FIRST SECTION
CASE OF SOKOLOV v. RUSSIA
(Application no. 3734/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
22 September 2005
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Sokolov v.
Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First
Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mr C.L.
Rozakis,
President,
Mrs F.
Tulkens,
Mrs S.
Botoucharova,
Mr A.
Kovler,
Mr K.
Hajiyev,
Mr D.
Spielmann,
Mr S.E.
Jebens,
judges,
and Mr S.
Nielsen,
Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 30 August 2005,
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in
an application (no. 3734/02)
against the Russian Federation
lodged with the Court under
Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by
a Russian national, Mr Mikhail
Aleksandrovich Sokolov (“the applicant”), on 25
December 2001.
2. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mr P. Laptev, Representative of the Russian
Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
3. On
5 January 2004 the
Court decided to communicate the application. Applying Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the
application at the same time.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in
Moscow.
1. Labour dispute
5. In July 1996 the applicant sued his former
employer, a private company, for wage arrears and compensation for non-pecuniary
damage.
6. On 31 January and 4 December 1997 the
Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow issued judgments in the applicant’s action
which were subsequently quashed on appeal.
7. The applicant amended his claims seeking
reinstatement because he had been meanwhile dismissed.
8. Between 13 July 1998 and 18 May 1999 the
Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow listed thirteen hearings, of which the
hearing on 13 July 1998 was adjourned due to the applicant’s absence and eight
hearings were adjourned so as to give time to his former employer to produce
additional evidence or to read materials submitted by the applicant. The
hearings of 3 and 18 March 1999 were adjourned due to the employer’s absence.
9. On 8 June 1999 the Nikulinskiy District
Court of Moscow allowed the applicant’s claim in part.
10. On an unspecified date the applicant
complained about the bailiffs’ failure to enforce the judgment of 8 June 1999.
On 17 November 1999 the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow confirmed that the
bailiffs had failed to comply with the domestic time-limit for the enforcement
of judgments.
11. On 26 November 1999 the Moscow City Court
upheld the judgment of 8 June 1999. The judgments remained unenforced.
12. On 14 December 2000 the Presidium of the
Moscow City Court quashed the judgments of 8 June and 26 November 1999 and
remitted the case to a differently composed bench.
13. On 23 January 2001 the President of the
Nikulinskiy District Court assigned the case to a judge.
14. Of nineteen hearings scheduled between 7
February 2001 and 19 December 2002 two hearings were adjourned on the
applicant’s request. Six hearings were adjourned due to the defendant’s failure
to attend and five hearings were postponed as to give the defendant time to
submit additional evidence. Three hearings were adjourned because the presiding
judge was on leave or was involved in other proceedings.
15. On 22 January 2003 the Nikulinskiy District
Court of Moscow reinstated the applicant, awarded him the arrears and a partial
compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
16. On 28 July 2003 the Moscow City Court
upheld the judgment.
2. Enforcement
proceedings
17. On 6 March 2003 bailiffs instituted
enforcement proceedings.
18. On 15 April 2003 the Nikulinskiy District
Court of Moscow, upon the bailiff’s request, stayed the enforcement proceedings
pending clarification of the judgment of 22 January 2003.
19. The applicant complained to a court that
the judgment of 22 January 2003, as upheld on 28 July 2003, had not been
enforced. On 13 August 2003 the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed
the complaint holding that the enforcement proceedings had been lawfully stayed.
20. On 4 September 2003 the Nikulinskiy
District Court of Moscow clarified the judgment of 22 January 2003, as upheld on
28 July 2003, and held that the applicant had to be immediately reinstated in
his previous position. The court resumed the enforcement proceedings.
21. On 9 February 2004 the employer issued an
order reinstating the applicant in his previous position. On 17 February 2004
the applicant asked the employer to grant him annual leave for all years of
absence since 1996 and to dismiss him after the leave.
22. On 19 February 2004 the bailiffs asked the
court to stay the enforcement until the applicant would return from his leave.
23. On 14 April 2004 the Nikulinskiy District
Court of Moscow stayed the proceedings until the end of the applicant’s leave.
The applicant appealed against that decision on 7 June 2004.
24. On 15 June 2004 the Nikulinskiy District
Court of Moscow disallowed the appeal because the applicant had missed the
time-limit for lodging it.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF
THE CONVENTION CONCERNING THE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
25. The applicant complained that the length of
the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement,
provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations
... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ...
tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
26. The Government submitted that the applicant was no longer a victim as the
domestic courts had granted his claim.
27. The applicant contested the Government’s view.
28. However, even assuming that the partial
granting of the applicant’s claim may be regarded as a favourable outcome of the
proceedings, the Court notes that such an outcome was not directly connected
with the length of the proceedings and cannot therefore be considered, either
directly or by implication, as a recognition of a violation of Article 6 or as
reparation for the damage allegedly caused to the applicant by the length of the
proceedings (see,
mutatis
mutandis,
Byrn v.
Denmark, no. 13156/87, Commission decision of 1 July 1992, Decisions and
Reports (DR) 74, p. 5). Accordingly, the Government’s objection should be
dismissed.
29. The Court notes that the complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The
period to be taken into consideration
30. The Government submitted that the
proceedings had begun in July 1996 and ended on 28 July 2003 with the final
judgment of the Moscow City Court.
31. The applicant submitted that none of the
judgments in his case, including the one of 28 July 2003, had been enforced. In
his view, the duration of the enforcement should be included in the overall
length.
32. The Court is of the view that the period
between July 1996 and 9 February 2004 should be regarded as a whole because it
was incumbent on the State to enforce the judgment once it was issued. Therefore
the periods when the enforcement proceedings were pending must be regarded as an
integral part of the “trial” for the purpose of Article 6 and should be included
in the overall length (see
Kravchuk v.
Russia (dec.), no. 72749/01, 1 February 2005;
Ivanova v.
Russia (dec.), no. 74705/02, 1 April 2004). The Court considers that the
proceedings lasted from July 1996 to 9 February 2004 when the employer issued
the order reinstating the applicant in his position.
33. The proceedings therefore lasted more than seven years and seven months.
The Court observes that the period to be taken into consideration began on 5 May 1998,
when the Convention came into force in respect of Russia. Thus, in this case, at
least five years and nine months fall within the Court’s competence
ratione temporis.
2. Reasonableness of the length of the
proceedings
34. The Government submitted that the delays in
the adjudication of the applicant’s action had been caused by the applicant’s
systematic failure to attend the hearings. Twenty-three hearings were adjourned
because of his absence. Furthermore, the applicant amended his claims on several
occasions. For that reason thirteen hearings were adjourned to give the
defendant time to produce new evidence.
35. The applicant averred that he had attended
all hearings, save for one on 13 July 1998 because he had not been summoned for
it. He pointed out that the Government did not indicate any particular hearing
that he had allegedly failed to attend, except that on 13 July 1998. He could
not be blamed for amending his claims because he had been forced to do so due to
his dismissal and a change in the employer’s legal status.
36. The Court reiterates that the
reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the
circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the
complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant
authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among
many other authorities,
Frydlender
v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
37. The
Court considers that the case was not particularly difficult to determine.
Consequently, it takes the view that an overall period of over seven years could
not, in itself, be deemed to satisfy the “reasonable time” requirement in
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
38. The
Court notes that the parties disagreed on certain factual matters concerning the
applicant’s attendance of the hearings. As it appears from the list of hearings
included in the Government’s memorandum the applicant was present at all
hearings, save for one on 13 July 1998. The Government did not indicate any
other hearing which the applicant had failed to attend. Therefore the Court
finds it established that the applicant had only been absent on 13 July 1998.
Irrespective of the reasons for his absence, the delay incurred therefrom was
negligible. As to the Government’s argument that the applicant contributed to
the delay in the proceedings by amending his claims, the Court reiterates that
the applicant cannot be blamed for taking full advantage of the resources
afforded by national law in the defence of his interest (see,
mutatis mutandis, Yağcı and Sargın v. Turkey, judgment of 8 June 1995,
Series A no. 319-A, § 66).
39. The Court observes, however, that substantial
periods of inactivity, for which the Government have not submitted any
satisfactory explanation, are attributable to the domestic authorities. For more
than a year, from 26 November 1999 to 14 December 2000, the enforcement
proceedings languished with no apparent progress. The domestic courts admitted
that the bailiffs had been responsible for their failure to enforce the
judgment. The aggregated length of the delays occasioned by the judge’s absence
and his participation in unrelated proceedings amounted to approximately seven
months. The Court also finds it peculiar that in the case which was of no
particular complexity so many hearings had to be adjourned to give time to the
defendant to produce additional evidence (compare with
Di Pede v. Italy,
judgment of 26 September 1996,
Reports of Judgments
and Decisions 1996-IV).
40. The Court furthermore notes that the conduct of the
defendant was one of the reasons for the prolongation of the proceedings. In the
Court’s opinion, the domestic authorities failed to take adequate steps in order
to ensure the defendant’s attendance. The defendant defaulted on at least eight
occasions which resulted in a delay of approximately seven months. There is no
indication that the court reacted in any way to that behaviour. Accordingly, the
Court considers that, the domestic courts did not avail themselves of the
measures available to it under national law to discipline the participants to
the proceedings and to ensure that the case be heard within a reasonable time
(see, mutatis
mutandis, Kuśmierek v. Poland, no. 10675/02, § 65, 21 September 2004).
41. Finally, the Court recalls that employment
disputes generally require particular diligence on the part of the domestic
courts (Ruotolo
v. Italy, judgment of 27 February 1992, Series A no. 230-D, p. 39, § 17).
Having regard to the overall length of the proceedings, the Court concludes that
the applicant’s case was not examined within a reasonable time. There has
accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE
CONVENTION
42. The applicant further complained that in
Russia there was no authority to which application could be made to complain of
the excessive length of proceedings. This complaint falls to be examined under
Article 13 of the Convention which reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the]
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national
authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity.”
43. The Government submitted that on several
occasions the applicant had successfully challenged the judgments before
higher-instance courts.
A. Admissibility
44. The Court notes that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
45. The Court reiterates that Article 13
guarantees an effective remedy before a national authority for an alleged breach
of the requirement under Article 6 § 1 to hear a case within a reasonable time
(see Kudła
v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 156, ECHR 2000-XI). It notes that the
Government did not indicate any remedy that could have expedited the
determination of the applicant’s case or provided him with adequate redress for
delays that had already occurred (see
Kormacheva
v. Russia, no. 53084/99, 29 January 2004, § 64). In particular, the
Government did not explain how the appeal on the merits of the case could have
expedited the proceedings or how the applicant could have obtained relief –
either preventive or compensatory – by having recourse to a higher judicial
authority.
46. Accordingly, the Court considers that in
the present case there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention on
account of the lack of a remedy under domestic law whereby the applicant could
have obtained a ruling upholding his right to have his case heard within a
reasonable time, as set forth in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
III. OTHER
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
47. Lastly, the Court has examined the
remainder of the applicant’s complaints as submitted by him. However, having
regard to all the material in its possession, it finds that these complaints do
not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in
the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application
must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3
and 4 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE
CONVENTION
48. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of
the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court
shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
49. The applicant claimed 930,141.64 Russian
roubles (RUR) in respect of pecuniary and RUR 435,341.12 in respect of
non-pecuniary damage.
50. The Government considered this claim to be
excessive and unreasonable.
51. The Court does not discern any causal link between
the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this
claim. On the other hand, the Court accepts that the applicant suffered
distress, anxiety and frustration exacerbated by the unreasonable length of the
proceedings and the lack of an effective remedy for a breach of the requirement
to hear his case within a reasonable time. Making its assessment on an equitable
basis, it awards the applicant EUR 2,400 in respect of non-pecuniary damage,
plus any tax that may be chargeable on the above amount.
B. Costs and expenses
52. The applicant did not make any claims for
the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and before the Court.
53. Accordingly, the Court does not award
anything under this head.
C. Default interest
54. The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares
the complaints concerning the excessive length of the proceedings and the
absence of an effective remedy admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
2. Holds
that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the
applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final
according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 2,400 (two thousand four
hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Russian
roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may
be chargeable;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank
during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses
the remainder of the applicant’s claims for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and
notified in writing on 22 September 2005, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the
Rules of Court.
Søren
Nielsen Christos
Rozakis
Registrar President
