective remedy or relief exists in Russian law.



   The  European  Court  should  conclude  in  regards  to  the Principal
   Applicant and the Applicant-Lawyer as to related violations of Article
   13  of  the  Convention,  as  no remedies in the present case meet the
   "effectiveness" standard both in practice and in law.

   IV. Statement relative to article 35 S: 1 of the Convention

   Final decision (date, court or authority and nature of decision)

   Appeal  decision of 4 June 2013 by the Appeal Collegium of the Russian
   Supreme  Court which rejected the appeal by the Principal Applicant on
   the  decision  of  10  April  2013  by the Russian Supreme Court Judge
   Emysheva  V.A. (Емышева В.А.) which ruled inadmissible the application
   by  the  Principal  Applicant  challenging  Article  12  of  the  1999
   Regulation  and  Article  3  of the 2000 Regulation which violated the
   Principal Applicant's rights to freedom of movement.

   Other  decisions  (list  in chronological order, giving date, court or
   authority and nature of decision for each of them)

    1. Decision  of  10  April  2013  by  the Russian Supreme Court Judge
       Emysheva   V.A.   (Емышева  В.А.)  which  ruled  inadmissible  the
       application  by  the Principal Applicant challenging Article 12 of
       the  1999  Regulation  and  Article 3 of the 2000 Regulation which
       violated the Principal Applicant's rights to freedom of movement.
    2. Appeal  Decision  of  4  June  2013 by the Appeal Collegium of the
       Russian  Supreme  Court which rejected the appeal by the Principal
       Applicant  on the decision of 10 April 2013 by the Russian Supreme
       Court  Judge Emysheva V.A. (Емышева В.А.) which ruled inadmissible
       the  application by the Principal Applicant challenging Article 12
       of  the 1999 Regulation and Article 3 of the 2000 Regulation which
       violated the Principal Applicant's rights to freedom of movement.
    3. Decision  of  24  September  2013  by  the Constitutional Court on
       inadmissibility of the application of 22 May 2013 by the Principal
       Applicant  challenging  Article  12  of  the  1999  Regulation and
       Article  3  of  the  2000  Regulation in connection with Part 3 of
       Article 27 of the Federal Law "On Security of Road Traffic."
    4. Decision  of  24  September  2013  by  the Constitutional Court on
       inadmissibility  of  the application by the Principal Applicant of
       24  June  2013  challenging  Part  2  of  Article 333 of the Civil
       Procedure  Code.  The  application  by  the  Applicant-Lawyer  was
       ignored by the Constitutional Court.

   Is  there  or  was there any other appeal or other remedy available to
   you which you have not used? If so, explain why you have not used it.

   There were no other effective remedies available.

   V. Statement of the object of the application

  The  Principal  Applicant  seeks  a  determination  by  this Court
       violations of his right to

    1. freedom of movement under Article 2 Protocol No. 4,
    2. freedom  from discrimination under Article 14 (read in conjunction
       with Article 2 of Protocol No. 4),
    3. freedom of expression under Article 10,
    4. a fair trial under Article 6 S: 1,
    5. an  effective  remedy  under  Article 13 (read in conjunction with
       Article  2  of Protocol No. 4 and Article 14 to the Convention and
       in conjunction with Article 10).



   The Applicant-Lawyer seeks a determination by this Court violations of
   his right to

    1. freedom of expression under Article 10,
    2. an  effective  remedy  under  Article 13 (read in conjunction with
       Article 10),



   The  Applicant-NGO/News-Agency  seeks  a  determination  by this Court
   violation of its right to freedom of expression under Article 10.



   The  Principal  Applicant  seeks  a ruling that Russia must conduct an
   effective  investigation  into violations of his right to a fair trial
   and  effective  remedy  including  but  not  limited  to affording him
   standing   as   a   litigant   to  make  the  Supreme  Court  and  the
   Constitutional Court claims.



   All  three  Applicants in the present case also seek just satisfaction
   under Article 41.

   VI. Statement concerning other international proceedings

   Have  you  submitted  the  above  complaints to any other procedure of
   international investigation or settlement? If so, give full details.

   No,  we have not submitted the above complaints to any other procedure
   of international investigation or settlement.

   VII. List of documents (Annexes)

    1. Reply  of  16 March 2013 by the Head of the police station Stadnuk
       I.I.  rejecting the application of the Principal Applicant for the
       duplicate of driving licence.
    2. Regulation  by the Government of the Russian Federation No.1396 of
       15 December 1999.
    3. Regulation  by  the  Minister  of  Internal Affairs of the Russian
       Federation No.782 of 20 July 2000.
    4. Application  by  the  Principal  Applicant  of 5 April 2013 to the
       Russian Supreme Court.
    5. Decision  of  10  April  2013 by the Russian Supreme Court's judge
       Emysheva   V.A.   (Емышева  В.А.)  which  ruled  inadmissible  the
       application  by  the Principal Applicant challenging Article 12 of
       the  1999  Regulation  and  Article 3 of the 2000 Regulation which
       violated the Principal Applicant's rights to freedom of movement.
    6. Appeal  of  15  April 2013 on the Decision of 10 April 2013 by the
       Supreme Court.
    7. Power  of attorney (doverennist) by the Principal Applicant to the
       Applicant-Lawyer  to  represent  the  Principal  Applicant  before
       national Courts.
    8. Memorandum    by    representative    of    the   Applicant,   the
       Applicant-Lawyer,  dated  4 June 2013 for submission at the appeal
       hearing on 4 June 2013.
    9. Print  screen of information about the date, time and the place of
       the appeal hearing from the website of the Russian Supreme Court.
   10. Appeal  Decision  of  4  June  2013 by the Appeal Collegium of the
       Russian  Supreme  Court which rejected the appeal by the Principal
       Applicant  on the decision of 10 April 2013 by the Russian Supreme
       Court's   judge   Emysheva   V.A.   (Емышева   В.А.)  which  ruled
       inadmissible   the   application   by   the   Principal  Applicant
       challenging Article 12 of the 1999 Regulation and Article 3 of the
       2000  Regulation which violated the Principal Applicant's right to
       freedom of movement.
   11. Request  dated 7 November 2013 to the Supreme Court by the head of
       the  Sverdlovsk regional non-governmental organization "Sutyajnik"
       and  the  head of its news agency "Sutyajnik-Press" Sergey Beliaev
       (the  Applicant-NGO/News-Agency) to receive a copy of Decisions on
       Enikeev's case delivered by the Supreme Court on 10 April 2013 and
       on 4 June 2013.
   12. Text  of Article 5.5 of the Order of 18 June 2010 by Chief Justice
       of the Supreme Court.
   13. Application  of  22  May  2013  by  the Principal Applicant to the
       Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation challenging Article
       12  of the 1999 Regulation and Article 3 of the 2000 Regulation in
       connection  with  Part  3  of  Article  27  of the Federal Law "On
       Security of Road Traffic."
   14. Letter  of  21  June 2013 by the Secretariat of the Constitutional
       Court  rejecting  the application by the Principal Applicant of 22
       May 2013.
   15. Follow   on   application   of   18   July  2013  to  the  Russian
       Constitutional Court.
   16. Decision  of  24  September  2013  by  the Constitutional Court on
       inadmissibility of the application of 22 May 2013 by the Principal
       Applicant  challenging  Article  12  of  the  1999  Regulation and
       Article  3  of  the  2000  Regulation in connection with Part 3 of
       Article 27 of the Federal Law "On Security of Road Traffic."
   17. Application  of  24  June  2013 by the Principal Applicant and the
       Applicant-Lawyer  to  the Russian Constitutional Court challenging
       Part 2 of Article 333 of the Civil Procedure Code.
   18. Letter  of  2 August 2013 by the Secretariat of the Constitutional
       Court  to the Principal Applicant rejecting the application of the
       Principal Applicant of 24 June 2013.
   19. Follow   on   application   of  26  August  2013  to  the  Russian
       Constitutional Court.
   20. Decision  of  24  September  2013  by  the Constitutional Court on
       inadmissibility  of  the application by the Principal Applicant of
       24  June  2013  challenging  Part  2  of  Article 333 of the Civil
       Procedure Code.
   21. Immigration   and  Refugee  Board  of  Canada,  Russia:  Residence
       registration  system;  official procedures to change registration;
       whether  registration  is  required to access government services;
       police  treatment  of  ethnic minorities and unregistered persons;
       regional restrictions on registration, particularly in Moscow, St.
       Petersburg and Yekaterinburg, 14 December 2009, RUS103311.E.
   22. Letter of reply from the Supreme Court to Bugrova's request.
   23. Power  of  attorney  of the Principal Applicant to Anton Burkov to
       represent before the European Court.
   24. Power  of  attorney  of  the  Applicant-Lawyer  to MJ Fernandes to
       represent before the European Court.
   25. Power of attorney of the Applicant-NGO/News-Agency to Anton Burkov
       to represent before the European Court.
   26. Reply  of  27  December  2012 by the Supreme Court (Карюк Владимир
       Ильич karyuk_vi@vsrf.ru) on   the  request  made  by  Simmons
       Deborah-Jane.
   27. Judgment No. ГКПИ07-527 of 09 August 2007.

   VIII. Declaration and signature

   I  hereby  declare  that,  to the best of my knowledge and belief, the
   information I have given in the present application form is correct.

   Place

   Date

   (Signature of the Applicant or of the representative)

   Anton  Burkov  -  Representative  of  the  first Applicant - Principal
   Applicant - E. Enikeev

   Anton Burkov - the second Applicant - the Applicant-Lawyer

   Anton   Burkov   -   Representative  of  the  third  Applicant  -  the
   Applicant-NGO/News-Agency

   ^[2]http://sutyajnik.ru/rus/aboutus.html

   ^[3]http://sutyajnik.ru/news/

   ^The  registration in a Russian city directly depends on the landlord.
   The landlord is the person who registers a resident. The landlord must
   show to the authorities his own registration or the ownership document
   of  the  flat.  Refusals  from landlords to register their tenants are
   common  practice  in Russia, particularly in Moscow. Landlords usually
   do  not  want  to  pay  taxes  for  the income they receive from their
   tenants.  Therefore,  they  are reluctant to register their tenants as
   residing  in  the  apartments  they own. Lodging a complaint against a
   landlord  because  of the refusal to register leads usually leads to a
   termination of the lease contract and expulsion by the landlord.

   ^"12.  Прием  экзаменов  у  граждан,  выдача  и замена им водительских
   удостоверений  осуществляется Государственной инспекцией на территории
   того  субъекта  Российской Федерации, где гражданин зарегистрирован по
   месту жительства или по месту пребывания."

   ^"13.  Прием  экзаменов,  выдача  и  замена водительских удостоверений
   гражданам   Российской   Федерации,  не  зарегистрированным  по  месту
   жительства  или  по  месту  пребывания, осуществляется Государственной
   инспекцией по месту их фактического проживания."

   ^"3.  Прием  экзаменов  у  граждан,  выдача  и  замена им водительских
   удостоверений  осуществляются  Государственной  инспекцией  в пределах
   субъекта   Российской  Федерации,  на  территории  которого  гражданин
   зарегистрирован по месту жительства или по месту пребывания."

   ^"4.  Прием  экзаменов у граждан Российской Федерации, выдача и замена
   им  водительских  удостоверений  при  отсутствии  регистрации по месту
   жительства   и   месту  пребывания  в  пределах  Российской  Федерации
   осуществляется  Государственной  инспекцией  по  месту их фактического
   проживания на основании решений лиц, указанных в пункте 5 Инструкции".

   ^"8.  Судья отказывает в принятии заявления, если имеется вступившее в
   законную силу решение суда, которым проверена законность оспариваемого
   нормативного  правового  акта  органа  государственной  власти, органа
   местного   самоуправления   или   должностного  лица,  по  основаниям,
   указанным в заявлении."

   ^"Заявитель   по  настоящему  делу  указывает  основания  противоречия
   оспариваемых нормативных актов, ранее не являвшиеся предметом судебной
   проверки.    В    частности   указывается   1.   противоречие   нормам
   международного  права  -  части  1  статьи  2  "Свобода  передвижения"
   Протокола 2 к Конвенции о защите прав человека и основных свобод".

   ^Статья 161. Проверка явки участников процесса. 1. Секретарь судебного
   заседания  докладывает суду, кто из вызванных по гражданскому делу лиц
   явился,  извещены  ли  неявившиеся  лица  и  какие  имеются сведения о
   причинах их отсутствия. 2. Председательствующий устанавливает личность
   явившихся  участников  процесса, проверяет полномочия должностных лиц,
   их представителей.

   ^The  audio recording of the question and the response can be found at
   http://sutyajnik.ru/audio/280.mp3

   ^Статья   333.   Порядок   подачи   и   рассмотрения  частной  жалобы,
   представления  прокурора.  1.  Подача  частной  жалобы,  представления
   прокурора    и   их   рассмотрение   судом   происходят   в   порядке,
   предусмотренном настоящей главой, с изъятиями, предусмотренными частью
   второй настоящей статьи. 2. Частная жалоба, представление прокурора на
   определение  суда  первой  инстанции,  за  исключением  определений  о
   приостановлении  производства  по  делу, о прекращении производства по
   делу,  об  оставлении  заявления без рассмотрения, рассматриваются без
   извещения лиц, участвующих в деле.

   ^[4]http://sutyajnik.ru/rus/aboutus.html

   ^[5]http://sutyajnik.ru/news/

   ^The propiska system  applied to migrants, asylum seekers and refugees
   in  Council of Europe member states: effects and remedies, Report Doc.
   9262  of  12  October  2001,  Committee  on  Migration,  Refugees  and
   Demography,  Rapporteur:  Mr Boriss Cileviчs, Latvia, Socialist Group,
   available at
   [6]http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=9539&Langua
   ge=en

   ^Ibid.

   ^http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/6c76e1b8ee1710e38025682
   4005a10a9?Opendocument.

   ^Регистрация  или  отсутствие  таковой  не  могут  служить  основанием
   ограничения   или   условием   реализации   прав   и  свобод  граждан,
   предусмотренных Конституцией Российской Федерации, законами Российской
   Федерации,  Конституциями  и  законами  республик в составе Российской
   Федерации.

   ^^See  Tatishvili  v.  Russia, No. 1509/02, 22 February 2007, Para 33,
   47.

   ^The propiska system  applied to migrants, asylum seekers and refugees
   in  Council of Europe member states: effects and remedies, Report Doc.
   9262  of  12  October  2001,  Committee  on  Migration,  Refugees  and
   Demography,  Rapporteur:  Mr Boriss Cileviчs, Latvia, Socialist Group,
   available at
   [7]http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=9539&Langua
   ge=en

   ^PACE  in  Resolution  1277 (2002) on the honouring of obligations and
   commitments  by  the Russian Federation, which was adopted on 23 April
   2002.

   ^See at [8]http://rzd.ru [14.10.2013].

   ^Supra note 20.

   ^Ibid.

   ^Okpisz v. Germany, ECtHR, 25.10.2005, 59140/00

   ^Olbertz vs. Germany, ECtHR, 25.5.1999, 37592/97; Burden vs. UK, ECtHR
   v. 29.4.2008, 13378/05 No. 59

   ^Clift vs. UK, ECtHR, 13.7.2010, 7205/07 No. 66

   ^For  more  on  Russian  Residence registration system please refer to
   Immigration   and   Refugee   Board   of   Canada, Russia:   Residence
   registration  system;  official  procedures  to  change  registration;
   whether registration is required to access government services; police
   treatment  of  ethnic  minorities  and  unregistered persons; regional
   restrictions  on  registration, particularly in Moscow, St. Petersburg
   and   Yekaterinburg,   14  December  2009, RUS103311.E, available  at:
   http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b7cee8728.html [accessed   5   November
   2013] (See Annex 21).

   ^Recommendation  Rec(2002)2  of  the  Committee of Ministers to member
   states     on     access     to     official     documents,    online:
   .

   ^Recommandation  Rec(2003)15 du Comite des Ministres aux Etats membres
   sur l'archivage des documents electroniques dans le secteur juridique,
   online : .

   ^Recommendation  Rec(2002)2  of  the  Committee of Ministers to member
   states     on     access     to     official     documents,    online:
   , at III.

   ^Ibid.

   ^Kobenter  and  Standard  Verlags  Gmbh  v.  Austria,  no. 60899/00, 2
   November 2006, at paragraph 29.

   ^Tarsasag a Szabadsagjogokert v. Hungary, no. 37374/05, 14 April 2009.

   ^Ibid, at paragraph 28.

   ^Benthem v. Netherlands, no. 8848/80, 23/10/1985.

   ^Ringeisen v. Austria, no. 2614/65, 16/07/1971.

   ^H v. Belgium, no. 8950/80, 30/11/1987.

   ^Kenedi v. Hungary, no. 31475/05, 26/05/2009.

   ^Interights  Manual  for  Lawyers  - Right to A Fair Hearing under the
   ECHR (Article 6), 2010, p. 9, online
   .

   ^Article  333  of  the Civil Procedure Code - Procedure for Filing and
   Considering  a  Separate  Appeal  or  Prosecutor's  Presentation: 1. A
   separate  appeal  or prosecutor's presentation shall be filed and they
   shall  be  considered by a court in the procedure provided for by this
   article, with the waivers stipulated by Part Two of this article. 2. A
   separate  appeal  or  prosecutor's  presentation against a ruling of a
   court of the first instance, except for rulings to suspend proceedings
   in respect of a case, to terminate proceedings in respect of a case or
   to  shelve  an  application  shall be considered without notifying the
   persons participating in the case.

   ^See  mutatis  mutandis Kenedi v. Hungary, cited, same civil right was
   violated.

   ^See  argumentation  of  the  alleged  violation  of  article 10. Same
   arguments about art 333 apply here.

   ^See,  amongst  many  authorities,  Aksoy  v.  Turkey  judgment  of 18
   December  1996,  Reports  1996-VI, p. 225, S: 92; Waite and Kennedy v.
   Germany  [GC],  no.  [9]26083/94,  S:  50,  ECHR 1999-I; Golder v. the
   United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A, no. 18, p. 18;
   and   Beneficio   Cappella   Paolini  v.  San  Marino,  no.  40786/98,
   13/07/2004, para 28-29.

   ^See  Bellet  v.  France,  judgment  of  4 December 1995, Series A no.
   333-B, p. 42, S: 36; and Beneficio Cappella Paolini v. San Marino, no.
   40786/98, 13/07/2004, para 28-29.

   ^See,  among  other  authorities,  Fayed  v.  The  United Kingdom, no.
   17101/90, 21/09/1994, S: 65; Bellet v. France, 4 December 1995, S: 31,
   Series A no. 333-B; Levages Prestations Services v. France, 23 October
   1996,  S:  40,  Reports  1996-V;  and  Gobec v. Slovenia, no. 7233/04,
   03/10/2013, para 159.

   ^See,  mutatis  mutandis,  Miragall  Escolano  and  Others  v.  Spain,
   nos.    [10]38366/97,    [11]38688/97,   [12]40777/98,   [13]40843/98,
   [14]41015/98,  [15]41400/98,  [16]41446/98, [17]41484/98, [18]41487/98
   and  [19]41509/98,  ECHR  2000-I;  see  Bulena  v. the Czech Republic,
   no. [20]57567/00, S: 28, 20 April 2004; and Lay Lay Company Limited v.
   Malta, no. 30633/11, 23/07/2013, para 55-56.

   ^See  Kaufmann  v.  Italy,  no.  [21]14021/02, S: 33, 19 May 2005; and
   Lupas  and  Others  v.  Romania  (No.  1),  no.  1434/02, 35370/02 and
   1385/03, 14/12/2006, para 63-64 and 73.

   ^Lupas  and  Others  v.  Romania  (No.  1),  no. 1434/02, 35370/02 and
   1385/03, 14/12/2006, para 73-77.

   ^Beneficio  Cappella  Paolini v. San Marino, no. 40786/98, 13/07/2004,
   para 29.

   ^Hadjianastassiou v. Greece, no. 12945/87, 16/12/1992, para 34-37.

   ^Dunayev v. Russia, no. 70142/01, 24/05/2007, para 36-38.

   ^Судья Верховного Суда России объясняет, почему дело рассматривается в
   присутствии  заявителя,  но  без  его  участия:  "Потому что мы вас не
   должны   слушать...   И   мы   вас   не   вызывали"   /  Available  at
   http://sutyajnik.ru/cases/522.html.

   ^See Krчmar and Others v. the Czech Republic, no. [22]35376/97, S: 39,
   3  March  2000; Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands, 27 October 1993,
   S:  33,  Series  A  no.  274;  and  Gryaznov  v. Russia, no. 19673/03,
   12/06/2012.

   ^See  Mantovanelli  v.  France,  18  March  1997,  S:  33,  Reports of
   Judgments  and  Decisions  1997  II;  and  Joksas  v.  Lithuania,  no.
   25330/07, 12/11/2013.

   ^See  Kraska  v.  Switzerland  judgment of 19 April 1993, Series A no.
   254-B, p. 49, at paragraph 30; and Van de Hurk v. The Netherlands, no.
   16034/90, 19/04/1994.

   ^See  Ziegler  v.  Switzerland,  S:  38;  and  Locher  and  Others  v.
   Switzerland, no. 7539/06, 30/07/2013.

   ^See  Nideroest-Huber  c. Suisse, 18 fevrier 1997, S: 24, Recueil 1997
   I;  F.R.  c.  Suisse, no [23]37292/97, S: 36, 28 juin 2001; Ziegler c.
   Suisse,  no  [24]33499/96, S: 33, 21 fevrier 2002; Contardi c. Suisse,
   no   [25]7020/02,  S:  40,  12  juillet  2005;  Spang  c.  Suisse,  no
   [26]45228/99,  S:  28,  11  octobre  2005;  Ressegatti  c.  Suisse, no
   [27]17671/02,   S:   30,  13  juillet  2006;  Kessler  c.  Suisse,  no
   [28]10577/04,  S:  31,  26  juillet  2007;  and  Elles  and  Others v.
   Switzerland, no. 12573/06, 16/12/2010.

   ^See  Chambaz  v Switzerland, no. 11663/04, 05/04/2012; and Dowsett v.
   Royaume-Uni, no. 39482/98, 24/06/2003, S:42.

   ^See Annex 4 and Minutes of the hearing recorded by the lawyer.

   ^See  I.J.L.  and  others  v.  United  Kingdom,  no. 29522/95 30056/96
   30574/96, 19/09/2000, S: 149; and Chambaz v Switzerland, no. 11663/04,
   05/04/2012.

   ^The  Court  considers  that,  if it were the case that the respondent
   State  had,  without good cause, prevented the applicants from gaining
   access  to,  or  falsely  denied  the  existence  of, documents in its
   possession  which  would have assisted them in establishing before the
   PAT  that they had been exposed to dangerous levels of radiation, this
   would  have been to deny them a fair hearing in violation of Article 6
   S:  1.  See  McGinley  and  Egan  v.  The United Kingdom, no. 21825/93
   23414/94,^ 09/06/1998.

   ^Interights  Manual  for  Lawyers  - Right to A Fair Hearing under the
   ECHR (Article 6), 2010, p.39, online
   .

   ^See,  for  instance, Fredin v. Sweden (no. 2), 23 February 1994, S:S:
   21-22,  Series  A no. 283 A; Fischer v. Austria, 26 April 1995, S: 44,
   Series A no. 312; Allan Jacobsson v. Sweden (no. 2), 19 February 1998,
   S:  46,  Reports  of  Judgments  and  Decisions 1998 I; Salomonsson v.
   Sweden,  no.  38978/97,  S: 34, 12 November 2002; Lundevall v. Sweden,
   no.  38629/97, S: 34, 12 November 2002; Doery v. Sweden, no. 28394/95,
   S:  37,  12  November  2002;  Goec, v. Turkey [GC], no. 36590/97, S:S:
   47-52,  ECHR  2002  V; and Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC],
   no. 63235/00, S: 73, ECHR 2007 IV.

   ^See Andersson v. Sweden, no. 17202/04, 07/12/2010.

   ^See,  for  example,  Doery  v.  Sweden,  no.  [29]28394/95, S: 37, 12
   November  2002, and Pursiheimo v. Finland (dec.), no. [30]57795/00, 25
   November  2003;  compare Lundevall v. Sweden, no. [31]38629/97, S: 39,
   12  November 2002, and Salomonsson v. Sweden, no. [32]38978/97, S: 39,
   12  November 2002; Goec, v. Turkey [GC], no. [33]36590/97, S: 51, ECHR
   2002-V,;  Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 24 June 1993, S: 58, Series
   A  no.  263  and  the cases cited therein; Haakansson and Sturesson v.
   Sweden,  21  February  1990,  S:  66,  Series  A no. 171-A; Helmers v.
   Sweden, judgment of 29 October 1991, Series A no. 212-A, p. 16, S: 36;
   and Jussila v. Finland, no. 73053/01, 23/11/2006.

   ^In  accordance with Part 8 of Article 251 of CPC the Judge may refuse
   to rule the application to be admissible if there is a judgment of the
   court  entered  into  force  which  has  checked  the  legality of the
   challenged  normative  legal  act of the government or official on the
   grounds specified in the application. See Annex 5.

   ^See,  among  other authorities, Yakovlev v. Russia, no. [34]72701/01,
   S:S:  19  et  seq.,  15  March  2005; Groshev v. Russia, no. 69889/01,
   20/10/2005,  S:S:  27  et  seq.;  Mokrushina  v. Russia, no. 23377/02,
   05/10/2006,  S:S:  20  et seq.; Prokopenko v. Russia, no. [35]8630/03,
   S:S:  17  et  seq.,  3 May 2007; and Kolegovy v. Russia, no. 15226/05,
   01/03/2012.

   ^Постановление  КС  РФ от 30 ноября 2012 г. N 29-П "По делу о проверке
   конституционности  положений  части  пятой статьи 244.6 и части второй
   статьи 333 Гражданского процессуального кодекса Российской Федерации в
   связи с жалобами граждан А.Г. Круглова, А.В. Маргина, В.А. Мартынова и
   Ю.С. Шардыко" // РГ. 2012. 14 дек.

   ^Борисова  Е.А.  Развитие норм ГПК РФ о проверке и пересмотре судебных
   постановлений:  теория  и  практика. // Вестник гражданского процесса,
   2013,  N 4 (E.A. Borisova. The development of the Civil Procedure Code
   of  the  Russian  Federation norms on the inspection and review of the
   judgments:  theory  and  practice.  // Vestnik Grazhdanskogo Protsessa
   No4, 2013).

   ^Борисова  Е.А.  Развитие норм ГПК РФ о проверке и пересмотре судебных
   постановлений:  теория  и  практика. // Вестник гражданского процесса,
   2013,  N 4 (E.A. Borisova. The development of the Civil Procedure Code
   of  the  Russian  Federation norms on the inspection and review of the
   judgments:  theory  and  practice.  // Vestnik Grazhdanskogo Protsessa
   No4,  2013);  Enikeev  E.  and  Burkov  A., Bez Menia Menia Zhenili //
   Newspaper   "эж-Юрист",   No.   37   от   20.09.2013,   available   at
   http://sutyajnik.ru/articles/462.html;  and S.F. Afanasiev. K probleme
   realizatsii   prava   byt   vislushannim   v   sude  pri  rassmotrenii
   grazhdanskikh  del.  //  Vestnik  grazhdanskogo protsessa. No 4. 2012.
   (С.Ф.  Афанасьев.  К проблеме реализации права быть выслушанным в суде
   при  рассмотрении  гражданских  дел. // Вестник гражданского процесса.
   No.  4.  2012.);  Terekhova L.A. O prave suda apelljacionnoj instancii
   vozvrashhat' delo na novoe rassmotrenie v sud pervoj instancii [On the
   right  of  the appellate court returned the case to the court of first
   instance] // Arbitration and Civil Procedure. 2012. No. 2.^

   ^Supra note 69.

   ^See  Pretto  and  Others  v. Italy, no. 7984/77, 08/12/1983, S:20-28;
   Interights Manual for Lawyers - Right to A Fair Hearing under the ECHR
   (Article 6), 2010, p. 43-44, online
   .

   ^See  Pretto  and  Others,  cited,  S:S:  27-28;  Axen v. Germany, no.
   8273/78,  08/12/1983,  S:  32;  Sutter  v.  Switzerland,  no. 8209/78,
   22/02/1984,  S:  34;  and  Ryakib  Biryukov  v.  Russia, no. 14810/02,
   17/01/2008.

   ^See  Werner  v.  Austria,  24  November  1997, S:S: 56 60, Reports of
   Judgments and Decisions 1997-VII; and Ryakib v. Russia, cited.

   ^See  Moser  v.  Austria, no. [36]12643/02, S: 103, 21 September 2006;
   and Ryakib v. Russia, cited.

   ^According  to  Article 5.5 of the Order of 18 June 2010 by the judges
   of  the  Supreme  Court.  Based  on Article 1(4) of the Federal Law of
   2008,  a  judicial  act is a ruling, issued in a form complying with
   relevant law, on the substance of a case examined in the procedure for
   administering   constitutional,   civil,  administrative  or  criminal
   justice  or  for  administering  justice  in a court of arbitration.
   Therefore,  Article 1(4) of the Federal Law of 2008 is under-inclusive
   since  the  definition  of  a judicial act simply omits to include any
   decisions rendered on inadmissibility.

   ^In  the  present  case, the 2007 judgment in question did not contain
   essential  information  like  the  legal  grounds  of the case and the
   arguments  of  the former applicant - this information is contained in
   the  case  material.  Neither  the  case material nor the judgment was
   accessible to the public.

   ^See  Golder  v.  The  United  Kingdom, no. 4451/70, 21 February 1975,
   Series  A no. 18, p. 18, S: 36; and Lawless c. Irlande, no. 332/57, 14
   November 1960, Series A no. 1, p. 13.

   ^Hiro Balani v. Spain, no. 303-B, 09 December 1994, at paragraph 27.

   ^Kraska  v. Switzerland, no. 13942/88, 19 April 1993, at paragraph 30;
   Van  de  Hurk  v.  The  Netherlands,  no.  16034/90, 19 April 1994, at
   paragraph 59.

   ^Van  de  Hurk v. the Netherlands, cited, at paragraph 61; Ruiz Torija
   v. Spain, no. 303-A, 9 December 1994, at paragraph 29.

   ^Suominen v. Finland, no. 37801/97, 1 July 2003, at paragraph 36.

   ^Hadjianastassiou  v.  Greece, no. 252, 16 December 1992, at paragraph
   33.

   ^Kuznetsov  and  Others  v.  Russia,  no.  184/02, 11 January 2007, at
   paragraphs 83 to 85.

   ^Dulaurans v. France, no 34553/97, 21 March 2000, at paragraph 33.

   ^Ruiz Torija v. Spain, cited, at paragraphs 29-30.

   ^"Secret  evidence" here is not employed in the traditional meaning of
   the  term,  since there was neither a national security reason nor any
   other  legitimate or recognized reason to deny access to the decision.
   It  became  secret  evidence  in fact, not in law, without having been
   declared so.

   ^Part  8  of  Article 251 of Civil Procedure Code; Decision of Supreme
   Court of Appeal, par. 4, in Annex 10.

   ^Decision No. ГКПИ07-527, 09.08.2007.

   ^Hiro Balani v. Spain, no. 18064/91, 09/12/1994, at paragraph 25.

   ^Gast  and  Popp  v.  Germany,  no.  29357/95,  25  February  2000, at
   paragraph 63.

   ^See, among others, Kudl/a v. Poland [GC], no. [37]30210/96, ECHR 2000
   XI,   S:   152;  T.P.  and  K.M.  v.  the  United  Kingdom  [GC],  no.
   [38]28945/95,   ECHR   2001-V,   S:   107;  Riener  v.  Bulgaria,  no.
   [39]46343/99,  S:  142,  23 May 2006; Milen v. Bulgaria, no. 40026/07,
   para  24,  03/09/2013;  Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), no. [40]33509/04, S:
   96,   ECHR   2009;  Yuriy  Nikolayevich  Ivanov  v.  Ukraine,  no.[41]
   a[42]40450/04, S: 63, ECHR 2009; and Delvina v. Albania, no. 49106/06,
   para 69, 08/03/2011.

   ^See,  mutatis  mutandis, Shebashov v. Latvia (dec.), 9 November 2000,
   no.gra  [43]50065/99; Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, no. [44]50963/99, 20 June
   2002; Riener v. Bulgaria, no. [45]46343/99, S: 138, 23 May 2006; Milen
   Kostov  v.  Bulgaria, no. 40026/07, par. 20, 03/09/2013; and Kudl/a v.
   Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, S: 157, ECHR 2000 XI.

   ^See  Burdov  v.  Russia  (no.  2),  no.  [46]33509/04,  S:  97; Yuriy
   Nikolayevich  Ivanov  v.  Ukraine, no. [47]40450/04, S: 64; Delvina v.
   Albania, no. 49106/06, par. 70, 08/03/2011; and Kudl/a v. Poland [GC],
   no. 30210/96, S: 157, ECHR 2000 XI.

   ^No  measures  were  adopted or applied by the Ministry of interior to
   render accessible the registration in Moscow, or to get a duplicate of
   a  driver's  license  at  the  effective  place  of residence when the
   applicant  is  already  registered  elsewhere. Of course the applicant
   cannot  take to chance to de-register from his previous place and then
   risk  being  without registration for an undetermined period, since it
   is  almost  impossible  to  register  in  Moscow.  The  Government  is
   conscious  of  the  systemic problem: for example, it has modified the
   license  plate  legislation in order to permit citizens to get a plate
   anywhere in the country no matter their registered place of residence.
   But those substantive arguments have not been discussed in the present
   case since the applicant had no access to justice at all.

                                     50

                                     50

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  74. http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx
  75. file://localhost/tmp/wv-j14076
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  78. http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx
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