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  • Решения Европейского Суда по прецедентным делам

    in Russian


    In the case of De Moor v. Belgium*,

    The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with
    Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human
    Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the relevant
    provisions of the Rules of Court, as a Chamber composed of the
    following judges:

    Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
    Mr F. Gölcüklü,
    Mr F. Matscher,
    Mr B. Walsh,
    Mr J. De Meyer,
    Mrs E. Palm,
    Mr L. Wildhaber,
    Mr G. Mifsud Bonnici,
    Mr J. Makarczyk,

    and also of Mr M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr H. Petzold, Deputy
    Registrar,

    Having deliberated in private on 28 January and 26 May 1994,

    Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the
    last-mentioned date:

    _______________
    * Note by the Registrar. The case is numbered 18/1993/413/492. The
    first number is the case's position on the list of cases referred to
    the Court in the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers
    indicate the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court
    since its creation and on the list of the corresponding originating
    applications to the Commission.
    _______________

    PROCEDURE

    1. The case was referred to the Court by the European Commission
    of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 13 April 1993, within the
    three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47
    (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention. It originated in an
    application (no. 16997/90) against the Kingdom of Belgium lodged with
    the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) by a Belgian national,
    Mr Jérôme De Moor, on 26 June 1990.

    The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48
    (art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby Belgium recognised
    the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The
    object of the request was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts
    of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its
    obligations under Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).

    2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with
    Rule 33 para. 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, the applicant stated that
    he wished to take part in the proceedings. He also sought leave to
    present his own case (Rule 30 para. 1); the President of the Court
    granted this request on 25 June 1993.

    3. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio
    Mr J. De Meyer, the elected judge of Belgian nationality (Article 43
    of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the
    Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)). On 23 April 1993, in the presence of the
    Registrar, the President drew by lot the names of the other seven
    members, namely Mr F. Gölcüklü, Mr F. Matscher, Mr B. Walsh,
    Mr C. Russo, Mrs E. Palm, Mr G. Mifsud Bonnici and Mr J. Makarczyk
    (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 4) (art. 43).
    Subsequently, Mr L. Wildhaber, substitute judge, replaced Mr Russo, who
    was unable to take part in the further consideration of the case
    (Rules 22 para. 1 and 24 para. 1).

    4. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5), Mr Ryssdal,
    acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Belgian
    Government ("the Government"), the applicant and the Delegate of the
    Commission on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules 37 para. 1 and
    38). Pursuant to the order made in consequence, the Registrar received
    the Government's memorial on 15 October 1993 and the applicant's claims
    under Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention on 20 October.
    On 24 November the Secretary to the Commission informed the Registrar
    that the Delegate would submit his observations at the hearing.

    5. On 10 December the Commission produced the file on the
    proceedings before it, as requested by the Registrar on the President's
    instructions.

    6. In accordance with the President's decision, the hearing took
    place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on
    25 January 1994. The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand.

    There appeared before the Court:

    (a) for the Government

    Mr J. Lathouwers, Deputy Adviser, Head of the
    Human Rights Department, Ministry of Justice, Deputy Agent,
    Mr E. Jakhian, former Chairman of the French-speaking
    Bar of Brussels, Counsel;

    (b) for the Commission

    Mr J.-C. Geus, Delegate;

    (c) the applicant.

    The Court heard addresses by Mr Jakhian, Mr Geus and
    Mr De Moor.

    AS TO THE FACTS

    I. The particular circumstances of the case

    7. The applicant, a Belgian national born in 1930, pursued a
    career in the Belgian army. In 1981 he retired with the rank of
    capitaine-commandant. On 7 July 1983 he gained a law degree.

    A. The applications for enrolment as a member of the Hasselt Bar

    8. On 27 May 1983 Mr De Moor informed the Chairman of the Hasselt
    Bar Association that he intended to apply for enrolment on the list of
    pupil advocates. On 15 June he had an interview with the Chairman.

    9. The Bar Council, when it learnt of the applicant's intention
    at its session on 23 June 1983, reacted in a somewhat unfavourable
    manner, but took the view that it was unnecessary to give a decision
    as no formal application had been made.

    10. On 27 June, in the course of a telephone conversation, the
    Chairman of the Bar Association allegedly told the applicant that the
    Bar Council had decided not to enrol him because he had completed one
    full career and the Hasselt Bar already had over two hundred members.

    11. By a letter of 25 August 1983 Mr De Moor submitted an
    application in the prescribed form.

    12. At a meeting on 8 September the Bar Council decided to consult
    the Chairman (doyen) of the National Bar Association.

    On 6 October, after considering the latter's opinion, according
    to which there were no grounds for refusing Mr De Moor's application
    ("er geen argumenten zijn om de Heer De Moor te weigeren"), the Council
    appointed two rapporteurs from among its members.

    13. On 17 November the Chairman read out the report of the first
    rapporteur, which was unfavourable, and the second submitted a
    comprehensive report on the matter. During the deliberations, it was
    pointed out that Mr De Moor had not taken the oath and had therefore
    not been entitled to seek enrolment. The same day the Council rejected
    the application.

    14. The Chairman of the Bar Association informed Mr De Moor of this
    decision in a letter of 23 November 1983. He stated that it was
    consistent with the practice followed by Bar Councils according to
    which persons who had completed a full career outside the Bar were not
    admitted to the list of pupil advocates.

    B. The proceedings in the Conseil d'Etat

    15. On 29 November 1983 Mr De Moor filed an application in the
    Conseil d'Etat to have the decision set aside on the ground that the
    Hasselt Bar Council did not constitute an "independent and impartial
    tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the
    Convention.

    16. On 16 February 1984 the Bar Council produced its statement of
    defence. It argued that the Conseil d'Etat lacked jurisdiction and
    that Mr De Moor had no interest in the proceedings inasmuch as he had
    not taken the oath and could not therefore be enrolled on the list of
    pupil advocates. On the merits, it affirmed that a refusal to enrol
    could be based on reasons other than those justifying disciplinary
    measures. The fact that the applicant had already completed one full
    career justified the impugned decision, particularly because he had
    stated that, as his income was sufficient, he wished to engage in what
    he regarded as a stimulating occupation on a part-time basis.

    17. Mr De Moor filed his reply on 24 April 1984. He maintained
    that the uncertainty concerning his admission to the Bar had made it
    impossible for him to find an advocate who was prepared to present him
    so that he could take the oath; this obstacle could be surmounted only
    by the designation of an ad hoc pupil master.

    18. On 15 September, 24 October and 5 December 1986 the Legal
    Adviser (auditeur) responsible for preparing the case requested various
    documents from the Bar Council, which sent them to him on 11 December.

    19. On 20 February 1987 the auditeur submitted his report, which
    was communicated to the applicant on 20 March. He expressed the view
    that the Conseil d'Etat had jurisdiction and that Mr De Moor had an
    interest in having the Bar Council's decision quashed. There was no
    legal obligation for a law graduate to take the oath before seeking
    enrolment on the list of pupil advocates. The text of the decision
    refusing the applicant admission to that list had not cited as a reason
    the fact, mentioned orally on 27 June 1983 (see paragraph 10 above),
    that the Hasselt Bar already had a large number of lawyers. It had
    referred solely to the circumstance that the applicant had completed
    a full career outside the Bar. Yet, in the light of the judgment of
    the Court of Cassation of 13 May 1952 (see paragraph 36 below), a
    refusal to enrol of this nature should have been grounded either on the
    failure to comply with the conditions laid down in Article 428 of the
    Judicial Code or on the postulant's unfitness or incompetence to
    practise as a lawyer. It followed that the reason given by the
    Hasselt Bar Council did not justify in law the decision of
    17 November 1983, which should therefore be set aside.

    20. On 13 May 1987 the Bar Council filed a final pleading,
    reiterating the same two objections to the admissibility of the
    application (see paragraph 16 above). It added that the reason given
    fell within the scope of the wide discretion that the Bar Council
    considered itself to enjoy in this area.

    21. On 21 August 1987 the President of the Conseil d'Etat,
    Mr Vermeulen, transferred the case from the Chamber before which it was
    pending and directed that it should be heard by the General Assembly
    of the Administrative Division. On 14 September he postponed the
    public hearing until 12 October 1987 as some members of the Conseil
    d'Etat were unable to attend on 8 October, the date for which it had
    been initially set down.

    22. On 16 September 1987 the National Bar Association sought leave
    to intervene in the proceedings. It considered Mr De Moor's
    application inadmissible. As he had not taken the oath and did not
    therefore satisfy one of the statutory conditions for enrolment, the
    Bar Council could only have given an opinion, in respect of which an
    application for annulment could not lie. It argued in addition that
    the Conseil d'Etat lacked jurisdiction. In its view, the intention of
    the legislature had been that only the ordinary courts, and not the
    Conseil d'Etat, should have jurisdiction for disputes arising from the
    decisions of the Bar Councils.

    23. On 12 October 1987 the General Assembly gave leave for this
    intervention and heard the parties, after which the President reserved
    the decision.

    24. On 28 November 1988 the applicant complained to the President
    of the length of the proceedings. He allegedly received no reply.

    25. On 28 November 1989 he laid a formal complaint with the
    Brussels Crown Counsel for a denial of justice. On 7 May 1990 he
    learned of the authorities' decision not to proceed with his complaint.

    26. In a judgment of 24 September 1991, the General Assembly,
    presided over by Mr Baeteman, President of the Conseil d'Etat, noted
    that the assembly which had heard the case up to that point had not
    concluded its deliberations and could no longer validly sit on account
    of the death of the judge-rapporteur, the appointment of one of the
    judges to another post and the retirement of Mr Vermeulen on
    23 May 1991. It consequently decided to reopen the oral proceedings
    before the General Assembly composed differently, at a hearing to be
    held on 15 October 1991.

    27. On 31 October 1991 that assembly, refusing to follow the
    opinion of the auditeur, Mr De Wolf, ruled that the objection based on
    the Conseil d'Etat's lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae was
    well-founded. It took the view, inter alia:

    "that having regard to the relations between the Bars and
    the judiciary and the concern to preserve advocates'
    independence, the legislature's intention [had been] that the
    decisions of the Bar Councils should fall outside the scope of
    review by the Conseil d'Etat. Accordingly, the decisions of
    the Bar Council [could not] be set aside by the Conseil
    d'Etat. The right to have his case heard by an independent
    and impartial national tribunal which the petitioner
    [inferred] from Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) [of the European
    Convention on Human Rights] [did not] mean that the Conseil
    d'Etat [had] to rule on a matter which [fell] outside its
    jurisdiction;"

    It therefore dismissed the application.

    II. The relevant domestic law

    A. The Bar Council

    28. Each Bar has as the administrative organs for the profession
    of advocate the Bar Council (conseil de l'Ordre), the Chairman of the
    Bar Association (bâtonnier) and the General Assembly.

    29. The Bar Council is composed of the Chairman of the Bar
    Association and two to sixteen other members, according to the number
    of advocates on the Bar roll and the list of the pupil advocates. The
    Hasselt Bar Council has fourteen members in addition to the Chairman.

    The members are directly elected by the General Assembly of the
    Bar Association, to which all advocates on the roll are convened
    (Article 450 of the Judicial Code). The election is held before the
    end of each judicial year.

    30. The Council exercises numerous functions of an administrative,
    regulatory, adjudicative, advisory and disciplinary nature. For the
    purposes of the present case it is sufficient to mention that it is
    responsible for drawing up the roll of advocates and the list of pupil
    advocates.

    31. At the material time, Article 432 of the Judicial Code gave the
    Council unfettered discretion in this respect:

    "Enrolment on the roll of advocates and on the list of pupil
    advocates shall be determined by the Bar Council. No appeal
    shall lie from its decision as it has absolute authority over
    the composition of the roll and the list of pupil advocates."

    An Act of 19 November 1992 amended that provision by requiring
    that any rejection of an application for enrolment had to state
    reasons. In addition, under the new Article 469 bis, an appeal from
    such a decision lies to the Disciplinary Appeals Board, without
    prejudice to the right to file an appeal on points of law with the
    Court of Cassation at a later stage.

    Another amendment concerned the public nature of the
    proceedings. Article 467, second paragraph, of the Judicial Code now
    provides: "The Bar Council, sitting in disciplinary proceedings or as
    in disciplinary proceedings, shall hear the case in public, unless the
    advocate against whom the proceedings have been brought or the person
    applying for enrolment or re-enrolment requests that the proceedings
    be private."

    B. Enrolment on the list of pupil advocates or on the roll of
    advocates

    32. The enrolment of a lawyer on the list of pupil advocates or as
    a member of the Bar was and is governed by Article 428 of the Judicial
    Code:

    "No one may bear the title of avocat or practise as an
    advocate unless he is a Belgian national or a national of a
    Member State of the European Economic Community and possesses
    the degree of Doctor of Laws; he must have taken the oath
    prescribed by law and be enrolled on the Bar roll or on the
    list of pupil advocates.

    ...

    Save where the law provides otherwise, no further
    qualification may be added to the title avocat."

    33. As regards the taking of the oath, which is a separate
    formality from admission to pupillage, Article 429 states as follows:

    "The oath shall be taken at a public sitting of the Court of
    Appeal, candidates being presented by an advocate enrolled as
    a member of the Bar of the jurisdiction of that court for not
    less than ten years, in the presence of the Chairman of the
    Bar Association of the seat of the Court of Appeal and at the
    suit of Crown Counsel".

    The candidate shall swear the following oath:

    'I hereby swear allegiance to the King, obedience to the
    Constitution and to the laws of the Belgian people, and not to
    deviate from the respect due to the courts and the public
    authorities, or to advise or defend any cause that I do not,
    to the best of my knowledge and belief, hold to be just.'

    The registrar shall draw up a record of the whole
    proceedings and endorse each diploma to certify that the
    formalities have been completed."

    34. To be enrolled on the list of pupil advocates a person holding
    a law degree, or Doctor of Laws, who has usually already taken the
    oath, lodges with the secretariat of the Bar Association an application
    for enrolment and his diploma bearing the endorsement certifying that
    he has taken the oath. In principle an application for admission as
    a pupil advocate contains the information on the basis of which the Bar
    Council can determine whether the candidate meets the required
    standards of integrity and decency.

    35. The Bar Council considers whether the candidate satisfies all
    the requirements as to good character and thus whether he is a fit
    person to bear the title of avocat. It also verifies that he does not
    fall within any of the statutory categories of incapacity and
    incompatibility set out in Article 437 of the Judicial Code, which is
    worded as follows:

    "The profession of advocate shall be incompatible with:

    1° the posts of full-time member of the judiciary (magistrat
    effectif), registrar and civil servant;

    2° the functions of notary (notaire) and bailiff (huissier
    de justice);

    3° industrial or commercial activity;

    4° remunerated employment and activity, whether in the
    public or private sector, unless it does not jeopardise the
    independence of the advocate or compromise the dignity of the
    Bar.

    ..."

    36. The Bar Council has a very wide discretion in deciding whether
    to admit candidates to the Bar. That discretion must however be
    exercised within the limits laid down by the code.

    Seeking to define those limits Mr Lemmens, the auditeur, in his
    report (see paragraph 19 above) took as authority a judgment of the
    Court of Cassation of 13 May 1952 concerning a decision taken by the
    Council of the Pharmacists' Association. Under the Act of 19 May 1949
    setting up the Pharmacists' Association, that Council was vested with
    powers, as regards admission to the roll, similar to those of the Bar
    Council. The relevant ground of the judgment in question is worded as
    follows:

    "... it may be inferred from paragraph 3 [of section 2 of
    the Act of 19 May 1949] laying down the procedure for appeals
    against decisions refusing applications for enrolment, in the
    light of the purpose of that text and its legislative history,
    that the Councils of the Association, responsible for drawing
    up the roll of the Association, can found their refusal of an
    application for enrolment only on a defect in the
    qualifications on which the application is based or on the
    current unfitness of the candidate or on his professional
    incompetence." (Pasicrisie, I, p. 578)

    PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

    37. Mr De Moor applied to the Commission on 26 June 1990. Relying
    on Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention, he maintained that
    the Hasselt Bar Council and the Disciplinary Appeals Board had not been
    impartial. He further complained that the proceedings before the Bar
    Council had lacked fairness and had not been conducted in public and
    that the length of the proceedings in the Conseil d'Etat had been
    excessive.

    38. The Commission declared the application (no. 16997/90)
    admissible on 6 January 1992, with the exception of the complaint
    concerning the Disciplinary Appeals Board. In its report of
    8 January 1993 (made under Article 31) (art. 31), the Commission
    expressed the unanimous opinion that there had been a violation of
    Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention on each of the points
    in issue. The full text of the Commission's opinion is reproduced as
    an annex to this judgment*.

    _______________
    * Note by the Registrar: for practical reasons this annex will appear
    only with the printed version of the judgment (volume 292-A of
    Series A of the Publications of the Court), but a copy of the
    Commission's report is obtainable from the registry.
    _______________

    FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT

    39. In their memorial the Government asked the Court to declare
    "the application inadmissible and, in the alternative, ill-founded".

    AS TO THE LAW

    I. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 6 PARA. 1 (art. 6-1)

    40. Mr De Moor asserted that he had been the victim of violations
    of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1), which provides as follows:

    "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations
    ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within
    a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
    established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but
    the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the
    trial in the interests of morals, public order or national
    security in a democratic society, where the interests of
    juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties
    so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion
    of the court in special circumstances where publicity would
    prejudice the interests of justice."

    41. In view of the different arguments adduced, the first issue to
    be addressed is the applicability of that provision.

    A. Applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)

    42. Like the Commission, the Court notes in the first place that
    there is little to distinguish the present case from that of H. v.
    Belgium, even though it concerns enrolment on the list of pupil
    advocates rather than the readmission to the Bar of an advocate who
    had been struck off the roll (see the H. v. Belgium judgment of
    30 November 1987, Series A no. 127-B, p. 31, para. 40).

    43. It is clear that the question raised before the Hasselt Bar
    Council concerned the determination of a right.

    Where legislation lays down conditions for the admission to a
    profession and a candidate for admission satisfies those conditions,
    he has a right to be admitted to that profession. Indeed this was
    recognised by the Belgian legislature when it passed the Act of
    19 November 1992 (see paragraph 31 above), which took account of the
    H. v. Belgium judgment, but which is not applicable in the instant
    case.

    44. In the Government's view, Mr De Moor did not satisfy the
    relevant requirements. He had not taken the oath before submitting his
    application for enrolment, although Article 428 of the Judicial Code
    (see paragraph 32 above) establishes a logical sequence for the
    formalities to be completed in order to secure admission to the
    profession of advocate. The applicant had disregarded that logical
    sequence and had thus acted erratically. This had made it impossible
    for the Hasselt Bar Council to give a valid decision with the result
    that the Bar Council's opinion could not constitute a decision on a
    civil right.

    45. The applicant submitted that the position adopted by the Bar
    Council from the outset made it pointless for him to look for an
    experienced advocate in whose chambers he could have effected his
    pupillage and who, as pupil master, would have presented him so that
    he could take the oath.

    46. The Court agrees with the Commission and Mr De Moor that the
    refusal to enrol was not based on the fact that the applicant had not
    taken the oath. The sole ground for the decision was that the
    candidate for enrolment had completed a full career outside the Bar.
    In addition, the Chairman of the National Bar Association had expressed
    the opinion that there was nothing to prevent the enrolment of the
    candidate in question (see paragraph 12 above). Finally, the auditeur
    of the Conseil d'Etat noted in his report that the law did not require
    a law graduate to take the oath before seeking enrolment (see
    paragraph 19 above).

    In these circumstances and in view of the wording of
    Article 428 of the Judicial Code, the applicant could, on arguable
    grounds, claim a right under Belgian law to enrolment on the list of
    pupil advocates.

    47. The Hasselt Bar Council was therefore called upon to determine
    a dispute (contestation) concerning a right which the applicant claimed
    and which has already been held by the Court to be a "civil right"
    within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) (see the H. v.
    Belgium judgment, cited above, pp. 32-34, paras. 44-48); that provision
    is therefore applicable.

    B. Compliance with Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)

    1. Before the Hasselt Bar Council

    48. In Mr De Moor's submission the Hasselt Bar Council did not
    constitute an impartial tribunal and its proceedings in his case were
    neither fair nor public.

    (a) The Government's preliminary objection

    49. The Government objected that the applicant had failed to
    exhaust the following domestic remedies: (i) he had not filed an appeal
    on points of law in the Court of Cassation against the judgment of the
    Conseil d'Etat of 31 October 1991 (Article 609 2° of the Judicial
    Code); (ii) he had not applied to take the oath before the Antwerp
    Court of Appeal, and had thus deprived himself of the opportunity to
    obtain an assessment of his "fitness"; (iii) he could have challenged
    an unjustified refusal to grant that application, in the Court of
    Cassation on the basis of a violation of the law (Articles 608 and
    609 1° of the Judicial Code); (iv) he had not waited for the outcome
    of the proceedings in the Conseil d'Etat before complaining to the
    Commission; (v) he had not brought an appeal on points of law against
    the refusal of 17 November 1983 (Article 610 of the Judicial Code); and
    (vi) he had failed to apply to the Court of Cassation for a transfer
    of jurisdiction from the Hasselt Bar Council on the ground of bias
    (Articles 648 and 653 of the Judicial Code).

    50. The Government are estopped from relying on the first limb of
    the objection because they did not raise it before the Commission (see,
    among many other authorities, the Tomasi v. France judgment of
    27 August 1992, Series A no. 241-A, p. 39, para. 106). This is not the
    case of the other five limbs, which had already been adduced in
    substance prior to the decision on admissibility.

    The application to take the oath cannot be regarded as a
    remedy, so that the possibility of filing an appeal on points of law
    against a refusal by the Court of Appeal to allow such an application
    is immaterial. Although Mr De Moor applied to the Commission without
    waiting for the judgment of the Conseil d'Etat, this does not mean that
    the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application was
    premature (see paragraphs 27 and 38 above) or that any legitimate
    interest of the respondent State was harmed (see the Ringeisen v.
    Austria judgment of 16 July 1971, Series A no. 13, p. 38, paras. 91 and
    93). On the matter of the last two remedies, the Court observes that
    the applicant instituted the proceedings before the Conseil d'Etat and
    pursued them to their conclusion. He cannot be criticised for not
    having had recourse to legal remedies which would have been directed
    essentially to the same end and would in any case not have offered
    better chances of success (see, in particular, mutatis mutandis, the
    A. v. France judgment of 23 November 1993, Series A no. 277-B, p. 48,
    para. 32). The objection is therefore unfounded.

    (b) The merits of the complaints

    51. Mr De Moor called into question the impartiality of the Hasselt
    Bar Council both in terms of its structure and in regard to the
    personal impartiality of its members. The Bar Council, being composed
    exclusively of advocates, pursued only its own interests whether
    pecuniary or non-pecuniary in nature; moreover, the members of the Bar
    in question each had an interest in the operation of a disguised
    numerus clausus which would protect them from having to share their
    fees with more practitioners. The applicant also complained that the
    proceedings before the Bar Council had been unfair and had not been
    conducted in public. That body's decision had been a corporative
    reflex; it had not proceeded on the basis of the statutory conditions
    for admission to the Bar. It had not held a public hearing to examine
    the application for enrolment or given its decision in public.

    52. The Commission in substance subscribed to the views taken by
    the applicant.

    53. The Government's arguments were confined to the question of
    impartiality. Under the objective test, Mr De Moor could not
    reasonably entertain suspicions in respect of the Bar Council and
    accuse it of having sought to eliminate him as a competitor. He had
    already completed a full professional career and was in receipt of a
    retirement pension, whereas at the same time the Council had admitted
    a considerable number of pupil advocates for whom the Bar constituted
    the sole source of income and who were accordingly genuine competitors.
    In addition, fears of subjective partiality could not be based on a
    mere rumour that two members of the Bar Council regarded the prospect
    of a fellow advocate establishing himself in the vicinity of their
    chambers unfavourably.

    54. The Court notes that under Article 432 of the Judicial Code
    (see paragraph 31 above), the Bar Council enjoys a very wide discretion
    in dealing with an application for enrolment on the list of pupil
    advocates. It observes, nevertheless, that a decision rejecting such
    an application must be based either on the failure to comply with the
    conditions laid down in Article 428 of the Judicial Code (nationality,
    diploma, the taking of the oath), or on the fact that the candidate
    falls within one of the categories of incompatibility or again is unfit
    or incompetent to practise the profession of advocate (see
    paragraphs 19, 35 and 36 above).

    55. In the present case the refusal to enrol the applicant did not
    refer to the first requirement, and in particular the fact that he had
    not taken the oath. Nor did it refer to any incompatibility. To be
    valid it should therefore have been founded on the applicant's
    unfitness or his professional incompetence. In his report, the
    auditeur, Mr Lemmens, took the view that such incapacity could not
    automatically be inferred from the circumstance of the candidate's
    having completed a full career outside the Bar but should be
    ascertained on the basis of the specific and concrete circumstances in
    which the previous activities of the person concerned were carried out,
    regard being had to the repercussions those activities might have on
    his capacity to practise the profession of advocate; as no mention was
    made of any such circumstances, the contested decision had no legal
    justification.

    The Court shares that view and therefore considers that the Bar
    Council did not give the applicant's case a fair hearing inasmuch as
    the reason it gave was not a legally valid one. It observes further
    that at the material time no remedy was available to the applicant (see
    paragraph 31 above).

    56. At the time the Judicial Code did not contain any rule
    regarding the public nature of proceedings in connection with enrolment
    on the list of pupil advocates (see paragraph 31 above). No public
    hearing was held to examine Mr De Moor's application and the Bar
    Council's decision was not delivered in public.

    For the reasons set out in the H. v. Belgium judgment (cited
    above, p. 36, para. 54), the applicant was entitled to public
    proceedings, as there was no reason justifying their being held in
    private.

    57. In sum, the contested proceedings did not satisfy the
    requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) and there has therefore
    been a breach of that provision.

    58. That finding makes it unnecessary for the Court to rule on the
    complaint based on the Bar Council's lack of impartiality.

    2. Before the Conseil d'Etat

    59. The applicant also complained of the length of the proceedings
    in the Conseil d'Etat.

    (a) The Government's preliminary objection

    60. The Government contended, as they had already done before the
    Commission, that Mr De Moor had not exhausted the domestic remedies
    inasmuch as he had failed to file a fresh criminal complaint for denial
    of justice with the principal public prosecutor's office of the Court
    of Appeal, together with an application to join the proceedings as a
    civil party.

    61. The Court cannot hold it against the applicant that he failed
    to have recourse to a legal remedy which would have been directed
    essentially to the same end as those of which he had already availed
    himself. Moreover, the Government have not shown that such a remedy
    would have been effective. The objection must therefore be dismissed.

    (b) The merits of the complaint

    62. The period to be taken into consideration began on
    29 November 1983, when the application to have the Bar Council's
    decision set aside was filed; it ended on 31 October 1991 with the
    delivery of the Conseil d'Etat's judgment. It therefore lasted seven
    years and eleven months.

    63. The reasonableness of the length of proceedings is to be
    determined with reference to the criteria laid down in the Court's
    case-law and in the light of the circumstances of the case.

    64. The Government pleaded the complexity and the sensitive
    character of the case, in which the Conseil d'Etat gave a decision
    conflicting with the opinion of the auditeur. The intervention of the
    National Bar Association, the death of the judge-rapporteur, the
    departure of another judge and the retirement of the President all
    contributed to slowing down the proceedings.

    65. According to the Commission, the case was not a particularly
    complex one although it did pose a problem for the Conseil d'Etat,
    whose General Assembly had to choose between two positions, the
    approach which had been followed up to that point, according to which
    it lacked jurisdiction to rule on such an application, and that,
    proposed by the auditeur, according to which it had such jurisdiction
    (see paragraphs 19 and 27 above). The intervention of the National Bar
    Association could not have the effect of delaying the proceedings
    (Article 54 of the Regent's decree of 23 August 1948 laying down the
    rules for the procedure in the Administrative Division of the Conseil
    d'Etat).

    66. Like the Delegate of the Commission, the Court distinguishes
    two periods. The first ran from the lodging of the application to the
    Conseil d'Etat on 29 November 1983 (see paragraph 15 above) to the
    hearing of 12 October 1987 before the General Assembly (see
    paragraph 23 above). No investigative measure was taken between
    24 April 1984, when Mr De Moor's memorial in reply was filed, and
    15 September 1986, on which date the auditeur requested various
    documents from the Hasselt Bar Council (see paragraphs 17-18 above).
    A possible explanation for this delay is that it was considered
    desirable to await the outcome in Strasbourg of the case of
    H. v. Belgium (see the judgment of 30 November 1987, cited above,
    paras. 1, 4 and 33-34). The second period began on 12 October 1987 and
    ended on 31 October 1991 with the judgment of the Conseil d'Etat (see
    paragraph 27 above). This period was one of total inactivity until the
    oral proceedings were reopened on 24 September 1991 (see paragraph 26
    above).

    67. The applicant's conduct is not open to criticism. The
    complexity of the case and the sensitive nature of the question put to
    the Conseil d'Etat do not explain the period of just over four years
    during which judgment was reserved. The intervention of the National
    Bar Association was not sufficient to justify the delay in the
    proceedings. It occurred one month before the first hearing on
    12 October 1987. Nor do the other events referred to by the Government
    justify the above-mentioned lapse of time.

    68. A "reasonable time" has therefore been exceeded and there has
    accordingly been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).

    II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 50 (art. 50)

    69. Under Article 50 (art. 50),

    "If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a
    legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting
    Party is completely or partially in conflict with the
    obligations arising from the (...) Convention, and if the
    internal law of the said Party allows only partial reparation
    to be made for the consequences of this decision or measure,
    the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just
    satisfaction to the injured party."

    A. Damage

    70. The applicant left it to the Court to assess the amount of
    compensation to be awarded him in respect of pecuniary and
    non-pecuniary damage.

    71. The Government did not express an opinion on this matter.

    The Delegate of the Commission noted that Mr De Moor had not
    indicated the extent of any pecuniary damage that he might have
    sustained. However, for non-pecuniary damage he was entitled to higher
    financial compensation than that awarded in the H. v. Belgium case.

    72. The Court dismisses the applicant's claims for pecuniary damage
    because they are not supported by any detailed information. On the
    other hand, it considers that Mr De Moor suffered some non-pecuniary
    damage, which is not sufficiently compensated for by the finding of a
    violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1). Making an assessment on an
    equitable basis, it awards him 400,000 Belgian francs (FB).

    B. Costs and expenses

    73. The applicant requested the Court to reserve the question of
    costs and expenses.

    74. Neither the Government nor the Delegate of the Commission
    expressed a view.

    75. As Mr De Moor presented his own case he cannot claim for the
    reimbursement of fees. On the basis of the criteria laid down in its
    case-law, the Court assesses the costs incurred in connection with the
    proceedings conducted before the Conseil d'Etat and the Convention
    institutions at 40,000 FB.

    FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

    1. Dismisses the Government's preliminary objections;

    2. Holds that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) is applicable in this
    case and that there has been a violation of that provision;

    3. Holds that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
    within three months, 400,000 (four hundred thousand) Belgian
    francs for non-pecuniary damage and 40,000 (forty thousand)
    Belgian francs for costs and expenses;

    4. Dismisses the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction.

    Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public
    hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 23 June 1994.

    Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
    President

    Signed: Herbert PETZOLD
    Acting Registrar

     

    Новинки

    А. Л. Бурков «Конвенция о защите прав человека в судах России». Москва: Волтерс Клувер, 2010

    А. Л. Бурков "Влияние Европейской конвенции по правам человека на Российское право" (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2007)

    Шестое издание "Применение Европейской конвенции по правам человека в судах России"

    Пятое издание "Исполнение постановлений Европейского суда по правам человека"

    Четвертое издание "Право на жизнь, запрет пыток и бесчеловечного или унижающего достоинство обращения или наказания: европейские стандарты, российское законодательство и правоприменительная практика"

    Третье издание "Право на свободу и личную неприкосновенность: европейские стандарты и российская практика"

    Второе издание "Европейские стандарты права на справедливое судебное разбирательство и российская практика"

    Первое издание "Европейский Суд по правам человека: правила обращения и судопроизводства"

    Сайт ОО Сутяжник: Главная / Новости / Библиотека / Судебные дела / Европейский Суд / Изучаем Европейскую Конвенцию / Оспаривание нормативных актов / Заочная школа правозащитника / Поиск