CM/Inf/DH(2006)19 revised
6 June 20061
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Non-enforcement of domestic judicial decisions in Russia: general
measures to comply with the European Court’s judgments
Memorandum prepared by the
Department for the execution of the European Court’s judgments and first
comments by the Russian authorities (Application of Article 46 of the ECHR)
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The present Memorandum has been prepared to
assist the Committee of Ministers in its supervision of the execution by the
Russian Federation of a number of judgments of the European Court relating to
the public authorities' failure to comply with domestic judicial decisions
against the state. These judgments reveal an important structural problem
requiring an urgent and comprehensive solution.
The Memorandum examines the special procedure
set up in 2006 to improve the enforcement of such judicial decisions and raises
a number of questions about its capacity to ensure that Russia meets its
obligations under the Convention as established by the Court's judgments. It
takes into account the experience of other member states in resolving similar
problems in response to the Court's judgments and the conclusions reached by the
CEPEJ on these issues.
Following this examination, the Memorandum
points at a number of outstanding problems and proposes a number of avenues that
the Russian authorities may consider in their ongoing search for a comprehensive
resolution of the aforementioned problem. The main avenues proposed are:
1) Improvement of budgetary procedures
within the Russian Federation;
2) Establishment of a subsidiary mechanism of compulsory enforcement
including seizure of state assets;
3) Ensuring effective state liability for the non-enforcement of judgments
through judicial remedies;
4) Introducing adequate default interest in case of non-enforcement;
5) Ensuring effective liability of civil servants for non-enforcement;
6) Possible reconsideration of the bailiffs’ role and increasing their
efficiency.
The Russian authorities were encouraged to
consider the Memorandum in the context of their preparation of the expected
action plan regarding further general measures needed rapidly to prevent new
violations and further applications to the Court.
The Memorandum has been well received by the
authorities and considered to be a positive contribution to the identification
of the general measures to be taken. In view of the extent of the problem, the
authorities suggested that certain areas be identified where the non-enforcement
problems should be solved as a matter of priority taking into account specific
circumstances involved.
INTRODUCTION
1. Since 2002 a number of judgments of the
European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) have found violations of the
European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) by the Russian Federation
on account of the public authorities’ failure to comply with domestic judicial
decisions delivered against them (violations of Articles 6§1 and 13 of the
Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No.1). Under Article 46 of the
Convention, all these judgments have been transmitted to the Committee of
Ministers for supervision of their execution, which notably implies the adoption
of general measures preventing new similar violations.
2. It was widely acknowledged in the Committee
of Ministers that the Court’s findings reveal important structural problems
which must be resolved to comply with the judgments. The main elements at the
origin of these problems at issue are summarised below:
- the bailiff’s inefficiency2;
- lack of coordination between various enforcement agencies3;
- lack of clarity in judgments to identify the debtor;
- lack of funds on the debtor’s account4;
- non-availability of budgetary funds5;
- lack of clarity as to the documents to be sent to the Ministry of Finance6.
The Committee of Ministers therefore invited the
Russian authorities to inform it of the measures taken or envisaged to remedy
these structural problems, thus preventing new, similar violations.
3. The Russian authorities expressed their
understanding for the concerns expressed in the Committee as regards the
importance and complexity of the problems, the large number of people affected
by them and the influx of similar applications before the Court (estimated at
40% of all admissible complaints against Russia). They also gave assurance that
the current problem is not the lack of funds but the “complicated budgetary
relations between the federal authorities and the authorities of the subjects of
the Russian Federation”. Solutions to the problems are already being sought in
close co-operation with the Council of Europe (notably through an ongoing
bilateral project with CEPEJ).
4. The Committee has acknowledged that priority
should be given to finding urgent solutions to these structural problems and the
Secretariat was asked to assist the Committee and the Russian authorities in
this matter.
5. The Secretariat has therefore prepared the
present Memorandum with a preliminary description and analysis of the underlying
problems and presenting certain possible key avenues for their resolution.
Without being exhaustive, the Memorandum largely builds upon the experience of
other countries, which were confronted with similar problems when executing the
Court’s judgments.
I – Changing enforcement procedure between
1997 and 2005
The procedure for enforcement of domestic
judicial decisions ordering the public authorities to pay money has changed
several times since the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Russia
(5 May 1998):
Between 1997 and 2001,
the bailiff service was the only authority competent to ensure enforcement of
all judgments, including of those delivered against the state, its subjects,
their organs, municipalities or its entities (hereinafter altogether the “Public
Authorities”). The 1997 Law on enforcement proceedings empowered bailiffs to
take all necessary measures to that effect, including the attachment of goods or
accounts.
The violations found by the Court during this
period mainly originated from the inefficiency of the bailiff service7.
Between 2001 and 2005,
the enforcement of judgments against the public authorities was mainly based
on a special procedure established by government decrees entrusting
execution to the Ministry of Finance8.
In addition, the Ministry of Finance was duly empowered to make the necessary
payments by yearly Laws on the Federal Budget (starting with the Law n° 150-ФЗ
of 27 December 2000). Bailiffs’ competence in this area was explicitly excluded
as from 2003 (Law n° 176- ФЗ of 24 December 2002). No compulsory means existed
to secure the execution of judgments.
Notwithstanding these laws and
regulations, the Supreme Court held on several occasions between 2001 and 2003,
that the existence of a specific execution procedure did not, in principle,
prevent claimants from seeking enforcement through the bailiff service, if
necessary. However, the enforcement of such decisions through bailiffs did not
appear to work effectively in practice.
On 14 July 2005, the Constitutional Court
challenged Government Decree No. 666,
stating that the special system set up required a legislative basis. The
Constitutional Court gave the authorities until 1 January 2006 to set up the
appropriate enforcement procedure, respecting the following principles:
· enforcement of judicial decisions shall
take place within a reasonable time;
· enforcement proceedings shall be subject to an effective – not only formal
– judicial review making it possible to challenge acts by civil servants
delaying or denying enforcement;
· non-compliance with a court decision shall give rise to debtors’
responsibility under the federal law and a special mechanism must exist to
implement civil servants’ responsibility for lack of or delay in
enforcement.
In the wake of the Constitutional Court’s
judgment, Parliament adopted the Law of 27 December 2005 which confirmed the
special enforcement procedure (Law n° 197 - ФЗ of 27 December 2005 amending
the Budgetary Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Arbitration Code and the
Federal Law on Enforcement proceedings, hereinafter referred to as “the Law of
2005”).
II - Enforcement Procedure in force since
January 2006
The new procedure for enforcement of judgments
delivered against the public authorities is largely based on the presumption
that the new responsible authority, the Federal Treasury (with its territorial
offices) will henceforth effectively ensure, upon the claimant’s request,
compliance with judgments. It was not found necessary to introduce any right for
claimants to use coercive enforcement mechanisms against the public authorities.
The main elements of the new procedure are as
follows:
a) Bailiffs’ competence considerably
restricted
· Bailiffs definitely have no competence for
forcible recovery of funds deposited on accounts held with the Federal
Treasury by the public authorities;
· Bailiffs conserve jurisdiction for
forcible recovery of funds deposited by state entities with private banks;
b) Uniform procedure introduced
· The competence for enforcement of judicial
decisions ordering payment by the public authorities today rests with the
Federal Treasury and its territorial offices;
· The Law introduced a uniform list of
documents to be submitted by claimants to the Treasury offices with a view
to enforcement of judgments (e.g. a writ of execution together with a
certified copy of the judgment and claimant’s request including his bank
details);
· The Law also specified an exhaustive list
of grounds and upheld the previously existing 5-day time-limit for
considering the claim and returning the file to the claimant;
· The time-limit for enforcement of the
judgment has been extended from two to three months from receipt of the
claim by the Treasury office;
d) Measures foreseen to ensure enforcement
· If the debtor lacks funds to comply with a
judgment, it shall request the budgetary authorities, within 3 months from
receipt of the claim, to allocate the necessary budgetary funds; this
request will specify the relevant judgment(s);
· Treasury offices have once again been
empowered to freeze debtors’ accounts (i.e. to suspend all expense
operations)9
until the sums awarded by judgments have been paid; It has also been
specified that the enforcement is guaranteed by all the debtor’s funds
deposited in the accounts held with the Treasury (including all incomes from
non-budget sources);
e) The subsidiary responsibility of the state
and of civil servants in case of non-enforcement
· The Law provides for the state’s
subsidiary responsibility for non-enforcement by different authorities
within a three-month time-limit, provided that such responsibility is
determined by a judge in a separate judgment;
· Civil servants’ responsibility for
non-enforcement may also be engaged through court proceedings.
III Clarifications sought and proposals to be
considered
A. Issues to be clarified in relation to the
new enforcement procedure
While the new procedure may have improved the
situation concerning the enforcement of domestic judicial decisions to a certain
extent, a number of points remain to be clarified.
The following questions have arisen in
particular:
· How are disputes settled between state
subdivisions and the Federal authorities as regards the correctness of
budgetary allocations that have been foreseen to meet expense needs
(including those arising from judicial decisions)? Is there any judicial or
other independent review?
· Does the new Law abolish the previous
procedure in which the sums ordered by judicial decisions had to be first
included in the following year’s budget and paid only after the adoption of
this budget, thus causing systematic delays in execution?
· What mechanism is available if the
Treasury’s fails to fulfil its duties (including the freezing of accounts)
and time-limits under the new Law in the same way as had happened under the
previous rules (cf. non-compliance with Regulation No.143 of 22/02/2001
challenged by the Court in Shilyayev against Russia, judgment of
6/10/2005, final on 6/01/2006)?
· More generally, how is the judicial review
required by the Constitutional Court (see § 3.3 of its decision of 14 July
2005 above) over the enforcement proceedings exercised (e.g. relating to the
Treasury’s failure to respect its obligations or to challenge the lawfulness
of acts of civil servants)?
· What are the mechanisms available to the
Treasury to freeze the expense operations on debtors’ account in case of
failure to execute a judgment? Have the necessary regulations or appropriate
instructions already been issued, as foreseen by the Law of 2005 (Articles
242-3 §3, 242-4 §3 and 242-5 §3)? How does this mechanism work in practice?
· How and at what stage may the proclaimed
state “subsidiary responsibility” be materialised in case of non-enforcement
by a specific authority? What remedies are available to individual creditors
to that effect?
· How may the proclaimed responsibility of
civil servants in case of non-enforcement be implemented? What is the role
of the competent public authorities in this respect?
· Is there any statutory default interest
applicable to state debts to ensure that delay in execution is automatically
compensated without further recourse to court proceedings?
· How may the conflict of jurisdiction be
resolved between the Treasury office and the bailiffs if the debtor
institution holds accounts with both the Treasury and a private bank?
The authorities’ detailed answers to the
above questions would be most helpful to
allow a thorough assessment by the Committee of the present situation and of the
need for further measures to prevent new violations and the incessant flow of
new complaints before the Court.
Of particular importance in this respect is the
detailed information about the implementation of the new procedures in
practice, demonstrating changes in the deficient pattern revealed by the
Court’s judgments. This assessment of the current practice will be all the more
necessary and important in that the Law of 2005 merely upheld some of the
previous procedures that have not proved effective in practice. For example,
the existence of the statutory time-limits in enforcement proceedings and the
power to suspend operations of debtors’ accounts have not prevented
non-enforcement of judicial decisions in the past, as has been amply
demonstrated by a number of judgments of the Court (e.g. Bazhenov against
Russia, judgment of 20/10/2005, final on 20/01/2006; Shilyayev against.
Russia, judgment of 6/10/2005, final on 6/01/2006; Shvedov against Russia,
judgment of 20/10/2005, final on 20/01/2006).
B. Key avenues for improvement of the
existing enforcement procedure
It would appear to be common ground that the
Law of 2005 has not have solved all the complex issues at the basis of the
violations found by the Court. The
Russian authorities themselves are thus actively pursuing their reflection on
possible solutions, in particular through a bilateral project with the CEPEJ, on
ways and means of improving the existing enforcement procedure.
In the context of the Committee’s supervision of
the implementation of the Court’s judgments at issue, the Russian authorities
were also invited to take into account the experience of other countries
confronted with similar problems in the past (see in particular Heirs of
J. Dierckx against Belgium and Hornsby against Greece, which were
closed by final Resolutions DH(95)105 and DH(2004)81 respectively) and the
Committee’s Recommendation Rec(2003)17 setting out guiding principles concerning
the enforcement of judgments. The importance of the CEPEJ’s conclusions has also
been highlighted.
In order to provide additional assistance to the
authorities’ in their reflection and to facilitate the Committee’s supervision
of the execution of the judgments concerned, the Secretariat has identified
below, on the basis of existing experience, some key avenues of interest with a
view to ensuring Russia’s compliance with the Convention’s requirements. The
list is not exhaustive and may be subject to changes depending on the
Committee’s assessment of the effectiveness of various measures adopted to
comply with the judgments.
1. Improvement of budgetary procedures
within the Russian Federation
a) The problem as acknowledged by the
authorities
The Russian authorities have repeatedly
acknowledged, before both the Committee of Ministers and the CEPEJ that the
non-enforcement of domestic decisions is not due to the lack of funds but
results from complicated budgetary procedures within the Russian Federation.
This general problem may obviously require more
comprehensive solutions going far beyond the enforcement of judicial decisions.
The following two specific issues would however appear of direct relevance to
the problem of execution of court decisions:
i) the lack of appropriate statutory
basis for the budget planning, which would ensure the funds allocated
correspond to the state’s payment obligations;
It seems, for example, that the “state minimal
social standards” criterion, which was effectively used for budget planning, had
never been defined by law. As a result, effective budget planning was rendered
impossible at all levels. This problem appears to have been recently remedied
through the introduction of an “expenditure obligation” (расходное
обязательство) as a new basis for budget planning. More clarification in
this respect would be useful.
ii) Inadequate procedures for
distribution of the budgetary funds to state organs and entities responsible
for payment
In other words, the federal funds allocated are
often not sent in time to the state authority responsible for payment or the
latter spends the federal funds received in an improper manner.
b) Possible solutions to be envisaged
i) Setting up a special federal fund
and/or specific reserve budget lines to ensure that sums ordered by judicial
decisions are rapidly made available to the debtor
Given the inadequacies of the current budgetary
procedures, there are inevitable shortfalls in the budgetary allocations to the
state entities responsible for payment ordered by domestic courts. Accordingly,
the CEPEJ experts have already proposed setting up special budget lines within
the responsible departments to allow them rapidly to execute judicial decisions
delivered against them. The condition of recourse to such funds should be the
existence of a valid judgment ordering the payment of sums.
Taking account of the changes introduced by the
Law of 2005, the authorities may also consider setting up either a special
federal fund or decentralised reserve lines within the Federal Treasury which
would allow rapid payments ordered by the courts with a subsequent possibility
to claim from the debtor the relevant sums together with default interest. The
Federal authorities would thus be able forcibly to recover the sums while
avoiding at the same time any delay in the execution of court decisions in the
individuals’ favour.
ii) Ascertaining the responsibility
for the lack of funds – judicial review of disputes between the federal and
local authorities
The establishment of the responsibilities of the
state organs and officials by an independent judicial body would be most helpful
to stop endless disputes between the federal and local authorities as to who is
responsible for non-payment. While this role is played in some states by courts
of audit, the existing Russian courts at a sufficiently high level could be
given responsibility for deciding disputes of this kind. Establishing
responsibility may in the longer run go further than merely establishing the
identity of the debtor and could include penalties.
2. Establishment of a subsidiary mechanism
of compulsory enforcement including seizure of state assets
The present system, as upheld by the Law of
2005, seems virtually to exclude compulsory enforcement procedure against the
public authorities in case of non-enforcement of court decisions through the
existing procedure. While the Treasury’s power to freeze debtors’ accounts may
be an important enforcement tool, its effectiveness remains to be demonstrated.
In any event it does not allow the attachment of sums for the individual
claimant’s direct benefit.
Yet the existence of a present enforcement
mechanism as a principal one should not exclude a subsidiary mechanism of
compulsory execution against the state and its entities. Indeed, the practice of
certain states has convincingly shown that compulsory execution with the ensuing
possibility of seizing state assets constitutes a powerful tool to render the
state’s subsidiary responsibility for non-enforcement of judicial decisions
effective (see Dierckx against Belgium, Resolution DH(95)105 and
Hornsby against Greece, Resolution DH(2004)81). This furthermore constitutes
an additional incentive for state officials to do everything in their power to
comply with court decisions.
The Russian authorities are therefore invited to
consider the introduction of a similar mechanism in Russian Law.
In addition, the Law of 2005 only guarantees the
execution of judicial decisions by funds held with either the Treasury or
private banks. The extension of this guarantee to the other state assets (except
those manifestly necessary for performing the state’s duties) may explicitly be
envisaged. Indeed, Articles 126 and 214 of the Civil Code even seem to imply
such a possibility. They provide that the Russian Federation guarantees its
undertakings – in particular those resulting from final judicial decisions –
with all assets which have not been granted to state companies or institutions.
A special legislative basis to ensure compulsory
execution at the expense of state assets needs therefore to be set up, as
appropriate. The authorities may wish to take account in this respect the
experience of other countries which established a list of state assets which may
be seized (see, inter alia, the abovementioned Resolution DH(95)105 in
Dierckx against Belgium).
3. Ensuring effective state liability for
non-enforcement of judgments through judicial remedies
The need for efficient judicial review of
enforcement proceedings under the Law of 2005 has already been raised above
(e.g. in respect of refusals to freeze accounts or to postpone execution). As
indicated it remains, however, unclear how this review is organised.
More generally, the authorities are invited to
pursue consideration in consultation with the judicial community of the ways and
means of involving the courts in the enforcement process.
Given the increasing number of similar cases
pending before the Court, the Russian authorities may wish to consider a
possibility of setting up at a national level a simplified judicial remedy
allowing claimants to obtain prompt compensation (at least for non-pecuniary
damages) proportionate to the delay in execution as compared to the statutory
time-limits (over and above the statutory default interest dealt with below) or
the acceleration of such proceedings, as had been done in other countries (e.g.
Interim Resolutions
ResDH(2005)114 and
ResDH(2004)72 concerning certain judgments against Italy and Resolution
ResDH(2005)60 concerning the Horvat against Croatia judgment).
As regards the possibility of granting
additional compensation covering all damages caused by the delay,
it is noted that the present Russian Civil Code provides the civil liability of
the state for “acts or omissions of state organs, municipalities or their
agents” (Article 1069). It is also noted that the new Law 2005 upheld the
state’s subsidiary responsibility for non-enforcement of judgments by different
authorities within a three-month time-limit. However, it remains unclear how
this responsibility may be implemented, given the difficulties encountered by
the courts in applying these provisions.
The Russian authorities may therefore also wish
to consider further measures, legislative or other, to ensure that the state’s
subsidiary responsibility becomes effective and may contribute more effectively
to deter against – and compensate for – the non-execution of judicial decisions
(e.g. Hornsby against Greece, Resolution DH(2004)81, Appendix, point 3).
That said, the Committee's consistent position
of principle concerning domestic remedies should be recalled: while setting up
such remedies is important and contributes to states’ compliance with their
obligations under the Convention, “it does not dispense states from their
general obligation to solve the structural problems underlying the violation”
(see the abovementioned Interim Resolution
ResDH(2005)114).
4. Introducing adequate default interest
in case of non-enforcement
It would appear that imposing default
interest for the state’s failure to enforce court decisions will be instrumental
in both avoiding multiple lawsuits in the same case and creating an additional
incentive for state authorities to comply with court decisions.
Article 395 of the Civil Code providing for
default interest seems virtually never applied by courts to state debts. The
imposition of default interest on the state may well be operated through a more
generous interpretation of Article 395 of the Civil Code which may at the outset
be prompted by possible interpretation guidelines of the Plenum of the Supreme
Court.
Subsequently, along with the improvement of the
situation, special legislation might provide for a higher interest rate
penalising non-execution of judicial decisions, or at least unjustified
non-execution established by a judicial decision.
For greater effectiveness, future legislation
might also provide that, if execution of a judicial decision is delayed or
denied, the debtor or the Ministry of Finance should pay the claimant a standard
sum for each day of delay as compensation. This sum may be calculated on the
basis of a certain percentage of the sum that remains unpaid under the court
decision.
5. Ensuring effective liability of civil
servants for non-enforcement
a) Present background
The Law of 2005 provides that non-enforcement of
court decisions gives rise to responsibility under federal law. The large range
of provisions governing the responsibility for non-compliance with judicial
decisions is recalled below:
· The Code on Administrative Offences
provides liability for not complying with decisions taken by courts or
bailiffs (Art. 17.3) and for interfering with legitimate acts of bailiffs
(Art. 17.8) or for late compliance with an order from the supervising organ
(Art. 19.5);
· The Law on enforcement proceedings of 1997
authorises bailiffs to hold state agents directly liable (Art. 85 and 87);
· The Criminal Code, in particular Article
315 (“Non-enforcement of a conviction, judgment or a court decision”),
constitutes a powerful tool to ensure the enforcement of judicial decisions;
· The Budget Code includes an entire section
dedicated to the responsibility of the civil servants for breaches of the
budgetary law.
b) Possible measures to be taken
While these provisions appear to constitute a
solid basis for the state officials’ responsibility for non-enforcement of
judicial decisions, their effectiveness remains to be demonstrated in practice.
The authorities are therefore invited to provide detailed statistics and
examples of domestic judgments showing how the said responsibility is
implemented in practice.
Prior to the entry into force of the new Law,
bailiffs were the main actors in the implementation of the above-mentioned
sanctions as their reports served as grounds for further prosecution of persons
responsible for the lack of or delay in enforcement.
Given the radical restriction of bailiffs’
competence by the Law of 2005, the authorities are invited to clarify the
respective roles of the Bailiff’s Department, the Federal Treasury and the
Prosecutor’s Office in effective implementation of state officials’
responsibility in this area.
iii) Closer supervision of compliance
and “zero tolerance” towards deliberate non-compliance with court decisions
As one of the urgent measures, the competent
authorities may be encouraged, through the appropriate means, closely to
supervise and to take the appropriate proceedings against deliberate violations
of state officials’ duty to execute court decisions.
6. Possible reconsideration of the role of
bailiffs and of increasing their efficiency
The procedure governing the activities of the
Bailiffs’ department and insufficient means allocated to it also appear to be
problems at the basis of the non-execution or inefficient execution of domestic
judgments. As bailiffs conserve a certain role, albeit a very limited one, in
the enforcement of court decisions against the state, their inefficiency remains
an issue of current interest. The reform of the relevant legislation as well as
other measures to make the institution of bailiffs more efficient would appear
appropriate.
IV – The Russian authorities’ comments
The Russian authorities welcomed the present
Memorandum inasmuch as it gives an accurate picture of the existing situation
and may positively contribute to the adoption of general measures required by
the European Court’s judgments.
They further highlighted the complexity of the
problem which requires comprehensive and thorough reforms at all levels over a
longer period. Therefore, the authorities suggested that certain areas be
identified where the non-enforcement problems should be solved as a matter of
priority taking into account specific circumstances involved, such as
· the kind of the non-complying entity (Federal
Treasury, State’s subdivisions, municipalities) and/or
· the kind of obligation imposed by domestic judgments (welfare payments,
pension increases, disability allowance increases, etc).
This “area-by-area”approach did not seem,
however, to preclude the parallel consideration and adoption of more
comprehensive reforms aiming at improving the existing enforcement procedures in
general along the avenues proposed in the present Memorandum.
Note
1 This document has
been classified restricted at the date of issue. It was declassified at the
966th DH meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies (6-7 June 2006).
Note
2
E.g. Timofeyev (58263/00), judgment of
23/10/2003, Wasserman (15021/02), judgment of 18/11/2004
Note
3
E.g. Reynbakh, judgment of 29/09/2005,
23405/03
Note
4
E.g. Plotnikovy (43883/02), Makarova &
others (7023/03), Poznakhirina (25964/02), judgments of 24/02/2005; OOO
Rusatommet (61651/00), judgment of 14/06/2005,; Yavorivskaya (34687/02),
judgment of 21/07/2005; Gerasimova (24669/02), judgment of 13/10/2005
Note
5
E.g. Gorokhov and Rusyayev (38305/02),
judgment of 17/03/2005; Bazhenov (37930/02), judgment of 20/10/2005;
Note
6
E.g. Shilyayev (9647/02), judgment of
6/10/2005
Note
7
E.g. Timofeyev (58263/00), judgment of
23/10/2003, Wasserman (15021/02), judgment of 18/11/2004
Note
8
The Decree of 22 February 2001 N 143
concerning the Rules of enforcement of the judgments on the basis of writs of
execution delivered by courts against the entities which receive their funds
from the federal budget followed by the Decree N°666 of 22/09/2002.
Note
9
Previously foreseen by the Decree of 22
February 2001 N 143 and not explicitly mentioned by the Decree N°666
