Судебное дело "А.В. Захаркин против России"
24.10.2014
First Section Registrar
So/ren Nielsen
European Court of Human Rights
22 October 2014
Written Observations on behalf of the applicant in reply to
observations by the Representative of the Russian Federation at the
European Court of Human Rights
Application No. 40377/10
Zakharkin v Russia
Dear Sir,
In reply to the written observations by the Representative of the
Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights (Agent) of 2
September 2014 No. 14-4104-14 we submit written observations on behalf
of the applicant to the European Court of Human Rights.
IN REPLY TO THE ANSWERS BY THE AGENT TO QUESTIONS Nos. 1, 2, 5 -
violations of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention
1. The Agent considers that the interference with the rights of the
applicant in this case, taking into account margin or appreciation
of the state, was reasonable and not amounted to violation of the
provisions of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention.
Overview:
2. Article 10 and 11 of the European Convention have been declared by
the European Court of Human Rights as being the foundation of a
democratic society. However, the state can legally restrict those
rights if there is a law that pursues a legitimate aim and that is
necessary in a democratic society. The law must be clear and
precise so that the applicant knows which actions will be followed
by an arrest and fine. To have a legitimate aim, the restriction
must fit into one of the categories enumerated in the second
paragraph of both articles. As for the condition of the necessity
in a democratic society, the state must prove that the restriction
is proportionate to the aim pursued.
3. Before analyzing the Court's requirements, we would like to
specify that the Court makes a difference between illegal and
legal protests. Illegal protests are those that have not been
authorized, while legal protests would therefore be the opposite,
meaning when the authorization has been issued for the protest.
The requirements for an illegal protest to be legitimate for the
Court is narrow, however in our case, solo protesting should be
legal without authorization and that is what we will try to argue.
Quality of the Law
4. The law must be clear and precise for the citizens to be able to
"regulate their conduct" Rekvenyi v. Hungary, ECtHR, App. No.
25390/94, 20 May 1990 para 34).
Firstly, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be
able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of
the legal rules applicable to a given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be
regarded as `law' unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to
enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able - if need
be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is
reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action
may entail. (Sunday Times judgment, p. 31, para. 49; Silver and Others
judgment, p. 33, paras. 87 and 88)
5. In our case, the precision of the law can be questioned. In fact,
Mr. Zakharkin thought that he regulated conduct of his fellows in
a way that was following the law. The fact that it isn't clear
that solo protesting is covered by the law in terms of the
obligation to give notice to local government means that the law
is not precise and clear enough.
6. When organizing solo protesters Mr. Zaharkin thought that he was
following Part 1 Article 7 of the Law "On assemblies, meetings,
demonstrations, processions and picketing."
A notice of holding the public event (except for a rally and picketing
held by a single participant) shall be sent by its promoter in writing
to the executive power body of the Subject of the Russian Federation
or the body of local self-government within the period not earlier
than fifteen and not later than ten days prior to holding of the
public event.
7. In addition to the irregularities of the law and practice of its
implementation in terms of the need to send notification, we state
further in our observation that it is not necessary in a
democratic society and even that it is a legal absurdity to
require a single person protesting on a street to register this
protesting with authorities (to send a notice of holding the
public event) in advance as this would require all pedestrians to
authorize their movements on the streets.
Legitimate aim:
8. It has been accepted by the Court that regulating protests has a
legitimate aim. (Nemtsov v Russia, ECtHR, App. no. 1774/11, 31
July 2014 and Eva Molnar v Hungary, ECtHR, App. no. 10346/05, 7
January 2009). For the public order and national security, a
government can require the protests to be subject to authorization
(Eva Molnar v Hungary,). However, as established by Eva Molnar v
Hungary, if the requirement of authorization is in fact just a
hidden obstacle to Article 11, then there would be no legitimate
aim to the measure.
9. Asking a solo protester to give his itinerary days in advance when
there could not be potential disturbance to the public order (in
the same way as there is no potential danger in a single
pedestrian walking on a street) is just a hidden obstacle to the
rights protected under Article 11. A peaceful single protester
standing on the sidewalk by definition as a regular citizen is not
a threat or a disturbance that needs to be supervised by the
police. There is no need to notify the local government so that it
can arrange special police forces to oversee public order at the
time and the place of a single protest. The only goal of advance
notification is to evaluate if a public event requires enforcement
of regular police on city streets. A solo person on a street does
not require enforcement. If this were the case, every single
person walking to work would be a threat and therefore would need
to ask for authorization to go to his or her office. It would be a
legal absurdity that would drastically affect people and their
freedom of expression.
10. Therefore the aim of the interference with Mr. Zakharkin's rights
in terms of requiring him to provide notification about
forthcoming solo picketing by definition posing no threat to
public order is not to protect the public, but rather to protect
the state from being questioned by the public. Consequently, as
established by Eva Molnar v Hungary, the requirement of the
legitimate aim is not met.
Necessary in a democratic society:
11. The right to freedom of assembly and freedom of expression are the
foundation of a democratic society. If there are restrictions to
the right to freedom of assembly, they must be "convincingly
established" and the exception of the second paragraph must be
"narrowly interpreted". (Nemtsov v Russia, ECtHR, App. no.
1774/11, 31 July 2014 at para 72).
12. The Agent must show that it is necessary in a democratic society
to restrain the solo protesting, which the Agent did not do.
Necessity implies the existence of a "pressing social need"
(Rekvenyi v. Hungary, ECtHR, App. No. 25390/94, 20 May 1990, para
42). It is not a pressing social need to restrain a peaceful solo
protester, because there is no interference to the public order or
no actual need to have police forces looking after one person
protesting while standing on the sidewalk. Requiring peaceful
single protesters to ask for an authorization restrains the right
to freedom of assembly and freedom of expression in such a way
that it will discourage people to show their conviction.
13. In Ezelin v.France, ECtHR App. No 11800/85 and in Nemtsov v
Russia, ECtHR, App. no. 1774/11, 31 July 2014, 26 April 1991, the
Court clearly states that Articles 10 and 11 cannot be restrained
by a state in a way that would discourage others from showing
their convictions. Moreover, the Court in that judgement declares
that any sanction, even at the lower end of the scale of
penalties, is a limitation to the rights of freedom of assembly
and freedom of expression and there should not be any limitation
as long as the person does not commit any reprehensible act
(Ezelin v.France, ECtHR App. No 11800/85, 26 April 1991 at para
53). Although the solo protests in that case were legal as they
did not requires authorization, and the sanction occurred within a
disciplinary context, the principle remains applicable to Mr.
Zakharkin for whom the restriction was the requirement to ask for
authorization. As we submitted earlier, solo protesting should not
need an authorization to be legal, and therefore any restriction,
even the smallest one, would not be legitimate as long as the solo
protester does not commit any reprehensible act.
Proportionality of the restriction
14. Even if the measure has a legitimate aim and is necessary in a
democratic society, it needs to be proportionate. In the Piermont
v France, ECtHR, App. No. 15773/89, November 3, 1994, the Court
established that a good balance should be kept between the
prevention of disorder and the freedom of expression protected by
Article 10 of the Convention. If the balance is not kept, than
there is a violation of Article 10. To have a law that requires
authorization by single protestors is not proportionate to the aim
pursued. There is no need for such a restriction of the citizens'
right of expression. A peaceful single protester standing (not
even walking) on the sidewalk does not create a disturbance or
traffic which would require an authorization in order to alert the
police to potential dangers.
15. In addition and without prejudice to the foregoing, even if
authorization had been a necessary requirement, the police's
decision to arrest Mr. Zakharkin may not have been a proportionate
reaction. In Oya Ataman v Turkey, ECtHR, App. No. 74552/01, 5
March 2007 at para 42, the Court held that even for unauthorized
protests, "where demonstrators do not engage in acts of violence,
it is important for the public authorities to show a certain
degree of tolerance towards peaceful gatherings if the freedom of
assembly guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention is not to be
deprived of all substance". Arresting peaceful solo protesters
does not show a degree of tolerance, on the contrary: it restrains
the right of freedom of expression used peacefully without any
interference to the public safety or order.
16. Therefore, it was violation of Articles 10 and 11 of the
Convention.
IN REPLY TO THE ANSWERS BY THE AGENT TO QUESTIONS No. 3.
Violation of Articles 5 of the Convention
17. According to Article 5(1)c of the Convention everyone has the
right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived
of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with
a procedure prescribed by law. Only one provision "c" of the
Article 5(1) might be applicable to circumstances of the
Zakharkin's case - "the lawful arrest or detention of a person
effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent
legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an
offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent
his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so."
However, provision "c" of the Article 5(1) of the Convention is
not applicable to Zakharkin as he had not committed any offence.
Indeed he followed the Law.
18. Mr. Zakharkin did not commit any offence, therefore he could not
be arrested.
19. Moreover, Mr. Zakharkin could not be arrested for being on the
street when it was -38C or in order to save him from the cold by
arresting him.
IN REPLY TO THE ANSWERS BY THE AGENT TO QUESTIONS No. 4.
Violation of Article 6 of the Convention - violation of the
impartiality requirement on account of the absence of any prosecuting
authority and the role of the judge in these circumstances
The tribunal was not impartial within the meaning of Article 6.
20. The judicial process leading to Mr. Zakharkin's fine was not
impartial because it lacked objective guarantees of impartiality,
thereby undermining the public's confidence in the judiciary. The
European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly drawn a distinction
between "a subjective approach, that is endeavouring to ascertain
the personal conviction of a given judge in a given case, and an
objective approach, that is determining whether he offered
guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this
respect" (Piersack v. Belgium, ECtHR App. No. 8692/79, 1 October
1982 at para 30).
21. By consistently applying the objective test in addition to the
subjective, the Court has indicated that the inquiry is of broader
significance than just determining whether a particular judge
lacked impartiality on a given matter. Instead, "[w]hat is at
stake is the confidence which the courts in a democratic society
must inspire in the public and above all, as far as criminal
proceedings are concerned, in the accused." (Hauschildt v Denmark,
ECtHR App. no. 10486/83, 24 May 1989 at para 48). In the case of
Mr. Zakharkin, the judge's assuming prosecutorial functions and
the absence of an independent prosecutor are sufficient to erode
public confidence in the judicial system.
22. The judge's assuming prosecutorial functions also breached Article
6 of the Convention because Mr. Zakharkin himself had objective
reasons to doubt the impartiality of the judge. In applying the
objective test, "the standpoint of the accused is important but
not decisive" (Piersack v. Belgium ECtHR App. No. 8692/79, 1
October 1982 at para 31 & Hauschildt v Denmark at para 48). In
addition, the fear of lack of impartiality must be justifiable
objectively (Hauschildt v Denmark, ECtHR App. no. 10486/83, 24 May
1989 at para 48). In cases involving prior involvement of a trial
judge in pre-trial investigative functions, the European Court of
Human Rights has noted that an accused would have objective
reasons to fear seeing a judge who had previously interrogated him
subsequently partaking in the trial court decision (de Cubber v.
Belgium, ECtHR App. No. 9186/80, 26 October 1984 at para 29, &
Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, ECtHR App no. 21722/11 at para 115).
In the case of Mr. Zakharkin, while the judge was not involved in
pre-trial decisions, Mr. Zakharkin's seeing a person responsible
for adjudicating his claim simultaneously interrogate him in the
absence of an independent prosecutor would lead to a similar
objectively justifiable fear. As such, the judge's assuming
investigative or prosecutorial functions was sufficient to breach
Article 6 of the Convention because Mr. Zakharkin's fears were
objectively justified.
23. The fact that Mr. Zakharkin's judge was not involved in the case
does not mitigate his lack of impartiality. In some situations
wherein a court partakes in summary procedures for contempt of
court, the European Court of Human Rights has held that judges'
acting as adjudicators while simultaneously determining the charge
can lead to lack of impartiality. In such cases, the Court has
noted that:
the confusion of roles between complainant, witness, prosecutor and
judge could self-evidently prompt objectively justified fears as to
the conformity of the proceedings with the time-honoured principle
that no one should be a judge in his or her own cause and,
consequently, as to the impartiality of the bench (Kyprianou v.
Cyprus, ECtHR App. no. 73797/01, 15 December 2005 at para 127).
24. In Mr. Zakharkin's case there has been a similar conflation of
roles, with the judge's assuming strong investigatory powers in
the absence of an independent prosecutor. While the judge may not
have had a personal interest in the outcome of Mr. Zakharkin's
case, by performing investigative roles normally limited to the
executive branch, the judge assumed a political role incompatible
with the idea of an independent judiciary. In this role as a de
facto extension of the executive branch, the judge gave the
appearance of having an interest in the outcome of the case.
Consequently, the judge's simultaneous involvement in
investigative and adjudicatory functions led to a breach of
Article 6 of the Convention.
25. Moreover, the conviction of Mr. Zakharkin was based solely on
documents provided by the police.
The tribunal was not independent within the meaning of Article 6
26. The judicial process that led to Mr. Zakharkin's fine was not
independent within the meaning of Art. 6. In evaluating
independence of a court, it is necessary to consider the:
manner of appointment of its members and their term of office, the
existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the question
whether the body presents an appearance of independence (Findlay v.
The United Kingdom, ECtHR App no. 22107/93, 25 February 1997 at para
73).
27. In Findlay v. United Kingdom, the Court considered a court martial
whose limited safeguards and subsequent review by other
independent judicial bodies were insufficient to mitigate the
problematic involvement of a convening officer in prosecutorial
and judicial functions (Findlay v. United Kingdom, ECtHR App no.
22107/93, 25 February 1997 at para 72). In the case of Mr.
Zakharkin, the judicial body did not even offer the pretext of
limited guarantees against outside pressures, as the absence of a
duly appointed prosecutor in Mr. Zakharkin's case eroded the
distinction between the executive and judicial branches, leaving
the judge to occupy both roles. Consequently, the judge acted as
if he were a member of the executive branch, thereby erasing any
appearance of independence.
28. Therefore, there was a violation of Article 6.
AS REGARDS THE ISSUE OF PROVIDING FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE TO THE
APPLICANT
29. A similar position by the Agent has already been expressed in the
observations in the case of Mikhailova v. Russia No. 46998/08. To
reply to this position we state the following.
30. The Court has held that domestic courts must have "regard to the
object and purpose of [Article 6 S: 3(c)]", which states a
defendant has the right to defend himself in person or through
legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient
means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the
interests of justice so require (Pakelli v. Germany, No. 8398/78,
25 April 1983). In Pakelli, the Court noted that the object and
purpose of the article necessitates that it be read not as a
choice between allowing the accused to defend himself in person or
through legal counsel, but that "a `person charged with a criminal
offence' who does not wish to defend himself in person must be
able to have recourse to legal assistance of his own choosing." In
other words, the accused has the fundamental human right to choose
whether he prefers to present his case by himself or through legal
counsel. A tribunal cannot make this decision for the accused. It
is submitted that this proposition holds true even if domestic law
allows an accused to appear in person to defend himself.
31. In Pakelli, the Court further held that "it goes without saying
that the personal appearance of the appellant would not have
compensated for the absence of his lawyer: without the services of
a legal practitioner, Mr. Pakelli could not have made a useful
contribution to the examination of the legal issues arising ..."
32. In Ezeh and Connors v. The United Kingdom, Nos. 39665/98 and
40086/98, 9 October 2003, the Court reached the same conclusion,
holding that an accused was "denied the right to be legally
represented in the proceedings before the prison governor" in
violation of Article 6 when the "governor excluded the applicants'
legal representation." The Convention violation for excluding
legal counsel was "irrespective of whether they could have
obtained the services of a lawyer free of charge."
33. In Zdravko Stanev v. Bulgaria, No. 32238/04, 6 November 2012, the
Court highlighted that even an educated man cannot be deemed
prepared to represent himself personally before a tribunal and
that the "interests of justice demanded that, in order to receive
a fair hearing, the applicant ought to have benefited from free
legal representation during the proceedings before the Sliven
Regional Court." In the words of the Court:
[A]lthough it is not in dispute that the applicant had a university
degree, there is no suggestion that he had any legal training, and
while the proceedings were not of the highest level of complexity, the
relevant issues included the rules on admissibility of evidence, the
rules of procedure, and the meaning of intent. In addition, the Court
notes that the applicant was charged with a criminal offence which
involved in impugnment of a senior member of the judiciary and which
called into question the integrity of the judicial process in
Bulgaria. . . . As such, a qualified lawyer would undoubtedly have
been in a position to plead the case with greater clarity and to
counter more effectively the arguments raised by the prosecution. The
fact that the applicant, as an educated man, might have been able to
understand the proceedings does not alter the fact that without the
services of a legal practitioner he was almost certainly unable to
defend himself effectively. [emphasis added]
34. It is submitted that the case law is consistent and clear that the
interests of justice and compliance with Article 6 necessitates
that an accused in a criminal proceeding who wants legal
representation must have access to it, and that an individual
cannot be considered to have had an adequate opportunity to defend
himself merely because he was present and permitted to speak at a
hearing.
The Government's observations
35. In the present case, the Government relies upon the fact that (1)
the Applicant was able to participate in the proceedings, (2) the
amount of the fine imposed on the applicant was small and (3) that
the proceedings are "simple" (according to the criteria set out in
Gutfreund v France, No. 45681/99, 25 April 2002) to show that the
interests of justice did not require that legal assistance be
provided free of charge. In all aspects, the reliance is
misplaced.
36. It is not correct to describe the proceedings before the Justice
of the Peace or District Court as "simple". The court procedure
involved the Applicant being called before a judge to give full
oral and written submissions. The Applicant was also entitled to
call and cross-examine witnesses. The nature of the offences of
which the Applicant was accused was criminal.
37. The Applicant is not a lawyer. He was placed in an emotionally
charged situation as she faced charge of a criminal nature with a
possible sentence of imprisonment if he refused or could not pay
the initial fine. Although he could physically appear before the
judge, submit written and oral statements, and cross-examine
witnesses, as a person with no legal background, he could not do
this effectively without legal assistance. The applicant was
devoid of any effective assistance before the courts because he
was unable to afford legal assistance, and was therefore unable to
effectively present his argument, cross-examine witnesses and
function effectively at the hearings.
38. In such a case, it is submitted that it is in the interests of
justice to provide an accused with a legal representative who can
effectively take care of the legal and emotional burden, can
present the accused's case calmly and dispassionately, making use
of his/her legal training to focus on making the legally important
points required to found a successful defence.
39. The fact that the Applicant lacked sufficient means to pay for
qualified legal representation himself and that the Russian
authorities did not provide him free legal assistance was
therefore a crucial factor affecting the fairness of the trial.
This principle of `fairness', which has been recognised by the
Court (see McVicar v. the United Kingdom, No. 46311/99, 7 August
2002), should have meant that in this case the Applicant received
the assistance of a lawyer.
40. Lack of a lawyer representing the applicant in a trial of the
charge means that the functions of a defending lawyer were assumed
by a judge. Therefore, in this case the judge conducted functions
of a judge, of a prosecutor and of a defending lawyer. This
situation could not be called a fair trial.
41. The fact that the applicant did not benefit from any legal
assistance and that the judge assumed all the functions of actors
of the trial was a prejudice which, it is submitted, violated
Article 6 of the Convention.
AS REGARDS THE STATEMENT BY THE AGENT ABOUT NON-EXHAUSTION OF DOMESTIC
REMEDIES
42. The Court has recognized on many occasions that application of the
rule requiring exhaustion of domestic remedies is neither absolute
nor capable of being applied automatically, but rather "must be
applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive
formalism" given its application "in the context of machinery for
the protection of human rights that the Contracting Parties have
agreed to set up." In reviewing whether an applicant has observed
the rule, the Court will consider the particular circumstances of
each individual case, including not only the existence of formal
remedies in the legal system of the respondent state, but also the
general legal and political context in which they operate, as well
as the personal circumstances of the applicant.
43. The Court has recognized that an applicant need not always exhaust
domestic remedies. The Court will often dismiss a preliminary
objection by a respondent state that the applicant has not
exhausted domestic remedies where the state has not "established
with sufficient certainty that the remedy advanced ... had a
reasonable prospect of success."^ The Court has interpreted this
requirement in the context of Article 13 as a requirement that the
applicant have an "effective" remedy. An effective remedy does not
require the certainty of a favorable outcome, but it does require
that the remedy either "prevent[] the alleged violation or its
continuation[] or ... provid[e] adequate redress for any violation
that has already occurred."^
44. The Court has concluded that an applicant need not pursue every
available form of relief where that applicant brought a number of
unsuccessful court complaints. In Arutyunyan v. Russia, the
applicant complained that the conditions of his detention violated
Article 3 of the Convention. Russia objected to the admissibility
of the application on the basis that the applicant had not
exhausted domestic remedies--even though he had brought numerous
complaints with the facility administration and various
law-enforcement and executive authorities, as well as the Russian
courts--because he had not brought a separate tort action. The
Court concluded that the applicant was not required to file "a
separate action with the same court":
The Court ... does not find it unreasonable that in a situation where
the domestic courts had analysed, a number of times, the applicant's
complaint of inadequate conditions of detention, he did not lodge a
separate action with the same court following the formal tort
procedure as required by the Russian Civil Code. In circumstances
where the domestic courts at two levels of jurisdiction had examined
and dismissed the applicant's complaints, having found that the
conditions of his detention fully complied with the domestic legal
norms, it is not apparent that a tort action before the same courts
would have been any more successful, would have been decided on the
basis of any other issues or could have even passed the admissibility
stage.^
45. It is worth noting that the existence of a judicial decision
providing the relief requested may be sufficient to support a
respondent state's contention that exhaustion of domestic remedies
is required. In Ananyev & Others v. Russia, the Court considered
complaints that the applicants had been detained in inhuman and
degrading conditions in remand centers while awaiting criminal
trials against them. The Court recognized that a judicial decision
showing an available remedy would have supported Russia's argument
that exhaustion was required, but ultimately rejected Russia's
objection to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and found a
violation of Article 13 where "[t]he Russian Government ... did
not submit a single judicial decision showing that the complainant
had been able to vindicate his or her rights by [submitting a
judicial complaint regarding the conditions of prison
detention]."^
46. The same situation in the case of the Applicant. Two judicial
instances (justice of the peace and a district court judge
confirmed legality of actions of the police). Having demanded that
Mr. Zakharkin to file a separate law suit against the police's
actions, the Agent did not submit a single judicial decision
showing that the suggested law suit would be able to vindicate Mr.
Zakharkin's rights by submitting a separate law suit regarding
police's actions, legality of which the justice of the peace and a
district court judge has already considered.
47. Therefore we submit that the Applicant Mr. Zakharkin has exhausted
effective domestic remedies.
THEREFORE I SUBMIT:
1. Mr. Zakharkin has exhausted effective domestic remedies.
2. There was a violation of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention.
3. There was a violation of Article 5 of the Convention.
4. Article 6 of the Convention was applicable to the domestic
proceedings in the present case, under the criminal limb.
5. There was a violation of Article 6 in two regards:
a. lack of prosecution to present the charge before the judge;
b. lack of free legal assistance offered to the applicant to fight
the charge
leading to the situation when the judge assumed all the functions
therefore breached the guarantee of a fair trial under Article 6 of
the Convention.
CLAIMS FOR JUST SATISFACTION
With regard to just satisfaction claims, the Applicant asks for
compensation of:
1. RUB 1,500 in respect of pecuniary damage caused by ordering the
Applicant to pay fines of RUB 1,500 under Article 20.2 (paragraph
1) of the Code of Administrative Offences;
2. EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
ANTON BURKOV
Representative of the applicant
ab636@cantab.net
^See, e.g., Maskhadova & Others v. Russia, No. 18071/05, S:S: 206-07
(June 6, 2013) (dismissing state's preliminary objection based on
failure to exhaust domestic remedies where there "was some uncertainty
in domestic law as regards the status of decisions taken under [the
proposed domestic remedy]" and where subsequent Constitutional Court
ruling called for judicial review of decisions taken under proposed
domestic remedy but "only enabled an applicant to ask for a review of
formal lawfulness of the relevant decision, but not to disagree with
the well-foundedness and proportionality of the measure as such").
^Ananyev at S: 96.
^Arutyunyan at S: 64.
^Ananyev at S: 110 ("The Court, for its part, has not noted any
examples of the successful use of this remedy in any of the
conditions-of-detention cases that have previously come before it.").
1
Добавить комментарий: